Grant v. Evans, 163 Wash. 484, 1 P.2d 852 (1931).

 484    GRANT v. EVANS.
                Statement of Case.                163 Wash.

      [No. 23280. En Banc. July 20, 1931.]
GEORGE A. GRANT, Individually and as County Auditor
      of King County, Appellant, v. DON H. EVANS
                et al., Respondents. 1

[1] COUNTIES (84) - PUBLIC DEBT - REQUISITES AND VALIDITY OF
BONDS - LIMITATION TO STRICTLY COUNTY PURPOSES. It is a
"strictly county purpose," within the limitation of Const. Art.
VIII, SS 6, for which the county may issue bonds, for the county
to join with the city and state in the construction of a bridge.

[2] STATUTES (9) - VALIDITY - EFFECT OF PARTIAL INVALIDITY.
The unconstitutionality of Rem. Comp. Stat., SS 6516, in
that the title to the amendatory act extending the
original act to include the "state" was defective in making
no reference to the state, affects the state only, and can
not be taken advantage of by the county.

[3] COUNTIES (84) - PUBLIC DEBT - REQUISITES AND VALIDITY
OF BONDS - LIMITATION USE OR FUNDS. The provision in
Chap. 25 of the Laws of 1913, Rem. Comp. Stat, SSSS 5592
et seq., to the effect that no proposition for the issuance
of county bonds for roads shall be submitted where more
than forty per cent of the proceeds shall be expended
within any city or town, refers to bonds for a number of
different roads submitted as one proposition and has no
application to proceedings under Chap. 96, of the Laws of
1909, Rem. Comp. Stat., SS 6516, empowering any county and
city of certain classes to join in the construction of any
bridge within or partly within the city; especially in view
of Rem. Comp. Stat., SS 5598, providing that the act of 1913
shall not repeal or affect any other act relating to bonds
for road or other purposes, but shall be construed as
additional thereto.

Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for
King county, Macfarlane, J., entered June 8, 1931,
dismissing an action for injunctive relief, upon sustaining
a demurrer to the complaint. Affirmed.


1 Reported in 1 P.2d 852.

                    GRANT v. EVANS.                          485
 July 1931          Opinion Per HOLCOMB, J.

Shorts & Denney and Clinton H. Hartson, for appellant.
Robert M. Burgunder, Arthur M. Hare, and David
J. Williams, for respondents.

John H. Dunbar, E. P. Donnelly, A. C. Van Soelen,
and J. Ambler Newton, amici curiae.

HOLCOMB

HOLCOMB, J. - This action was brought as a test case,
by appellant, to enjoin the issuance and sale by
respondents of $500,000 general bonds of King county for the
purpose of paying part of the cost of constructing the
so-called "Aurora avenue bridge" in Seattle to carry
the traffic of the Pacific highway. The construction of
the bridge was begun under a plan whereby the entire
cost would be borne by the state, King county, and
Seattle, in agreed proportions.

A resolution was duly adopted by the board of
county commissioners of King county under which
there was submitted to the voters of the county, at the
general election held on November 4, 1930, the question
of the issuance by the county of $1,000,000 in bonds for
paying a part of the cost of the bridge. The proposition,
so submitted, received the statutory favorable
vote, and thereafter, pursuant to another resolution
adopted by the board, bids for $500,000 of the bonds
were called for. Bids were accordingly presented, and,
by another resolution passed by the board, a joint bid
of two bond purchasers, being the best bid therefor,
was accepted by the board, and the bonds sold to those
bidders. By other resolutions, the board had fixed the
form, date, and other details of the bonds, and fixed
the definite maturities of the same.

Injunction was sought solely on the ground that the
county had no statutory authority, even with the consent
of the voters, to issue the bonds. No question of

 486    GRANT v. EVANS.
                Opinion Per HOLCOMB, J.           163 Wash.

the constitutional or statutory debt limit is here involved.

The trial court sustained the general demurrer of
respondents to the complaint; appellant elected to
stand on his complaint, whereupon the court entered
judgment of dismissal.

Three propositions are presented by appellant: (1)
The bond issue is not for a strictly county purpose.
(2) Rem. Comp. Stat., SS 6516 (Laws of 1901, Chap. 70,
p. 120, as amended by Laws of 1909, Chap. 98, p. 377),
is unconstitutional. (3) Rem. Comp. Stat., SS 5592,
should apply to the facts in this case.

[1] The constitutional limitation invoked by appellant
is that part of the state constitution, Art. VIII, SS 6,
reading:

". . . Provided, that no part of the indebtedness
allowed in this section shall be incurred for any purpose
other than strictly county . . . purposes: . . ."

Shea v. Skagit County, 68 Wash. 233, 122 Pac. 1061,
relied upon by appellant, is not in harmony with earlier
and later cases decided by this court. Lancey v.
King County, 15 Wash. 9, 45 Pac. 645, 34 L. R. A. 817,
where the securing of the right of way for the Lake
Washington canal, for the Federal government, was
involved, held that to be a county purpose and that,

"The word 'strictly' lends little or no additional
meaning to the provision."

In State ex rel. Board of Commissioners v. Clausen,
95 Wash. 214, 163 Pac. 744, we held that it was a
strictly county purpose to authorize and compel Pierce
county to appropriate and pay for lands therein, for
Federal military purposes. In Rust v. Kitsap County,
111 Wash. 170, 189 Pac. 994, we receded from the holding
in the Shea case, as not being sound. In that case

                     GRANT v. EVANS.                    487
 July 1931          Opinion Per HOLCOMB, J.

we also said: "In so far as the work is done by the
particular municipal corporation it is strictly its
purpose."

We feel that it is definitely settled in this state that,
if the purpose is a county purpose, even though it be
performed concurrently with this, or another state, or
a city, it is, nevertheless, a strictly county purpose.
See Rands v. Clark County,
79 Wash. 152, 139 Pac.
1090.

[2] The contention that Rem. Comp. Stat., SS 6516,
is unconstitutional is based upon the argument that the
original act of 1901, supra, contained only one section
which empowered any county, or any city of the first,
second, or third class, to join in-paying for the construction
of any bridge within, or partly within, such
city. In 1909, the legislature passed Chap. 96, Laws of
1909, p. 229, now codified as SS 6516, supra, containing
only one section, which amended the 1901 act to read:

"That any county . . . and any city or town,
. . . and the State of Washington, or any two of
such bodies, be, and they are hereby authorized . . ."

It is argued that the title of the 1909 amending act,
extending the provisions of the 1901 act to towns, included
the state in the section without mention of any
such subject in the title of the act.

Whatever may be the effect as to the constitutionality
of the act respecting the state of Washington, it is
not here complaining. Whether or not the act of 1909,
with a defective title, would be unconstitutional as to
it, is not necessary here to decide. If the act is
unconstitutional, it is so only as to the state, which is
immaterial in determining this case.

[3] As to the last question raised by appellant, he
concedes that the county would have authority to issue
these bonds under the provisions of Rem. Comp. Stat.,

 488    GRANT v. EVANS.
                Opinion Per HOLCOMB, J. 163 Wash.

SSSS 5575 to 5583, were that authority not restricted by
the later act, Laws of 1913, Chap. 25, p. 63, Rem. Comp.
Stat., SSSS 5592 to 5598. The first sections above cited
were originally enacted by Laws of 1890, Chap. 2, p. 37.
In Laws of 1913, Chap. 25, p. 63, now codified
SSSS 5592 et seq., supra, there is a provision as follows:

"No proposition for bonds shall be submitted which
proposes that more than forty per cent of the proceeds
thereof shall be expended within any city or town or
within any number of cities and towns."

These sections are very lengthy and will not be set
out at length here. It is apparent, however, what that
act contemplated was to give county commissioners of
all counties power to submit to the voters, as one
proposition, a comprehensive plan contemplating the
improvement or construction of a system composed of
different highways, roads, streets, avenues, bridges,
and other public ways, part of which might be within
the corporate limits of towns and cities. For instance,
SS 1 of the act, Rem. Comp. Stat., SS 5592, contains the
following language:

"The question of the issuance of bonds for any undertaking
which relates to a number of different roads
or parts thereof, whether intended to supply the whole
expenditure or to aid therein, may be submitted to the
voters as a single proposition in all cases where such
course is consistent with the provisions of the state
constitution. If the county commissioners in submitting
any such proposition relating to different roads or
parts thereof find that such proposition has for its
object the furtherance and accomplishment of the construction
of a system of public and county highways
in such county, and constitutes and has for its object a
single purpose, such finding shall be presumed to be
correct, and upon the issuance of the bonds such presumption
shall become conclusive."

Then follows the restriction above quoted. A
subsequent section of the same act (Rem. Comp. Stat.,

                     GRANT v. EVANS.                     489
 July 1931          Opinion Per HOLCOMB, J.

SS 5596), also very lengthy, further indicates the same
intention. The last section of the act (SS 5598, supra),
prescribes that the acts shall be concurrent with other
provisions of the law as follows:

"This act shall not be construed as repealing or
affecting any other act relating to the issuance of bonds
for road or other purposes, but shall be construed as
conferring additional power and authority."

Laws of 1913, Chap. 56, p. 168, was passed later at
the same session, and approved by the governor later
than Chap. 25, supra.

Chap. 56 was codified in Rem. Comp. Stat., as
SSSS 6524 to 6539, inclusive. This act was held to be
general and comprehensive in its scope in Barr v. Cowlitz
County,
127 Wash. 14, 220 Pac. 6, and would have controlled
this matter.

This act, however, was purported to be repealed by
Laws of 1927, Chap. 250, p. 393, SS 6. In Rem. 1927 Sup.,
carrying forward those sections, the codifier says:

"The above repeal is clearly abortive, since by its
title the repealing act is confined to the subject of
'tollbridges'; and the act of 1913 has no provision or word
as to toll-bridges." Annotation to SSSS 6524-6539.

However, the invalidity of the repealing act is not
asserted by respondents here, nor Chap. 56, Laws of
1913, relied upon. It is, therefore, not a question to be
passed upon in this case.

After a careful analysis of the several statutes, we
conclude that SS 6516, supra, being a valid statute as to
counties and cities and towns, at least, is sufficient to
authorize the joinder of King county and Seattle in the
construction of the bridge in question and for the
issuance of the bonds by King county in this proceeding.
We are further of the opinion that the forty per cent
restriction contained in SS 5592, supra, was not intended
to apply in such joinder as this, when the concluding

 490    HARTMAN v. FARMERS MUTUAL INS. CO.
                Statement of Case.                163 Wash.

words of SS 5598 of the same act are considered in connection
therewith.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

TOLMAN, C. J., MITCHELL, PARKER, BEALS, MILLARD,
BEELER, and MAIN, JJ., concur.