[No. 13287. En Banc. October 9, 1916.]
PUGET MILL COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON et al., Defendants. «1»
NAVIGABLE WATERS - SHORE LANDS - STATE DEED - TITLE - OUTER
BOUNDARY - EXTENSION. An authorized state deed of second-class
tide lands vests in the grantees an absolute fee-simple title; and
where the outer boundary is undefined except as defined by law as
the line of navigability, the grantees take title to such line as
it then existed or as it might be moved further out by any act of
the state lowering the waters.
SAME - STATE DEED - RESERVATIONS - VALIDITY - CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW - OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT. Such title cannot be impaired by
any act of the state after making the deeds upon which the title
rests; hence attempted reservations to public use designated upon
the state's plats above the harbor lines established, except
extensions of existing streets running transversely to the shore
line, are void.
SAME - SHORE LANDS - STATE DEED - OUTER BOUNDARY - ESTABLISHMENT
OF HARBOR AREA. The conveyance of second-class tide lands to
private individuals before the establishment of harbor lines in
front thereof, is subject to the power of the state to thereafter
establish such harbor lines, leaving the outer boundary of the
shore land subject to the establishment of harbor lines.
SAME - SHORE LANDS - ESTABLISHMENT OF HARBOR AREA - COMMISSION -
POWERS - STATUTES. Where harbor lines in front of second-class
tide lands are platted by the commissioner of public lands,
pursuant to Rem. 1915 Code, SS 8173-2, authorizing him to select
and plat the same, and the harbor line commission joined therein
by entering its formal order establishing the harbor lines
designated on the plats, there was a lawful establishment thereof,
notwithstanding article 15 of the constitution, in connection with
Rem. 1915 Code, SS 6744, seems to contemplate the establishment of
harbor lines, within specified limits (not including second-class
tide lands) by a
«1» Reported in 160 Pac. 310.
PUGET MILL CO. v. STATE. 129
Oct. 1916 Statement of Case.
"commission"; as the duty and power prescribed does not constitute
a limitation of power upon the legislature touching harbor lines
in front of second-class tide lands.
SAME - SHORE LANDS - OUTER BOUNDARY - EXTENSIONS - STREETS -
RIGHT TO EXTEND. Where the state's grantees of shore lands became
entitled, upon the lowering of the waters by an act of the state,
to added shore lands to the line of navigability, the state and
municipal authorities representing the public become entitled, on
the same principle, to claim the added shore line which is in
front of and abutting upon the end of existing streets running
transversely and substantially at right angles to the shore line.
SAME - SHORE LINES - HARBOR AREA - SLIPS AND WHARVES - TITLE
OF STATE. Upon quieting the title of the state to designated sites
for slips and wharves shown on the plat of the harbor area, the
title should be quieted only in such slips and wharves and
portions thereof as are within the designated harbor areas, and
not above the harbor areas.
SAME - SHORE LANDS - ESTABLISHMENT OF OUTER BOUNDARY -
"PIERHEAD LINES." In platting harbor areas, the designation of a
"pierhead" line alone, upon the state plat, is not the
establishing of harbor lines or harbor areas and does not fix the
inner harbor line which when established fixes the shore land
boundary.
SAME - SHORE LANDS - ESTABLISHMENT OF OUTER BOUNDARY -
POWER OF STATE. The state has power to determine, by the
establishment of harbor lines, the line of navigability or outer
boundary of shore lands dividing harbor area front second-class
tide lands sold to private individuals.
Cross-appeals from a judgment of the superior court for
King county, Frater, J., entered July 19, 1915, upon
findings in favor of the plaintiffs, in consolidated actions to
quiet title, tried to the court. Modified on defendants'
appeal.
Oldham & Goodale, Farrell, Kane & Stratton, Walter B.
Beals, and Hughes, McMicken, Dovell & Ramsey, for
plaintiffs.
The Attorney General and R. E. Campbell, Assistant;
France & Helsell, James E. Bradford, Howard Hanson,
Alfred H. Lundin, Hugh M. Caldwell, and Robert H. Evans,
for defendants.
130 PUGET MILL CO. v. STATE.
Opinion Per PARKER, J. 93 Wash.
PARKER, J. - This controversy originated in the commencement
of four separate actions in the superior court for
King county, which, because of the common interest of the
numerous parties in the controlling questions presented, were
consolidated, tried and disposed of together in the superior
court. The plaintiffs seek a decree quieting their titles to
certain lands which they claim as second-class shore lands
bordering upon the waters of Lake Washington, as against
the claims of the defendants, the state of Washington, city
of Seattle, Port District of Seattle, and King county. The
superior court granted relief by rendering its decree
quieting title in the plaintiffs as prayed for by them, except as
to harbor areas established by the state commissioner of
public lands and the state harbor line commission and the
extensions of streets and roads over the shore land running
transversely to the shore line, all as designated upon the state's
plats made after the plaintiffs acquired their titles from the
state as here claimed by them. The defendants have appealed
from the decree in so far as it denies their claims for
public use to sites for slips and wharves and roads, streets,
boulevards and parkways running longitudinally to the shore
line, as designated upon the state's plats. The plaintiffs
have also appealed from the decree in so far as it denies their
claims to the areas within streets and roads running
transversely to the shore line as extensions of existing streets
and to the harbor areas, as designated upon the state's plats.
The plaintiffs' claims of title are rested upon deeds of the
state made to them or their predecessors in interest,
describing the land conveyed as "all shore lands of the second
class owned by the state of Washington situated in front of,
adjacent to or abutting upon those portions of the United
States government meander line lying in front of the
following described upland, to wit, . . . to bare and to hold
said premises with their appurtenances unto the said . . .,
successors and assigns forever," leaving the outer
boundaries of the lands so conveyed undefined in so far as
specific
PUGET MILL CO. v. STATE. 131
Oct. 1916 Opinion Per PARKER, J.
terms of the deeds are concerned, this being the form of
description used by the state in conveying shore lands of the
second class, and as authorized by law. These deeds were
made by the state in the year 1904. They were all made
for a money consideration in pursuance of lawful sale of the
lands to the plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest and,
as will be noticed, are absolute in form, in so far as the
nature of the titles conveyed is concerned. At the time of
their execution, the state had not platted any of the shore
lands so conveyed, nor had it established any harbor lines or
harbor areas in front thereof.
In the year 1914, after the state and national
governments had by their action rendered it certain that the Lake
Washington canal project would be consummated, resulting
in the lowering of the waters of the lake, the state
commissioner of public lands caused to be platted the shore lands
of the lake, including the lands here involved, designating
upon the plats inner and outer harbor lines with harbor
areas between in front of portions of the shore lands, and
pierhead lines only in front of other portions of the shore
lands; and also designating upon the plats above the harbor
areas and pierhead lines certain areas or tracts purporting
to be reserved and dedicated to public use as sites for slips
and wharves and also streets, roads, boulevards and
parkways running both longitudinally and transversely to the
shore line, some of which transverse roads and streets
appear as extensions of roads and streets already established
over the original shore lands to the added shore lands. This
platting was acquiesced in by the state harbor line
commission, which commission, by an order duly made of record,
adopted and established the harbor lines and harbor areas as
designated upon the plats. In the platting of these shore
lands and the establishing of the harbor lines, harbor areas
and pierhead lines, the commissioner of public lands and the
harbor line commission did so with reference to the shore line
and the line of navigability as changed by the lowering of
132 PUGET MILL CO. v. STATE.
Opinion Per PARKER, J. 93 Wash.
the waters of the lake in the consummation of the Lake
Washington canal project, so that the harbor lines and pierhead
lines are located farther out than they would have been had
there been no lowering of the waters of the lake. We shall
assume, as we proceed, that all of the reservations to public
use of tracts and areas as designated upon the plats made
by the commissioner of public lands and the harbor line
commission, here involved, are from lands which are outside of
the shore lands as they existed at the time of the execution
of the state's deeds upon which the plaintiffs' rights are
rested, before the lowering of the waters of the lake in the
prosecution of the Lake Washington canal project.
The problem here presented, so far as the nature of
plaintiffs' titles is concerned, is, in substance, the same as
that involved in the case of State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158,
135 Pac. 1035, 138 Pac. 650, in the decision of which case
we held that the outer boundaries of the granted shore lands
had been extended by the lowering of the lake to include the
added shore lands, and that the grantees acquired title
thereto as if such added shore lands had been then in existence
and included in the original grant. This was held to be the
law of the state's grantees' shore lands rights in the absence
of statute touching the question at the time of the grant,
though the state did by statute thereafter so recognize the
shore land grantees' titles, attempting, however, to reserve
to itself the right to make reservations from the added shore
lands for public use in addition to the exercise of its power
to establish harbor lines. This was done by the Laws of
1918, ch. 183, page 667, as follows:
"Sec. 1. In every case where the state of Washington
has heretofore sold to any purchaser from the state any
second class shore lands bordering upon navigable waters of
this state by description wherein the water boundary of the
land so purchased is not defined, such water boundary shall
be held and is hereby declared to be the line of ordinary
navigation in such water; and whenever such waters have
heretofore been or shall hereafter be lowered by any action done
PUGET MILL CO. v. STATE. 133
Oct. 1916 Opinion Per PARKER, J.
or authorized either by the state of Washington or the United
States such water boundary shall thereafter be held and is
hereby declared to be the line of ordinary navigation as the
same shall be found in such waters after such lowering, and
there is hereby granted and confirmed to every such
purchaser, his heirs and assigns, all such lands: Provided,
however, That this act shall not apply to such portions of such
second class shore lands which shall as hereinafter provided
be selected by the commissioner of public lands of the state
of Washington for harbor areas, slips, docks, wharves,
warehouses, streets, avenues, parkways and boulevards, alleys, or
other public purposes: . . .
"Sec. 2. Within twelve months after the taking effect of
this act it shall be the duty of the commissioner of public
lands to survey such second class shore lands and in platting
such survey to designate thereon as selected for public use
all of such shore lands as in the opinion of said commissioner
of public lands is available, convenient or necessary to be
selected for the use of the public as harbor areas and sites
for slips, docks, wharves, warehouses, streets, avenues,
parkways and boulevards, alleys and other public purposes. Upon
the filing of such plat in the office of the commissioner of
public lands, the title to all harbor area so selected shall
remain in the state, the title to all selections for streets,
avenues and alleys shall vest in any city or town within the
corporate limits of which they may be then situate, otherwise in
the county in which situate, the title to and control of any
lands so selected and designated upon such plat for parkway
and boulevard purposes shall, if the same lie outside of the
corporate limits of any city or town and if the same form a
part of the general parkway and boulevard system of a city
of the first class, be in such city, the title to all selections
for commercial waterway district purposes shall vest in the
commercial waterway district in which situate, or for which
selected, and the title to all selections for slips, docks,
wharves, warehouses and other public purposes shall vest in
the port district if they be situate in a port district,
otherwise in the county in which situate." Rem. 1915 Code,
SS SS 8173-1, 8173-2.
Counsel for the defendants contend that, since the lands
here involved were not shore lands at the time of the execution
134 PUGET MILL CO. v. STATE.
Opinion Per PARKER, J. 93 Wash.
of the state's deeds to the plaintiffs and their
predecessors in interest, but were then lands under navigable
waters of the state, such lands were held by the state not in its
proprietary capacity, but in its governmental capacity in trust
for the people of the state for the use of navigation and
commerce, and for that reason they are not subject to
disposition so as to vest absolute title thereto in private
parties.
While it is not urged that the plaintiffs have acquired no
interest in these added shore lands, it is argued that their
title thereto is subject to the power of the state to reserve
therefrom for public use all reserved areas shown upon the
plats above mentioned made by the commissioner of public
lands and the harbor line commission above the designated
harbor areas and pierhead lines, as well as subject to the
power of the state to establish harbor areas and extensions
across such added shore lands of existing roads and streets
running transversely to the shore line. It seems to us that
this contention cannot be sustained in the light of the history
of the state's policy since admission to the Union and the
decisions of this court. It is true that, by the limitations
prescribed by article 15 of our constitution. the state
authorities are prohibited from disposing of and vesting in
absolute private ownership the lands of the state lying under
navigable waters which shall be established as harbor areas;
but it is also true that the same article of our constitution
provides that the location of such harbor areas along the
shores of navigable waters shall be determined and
established by a commission appointed for that purpose, thus
rendering certain the line dividing shore lands which may
be disposed of and vested in absolute private ownership from
the lands within harbor areas which cannot be lawfully so
disposed of. Now it is no longer an open question in this
state as to the nature of the title vested in the grantees of
second-class tide and shore lands by deeds from the state
absolute in form as these deeds are, upon which are rested
the titles of the plaintiffs. The decisions of this court lead
PUGET MILL CO. v. STATE. 135
Oct. 1916 Opinion Per PARKER, J.
to no other conclusion than that the state authorities have
the power to, and when conveying lands of this nature by
deeds absolute in form do, vest in the grantees an absolute
fee simple title to such lands. Eisenbach v. Hatfield,
2 Wash. 236, 26 Pac. 539, 12 L R. A. 632; Allen v. Forrest,
8 Wash. 700, 36 Pac. 971, 24 L. R. A. 606; Palmer v.
Peterson, 56 Wash. 74, 105 Pac. 179; State v. Sturtevant, supra;
Anderson Steamboat Co. v. King County, 84 Wash. 375, 146
Pac. 855.
It has also become the settled law of the state by our
decision in State v. Sturtevant, supra, as we have already
noticed, that the grantees of these second-class shore lands, the
outer boundary of which remained undefined by the
descriptions in the state's deeds except as the law defined such
outer boundary as the line of navigability, acquired title out to
that line as it then existed or as it might be moved farther
out by any act of the state. Concluding an exhaustive
review of this question involving one of the same deeds from
the state upon which some of the plaintiffs' titles are rested,
Justice Chadwick, speaking for the court, at page 173, said:
"We conclude, therefore, on the principal issue, that the
Rainier Beach Improvement Company acquired the title to
the shore lands conveyed by the state, and that it and its
grantees are entitled to follow the line of navigability as it
may be finally fixed by or through or in consequence of the
act of its grantor, the state."
We conclude, then, that the plaintiffs acquired absolute
fee simple title to these added shore lands, as they did to
the shore lands existing at the time of the execution of the
deeds therefor by the state.
Now this being the nature of the plaintiffs' titles, it is
elementary constitutional law that such titles cannot be
impaired by any act of the state after making the deeds upon
which they rest. This brings us to the question of the outer
boundary of the shore lands to which plaintiffs have thus
acquired title, which we regard as the controlling question in
136 PUGET MILL CO. v. STATE.
Opinion Per PARKER, J. 93 Wash.
this controversy and as quite a different question from that
of the nature of the plaintiffs' titles. That is, the fact that
the titles so acquired are absolute in fee simple does not
determine the question of where, upon the ground, are the outer
boundaries of the shore lands so acquired by the plaintiffs.
When that question is determined, it will follow that all of
the reservations to public use designated upon the state's
plats above the harbor lines established by the commissioner
of public lands and the harbor line commission, except
extensions of existing streets running transversely to the shore
line, presently to be noticed, are attempted reservations and
dedications to public use of portions of the plaintiffs' shore
lands to which they have absolute fee simple title, and are
therefore void as against the rights of the plaintiffs.
Had the state established harbor lines in front of these
shore lands before they were conveyed by the state to
plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest, it is plain that
the grantees of such conveyances would have acquired title only
to the lands above the harbor lines so established. It seems
equally plain to us that the conveyance of shore lands by
the state before the establishing of harbor lines in front
thereof does not prevent the state from thereafter
establishing harbor lines in front of such shore lands, and that
the grantees of such shore lands take subject to the power of
the state to thereafter establish harbor lines in front thereof.
This is foreign to the question of whether a grantee's title
to shore lands so acquired is absolute or qualified. It has to
do only with the question of the outer boundaries of the
granted shore lands, and that boundary, being by the terms
of the grants made before the harbor lines were established,
undefined except as the law may define them, we conclude
leaves the matter of the outer boundaries of the shore land
subject to the establishment of harbor lines by the proper
state authorities. Our decision in State v. Sturtevant, supra,
leads to this conclusion. What the remedy of the owner of
the shore lands might be in case of the establishment of
PUGET MILL CO. v. STATE. 137
Oct. 1916 Opinion Per PARKER, J.
harbor areas in front of such shore lands in arbitrary and
fraudulent disregard of the line of navigability is not involved
in this controversy. We do not want to be understood as
holding that there would be no remedy in such a case.
Some contention is made in the plaintiffs' behalf that there
is no power in the commissioner of public lands or the harbor
line commission to establish the harbor lines here involved.
The argument seems to be that the commissioner of public
lands has no such power because article 15 of the
constitution contemplates the establishment of such lines by "a
commission," and that the harbor line commission has no power
to establish these harbor lines because they are not within
or in front of the corporate limits of any city or within two
miles thereof. It is true that article 15 of the constitution,
read in connection with Rem. 1915 Code, SS 6744, extending
first-class shore lands two miles beyond city corporate limits,
seems to make it the duty of the legislature to cause harbor
lines within such limits to be established by "a commission."
However, whatever may be the duty and power of the
legislature touching the establishment of harbor lines in front of
cities in the light of article 15 of our constitution, we are
of the opinion that the duty and power therein prescribed
does not constitute a limitation of power upon the
legislature touching the establishing of harbor lines in front of
second-class shore lands, that is, lands beyond the limits
mentioned in article 15 of the constitution, as these lands are.
Rem. 1915 Code, SS 6769, confers power upon the harbor line
commission "to lengthen or to extend any such [harbor] areas
now existing or which may hereafter lie existing in front of
any city or town;" and SS 2 of the act of 1919 (Id., SS 8173-2)
above quoted, authorizes the commissioner of public lands to
select and plat harbor areas in front of the second class shore
lands of Lake Washington, including the very lands here
involved. That section further provides that "the title to all
harbor area so selected shall remain in the state." It might
well be argued that the action of the commissioner of public
138 PUGET MILL CO. v. STATE.
Opinion Per PARKER, J. 93 Wash.
lands alone, in pursuance of this power, would constitute a
lawful establishing of these harbor areas. We are, however,
quite convinced that when the harbor line commission joined
with the commissioner of public lands in the making of these
plats and entered its formal order establishing the harbor lines
designated thereon, such joint action of the commissioner of
public lands and the harbor line commission constituted a
lawful establishing thereof. It seems to us quite clear that
this was within the power of the legislature to provide for,
even though the constitution has made special provision for
the establishing of harbor lines in front of cities. We
conclude, therefore, that these harbor lines and harbor areas
were lawfully established. It is true that the constitution
does not in terms prohibit the sale into absolute private
ownership of harbor areas other than such areas as are to be
established "within or in front of the corporate limits of any
city or within one mile thereof ;" but plainly a grant of
second-class state lands was never intended to convey land
beyond the line of navigability, which line we must assume in
this case was properly determined in so far as the harbor
lines here involved are concerned.
It is contended in plaintiffs' behalf that the reservations
made upon the state's plats of the extensions of existing
transverse streets over the added shore lands is as much an
invasion of their rights as the reservations upon the state's
plats of streets, boulevards and parkways running
longitudinally over the added shore lands above the harbor and
pierhead lines. As we read the decree of the superior court,
it only quiets title to the defendants state and municipal
corporations, as representatives of the public, in those
extensions of existing roads and streets running transversely
to the shore lines which have been dedicated as such by the
owners across their shore lands to the added shore lands,
limiting such extensions to the width of the dedicated roads
and streets where they abut upon the added shore lands. It
seems to us that the principle which entitles the plaintiffs,
PUGET MILL CO. v. STATE. 139
Oct. 1916 Opinion Per PARKER, J.
as owners of the shore lands, to claim the added shore lands
because they became a part of the original shore lands, also
entitles the defendants, as representing the public, to claim
the added shore land which is in front of and abutting upon
the end of the existing streets running transversely to the
shore line. In other words, the public's right to extend its
ownership over the added shore lands is at least as great as
that of the private owners of the original shore lands. Since
apparently the roads and streets which are here involved and
extended transversely across the added shore lands are
substantially at right angles to comparatively straight shore
lines, we are not here concerned with the question of
converging or diverging side lines of shore lands, as might be
involved when such lands abut upon a curved shore line.
We note that upon the state's plats, copies of which are
here in evidence, there is designated sites for slips and
wharves, some of which appear above the established harbor
areas and above the designated pierhead lines where there are
no designated harbor areas, and some of which appear to be
within the established harbor areas. We construe the
decree as meaning that the titles of the plaintiffs are quieted as
against the claims of the defendants only in those sites for
slips and wharves and portions thereof designated upon the
state's plats above the designated harbor areas and pierhead
lines, and not those designated sites for slips and wharves and
portions thereof which are within the designated harbor areas.
The decree being in general terms rather than by specific
descriptions of each tract as to which title is adjudged to be in
plaintiffs or defendants, induces us to here note our
construction of its meaning touching the title of the respective
parties in these designated sites for slips and wharves, to the
end that our decision and the decree may not be construed as
awarding to the plaintiffs any title to the harbor areas.
The decree seems by its terms to quiet title in the
plaintiffs to all sites for slips, wharves, etc., designated upon
the state's plats, unqualifiedly, except such as are designated
140 PUGET MILL CO. v. STATE.
Opinion Per PARKER, J. 93 Wash.
within harbor areas. This would seem to include such
designated sites and tracts as abut upon designated "pierhead
lines" where there are no harbor lines or harbor areas, and
be an adjudication against the state touching its power to
establish inner harbor lines which might fix the outer boundary
of the shore land inside the designated pierhead lines. It
seems to us that these, as well as other shore lands in front
of which no harbor lines are established, are held subject
to the power of the state to establish harbor lines in front
thereof, and that the decree should be modified accordingly.
The designation of a "pierhead line" alone, upon the state's
plats, is not, as we view the law, the establishing of harbor
lines or harbor areas. These words may suggest the outer
limits of piers, but we think they should in no event be
construed as fixing the inner harbor line, which when
established becomes the outer shore land boundary.
Counsel for the defendants have learnedly discussed at
great length, and reviewed many authorities, touching the
doctrine of jus publicum as applied to the state's ownership
and dominion over shore lands and lands under navigable
waters bordering thereon, with a view of demonstrating want
of power in the state, or rather its constituted authorities, to
vest in absolute private ownership these added shore lands.
As we view the problem here presented, however, it is not so
much a question of the power of the state to vest in private
ownership the lands or harbor areas here involved, but it is
a question of where, upon the ground, is the line between
shore lands which the state has the power to vest in private
ownership, and harbor areas and other lands under navigable
water which cannot be so disposed of. Our holding here is,
and we need go no farther, that the state has the power to
determine where the line dividing these two classes of lands
shall be located upon the ground, and has lawfully done so
in so far as it has established the harbor areas designated
upon the state's plat made by its commissioner of public
lands and harbor line commission.
PUGET MILL CO. v. STATE. 141
Oct. 1916 Concurring Opinion Per CHADWICK, J.
We have proceeded upon the assumption, as already stated,
that all of the attempted reservations to public use of tracts
and areas designated upon the state's plats are from lands
outside the shore lands as they existed at the time of the
execution of the state's deeds upon which the plaintiffs' rights
are rested. If we are wrong in this assumption of fact, it
is of no material consequence in this controversy, since, from
what we have said, we think it is rendered plain that the
rights of the plaintiffs in the shore lands, as those lands
existed at the time of the execution of the state's deeds, are no
less than their rights to the added shore lands, and that both
the original and added shore lands are held by the state's
grantees subject to the power of the state to establish
harbor lines, and thereby define the outer boundaries of the
shore lands.
We conclude that the decree of the superior court should
be modified in its terms only so far as to render certain
that it will not constitute an adjudication estopping the
state from exercising its power to establish harbor lines and
harbor areas in front of the plaintiffs' shore lands where no
harbor lines or harbor areas are now established, and thus
define the outer boundaries of such shore lands, and that in
all other respects the decree should be affirmed. It is so
ordered, and the superior court is directed to modify and make
certain the decree accordingly. None of the parties will
recover costs in this court.
MORRIS, C.J., HOLCOMB, ELLIS, FULLERTON, MOUNT, and
MAIN, JJ., concur.
-Concurring-
CHADWICK
-Concurrence-
CHADWICK, J. (concurring) - The use of the words
"pierhead line" on the plat prepared by the state, and in the
decree, is an unfortunate misuse of terms. The words mean
nothing under our constitution and statutes. In some of
the eastern states, we understand that "pierhead lines" are
defined, but the constitution makers in this state were careful
to avoid the confusion that may result from the drawing of
142 PUGET MILL CO. v. STATE.
Concurring Opinion Per CHADWICK, J. 93 Wash.
an arbitrary line beyond which piers and docks should not
be erected, by providing for an inner and an outer harbor
line with an intervening area subject to state ownership and
control.
It may be that the commissioner of public lands and the
harbor line commission intended the line so designated to be
the outer harbor line, subject, of course, to the approval of
the war department, for, under our law, piers or wharves
could be built in the harbor area between the inner and the
outer harbor line, and in that sense, if there be no further
limitation, the outer harbor line is a "pierhead line." But
I agree that we should not assume anything against the
future right of the state to define, in terms, that which it has
reserved - the right to fix an inner and an outer harbor line.
Treating the words "pierhead line" as without legal
meaning under our statutes, the conclusion follows as indicated
by Judge Parker.
I deem it my duty to suggest that the commissioner of
public lands should, without delay, file an amended plat,
fixing the harbor lines in Lake Washington in front of the city
of Seattle. Until this is done, there will be a confusion of
interests, with no way of determining legal rights.
I do not want to be understood as holding that the
legislature could not provide for the drawing of a "pierhead
line" between the inner harbor line and the outer harbor line,
either through the instrumentality of the harbor line
commission, the commissioner of public lands, a harbor
commissioner or port warden, or by an independent board. What
I do hold is that it cannot be done in any event until the
harbor lines are established.