[No. 79869-9. En Banc.]
Argued November 1, 2007. Decided December 13, 2007.
In the Matter of the Recall Charges Against SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 DIRECTORS BRITA BUTLER-WALL ET AL.
[1] Appeal Notice of Appeal Timeliness Motion for Reconsideration Effect. The filing of a timely motion for reconsideration postpones the running of any applicable time limit for filing a notice of appeal until the motion is resolved by an order.
[2] Appeal Decisions Reviewable Moot Questions Effective Relief. A case on appeal is moot if the appellate court can no longer provide effective relief.
[3] Elections Recall Petition Sufficiency Review Moot Case Public Official Soon Leaving Position. Appellate review of the sufficiency of a charge in a recall petition is moot as to an official sought to be recalled if that official will be leaving public office in such a short period of time that the petitioner lacks sufficient time to gather the signatures necessary to justify the holding of a recall election.
[4] Parties Intervention Standing Test. Under CR 24, a party may be permitted to intervene in an action if the party claims an interest in the action that is not adequately protected by the existing parties to the action or when the party's claim or defense has a question of fact or law in common with the main action.
[5] Parties Intervention Permissive Intervention Review Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to allow a party to intervene in an action under CR 24 is discretionary. Its decision will not be disturbed by a reviewing court absent an abuse of discretion.
[6] Parties Intervention Permissive Intervention Grounds. A court may allow a party to intervene in an action under CR 24 on the grounds that the party has a separate and distinct interest in the proceedings and that the party's participation is likely to be of assistance to the court in focusing on the issues in dispute.
[7] Open Government Courts Public Access Constitutional Right State Constitution. Const. art. I, § 10, which provides that "[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly," gives the public and the press a right to attend court proceedings.
[8] Elections Recall Petition Sufficiency Hearing Representation by Counsel Statutory Provisions Preclusion of Third Party Attendance Validity. RCW 29A.56.140 merely provides that the parties to a recall petition may have legal counsel represent them at the hearing on the sufficiency of the charges in the recall petition; the statute does not purport to preclude persons, other than the petitioner and the official sought to be recalled, from attending the hearing.
[9] Elections Recall Petition Legal and Factual Sufficiency Necessity In General. A recall petition must be based on legally and factually sufficient charges of malfeasance, misfeasance, or a violation of the oath of office.
[10] Elections Recall Petition Court Review Supreme Court Standard of Review. The Supreme Court reviews the sufficiency of the charges in a recall petition de novo.
[11] Elections Recall Petition Court Review Purpose. In the recall process, the courts serve as gatekeepers to ensure that public officials are not subject to frivolous or unfounded charges.
[12] Elections Recall Petition Sufficiency Factual Sufficiency Specificity. A charge in a recall petition is not factually sufficient unless the petitioner alleges specific facts that, as a whole, identify to the electors and to the official sought to be recalled the acts or failures to act that, without justification, would constitute a prima facie showing of misfeasance.
[13] Elections Recall Petition Sufficiency Legal Sufficiency Test. A charge in a recall petition is not legally sufficient unless it defines substantial conduct clearly amounting to misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of the oath of office. The legal sufficiency requirement is not satisfied by conduct that is insubstantial or where there is a legally cognizable justification for the challenged official's conduct, even, under some circumstances, when the official actually violated the law.
[14] Elections Recall Petition Factual Sufficiency Purposes. The purposes of the factual sufficiency requirement for a recall petition are to ensure that the recall charges are supported by identifiable facts and to protect elected officials from being subjected to the financial and personal burden of a recall election grounded on false or frivolous charges.
[15] Elections Recall Petition Factual Sufficiency Petitioner's Knowledge Degree. A recall petitioner need not have firsthand knowledge of the facts underlying the charges in the petition but must demonstrate to the court that he or she knows of identifiable facts that support the charges.
[16] Elections Recall Petition Legal Sufficiency Discretionary Act. A public official may not be recalled for appropriately exercising discretionary authority granted by law.
[17] Schools School Board Closing Schools Nature of Act. A school board's decision to close a district school is a discretionary act.
[18] Schools School Board Closing Schools Superintendent's Final Recommendation Hearing Necessity. A school district is not required to hold a hearing on the district superintendent's final recommendation for school closures prior to the superintendent's issuance of the final recommendation.
[19] Elections Recall Petition Sufficiency Official Not Holding Office at Relevant Time. A charge in a recall petition is legally and factually insufficient as to a public official who did not hold office at the time the conduct underlying the charge was alleged to have occurred.
[20] Vendor and Purchaser Option To Purchase Exercise of Option Effect. A buyer's exercise of an option to purchase real property creates a binding obligation on both the buyer and the seller. The closing of the sale thereafter is simply the fulfillment of the obligations created by the option contract.
[21] Government Public Property Purchase and Sale Option To Purchase Exercise Effect. When a lawful agreement to lease property owned by a government agency contains an option to purchase the property, the lessee's timely exercise of the option is binding and enforceable on the agency despite whatever action the governing board of the agency might take.
J.M. JOHNSON and SANDERS, JJ., concur by separate opinion.Nature of Action: Action to determine the sufficiency of the charges in a petition to recall five school district directors. After the action was filed, the school district sought to intervene in the action.
Superior Court: After granting the school district's motion to intervene, the Superior Court for King County, No. 07-2-02946-0, William L. Downing, J., on February 20, 2007, entered a judgment ruling that the charges in the petition were legally and factually insufficient.
Supreme Court: Holding that the petitioner's appeal was timely, that the petitioner's appeal was moot as to three school district directors who will be leaving office in January 2008, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the school district to intervene in the action, and that the disputed charges are factually and legally insufficient, the court affirms the judgment.
Dwight T. Vanwinkle-, for appellant.
Lawrence B. Ransom- and Andrew J. Liese- (of Karr Tuttle Campbell) and Gary L. Ikeda- (of Seattle Public Schools), for respondent.
En Banc
Ά1 ALEXANDER, C.J. In January 2007, Eric Dawson filed a petition with the King County Elections Division. In it, he sought the recall of Seattle School District Directors Brita Butler-Wall, Cheryl Chow, Michael DeBell, Darlene Flynn, and Irene Stewart. The King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office then petitioned the King County Superior Court to determine the sufficiency of the recall petition. This prompted the Seattle School District to seek intervention. Its motion to intervene was granted.
Ά2 On February 2, 2007, King County Superior Court Judge William Downing conducted a hearing on the sufficiency of the petition. At the conclusion of that hearing, Judge Downing orally ruled that the charges Ά3 Dawson then moved for reconsideration. In support of his motion, he included new evidentiary materials that had not been offered at the earlier hearing. On February 7, 2007, Judge Downing entered his written findings of fact and conclusions of law. Approximately two weeks later, Judge Downing entered an order striking the new evidentiary materials and denying the motion for reconsideration. Pursuant to RCW 29A.56.270, Dawson filed a notice of appeal in this court. He presents argument here on only three of the charges, to wit: two, three, and six. I Ά4 Before reaching the issues of the legal and factual sufficiency of the charges, we must address the school district's assertion that Dawson's appeal is not timely and is moot as to three of the school district directors. We also address Dawson's assertion that the school district should not have been permitted to intervene. A B C (a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties. (b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application, anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) When a statute confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) When an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered by a federal or state governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirements, or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or agency upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. Pursuant to this rule, a party may be permitted to intervene in an action when that party claims an interest in the action that is not adequately protected by the existing parties to the action or when the new party's claim or defense has a question of fact or law in common with the main action. A trial court's decision to allow intervention under this rule is discretionary, and the question on review is whether that court has abused its discretion. Ford v. Logan, 79 Wn.2d 147, 150, 483 P.2d 1247 (1971). II Ά12 "A 'legally cognizable justification for an official's conduct renders a recall charge insufficient,' even, under some circumstances, when the official actually violated the law." Carkeek, 156 Wn.2d at 474 (quoting In re Recall of Ackerson, 143 Wn.2d 366, 371, 20 P.3d 930 (2001)). The seminal case is Greco, 105 Wn.2d 669, 717 P.2d 1368. [I]n Greco, this court dismissed a recall attempt against the Pierce County auditor for failure to redraw the voter precincts within the 32 days required by the Pierce County Council's ordinance. Since it was undisputed that the Pierce County Council ordered the auditor to do an impossible task, we found there was a "legally cognizable justification" (in that case, an impossibility) for his failure to comply with the law. Carkeek, 156 Wn.2d at 474-75 (citation omitted); see Greco, 105 Wn.2d 669. Ά15 In charge number two, Dawson contends that "the directors took no action to prevent closure of Martin Luther King Elementary School prior to a vote of the school board closing the school." Br. of Appellant at 5. The record shows that due to low student enrollment at both Martin Luther King Elementary School and T.T. Minor Elementary School, the school district administration decided to merge the programs and house both schools at T.T. Minor for the 2006-2007 school year. This was not a school closure because Martin Luther King Elementary School was not "officially" closed as it was possible to reassign the programs to Martin Luther King Elementary School for the upcoming school year. Eventually, though, the directors did vote to close Martin Luther King Elementary School. Dawson's claim that the directors took no action to prevent the closure of Martin Luther King Elementary School prior to a board vote on the issue has no merit, the school not being closed until a proper vote was conducted. Ά19 We conclude that the charges leveled in the recall petition are moot as to Directors Butler-Wall, Stewart, and Flynn and that the trial judge properly determined the charges to be legally and factually insufficient. We, therefore, affirm the trial judge's decision. C. JOHNSON, MADSEN, BRIDGE, CHAMBERS OWENS, and FAIRHURST, JJ., concur. Ά20 J.M. JOHNSON, J. (concurring) Since recall of public officials is a Washington constitutional right, the use of public funding to oppose exercise of that right is normally unlawful. There are statutes forbidding governments such as the Seattle School District (District) from spending any public money or staff time opposing a recall. By allowing the District to intervene and oppose this recall, the trial judge allowed the District to accomplish the same endlikely with its limited taxpayer funds. Ά21 Washington voters through Initiative 134 (I-134) have decided to prohibit government from spending public money on politics, whether the money is in the form of cash or public-employee time. RCW 42.17.128 forbids use of public funds to finance political campaigns, and RCW 42.17.130 prohibits the use "directly or indirectly" of public facilities or employee time to oppose a ballot measure, specifically including recall. RCW 42.17.020(4). Ά22 But attracting talent to local government is important enough that it is also policy to avoid unnecessarily subjecting members to some costs. Thus, RCW 4.96.041(3) sometimes allows the target of such recall to request representation in a determination of the recall petition's sufficiency and formulation of a fair title. In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 129 Wn.2d 399, 402, 918 P.2d 493 (1996). To make sure such request is not just a veiled use of public funds to oppose the recall, the law requires both the local legislative body and the government attorney approve participation in the litigation. RCW 4.96.041(3). As noted below, a public official cannot approve such approval to benefit himself. Ά23 Here, the District did not follow this procedure before it used (and continues to use) public money to intervene and oppose recall. The statute requires first getting a vote of a quorum of nonconflicted members of the board and then the District attorney approves. Obviously, any affected member, here a majority of the board, would be prohibited by conflict of interest law from authorizing a contract to his or her benefit (see RCW 42.23.030). The failure to get the required approval means any expenditure violates other law, especially provisions of I-134, now chapter 42.17 RCW, cited above. The District claims here it is not technically representing the members or that the interests diverge. The record here does not establish any factual determination that the interests actually diverge. See Order Granting Seattle School District's Mot. to Intervene. The trial judge had no discretion to allow the District to intervene. Ά24 The District claims that Eric Dawson assigned error to the intervention but did not argue it in his first appeal brief. RAP 10.3(a)(4); See Ang v. Martin, 154 Wn.2d 477, 487, 114 P.3d 637 (2005). We have discretion to decide an issue a party fails to argue in its initial brief, especially where, as here, the party raised it below and addresses it in a reply brief. State v. Olson, 126 Wn.2d 315, 323, 893 P.2d 629 (1995). Ά25 The District also rejoins that the case is moot because the election is over. This argument ignores the established exception to mootness for cases that have the capability of repetition but evading review. De Funis v. Odegaard, 84 Wn.2d 617, 628, 529 P.2d 438 (1974). Complaints over elections often fit neatly into this exception because by the time appeal is heard, the election is over. Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816, 89 S. Ct. 1493, 23 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1969). Ά26 So the trial judge abused his discretion by allowing the District intervention. This error is not determinative in the litigation at hand. Citizens may recall their elected officials only for misfeasance, malfeasance, or violating the oath of office. WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 33-34; RCW 29A.56.110. Closing and selling Martin Luther King Elementary School did not constitute this level of improper conduct. Ά27 We ought not turn a blind eye to a government's misconduct or misuse of limited taxpayer resources. Recall in Washington is not just a statutory right, but a constitutional right. WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 33-34. When a government illegally spends tax money to oppose exercise of a constitutional right, there is an injustice of constitutional dimension. The courts must diligently guard against such violation. With that admonishment, I concur. SANDERS, J., concurs with J.M. JOHNSON, J.