State Ex Rel. Willis v. Monfort, 93 Wash. 4, 159 Pac. 889 (1916).

-Caption

 4    STATE EX REL. WILLIS v. MONFORT.
                     Opinion Per MOUNT, J.           93 Wash.

           [No. 13632. Department One. September 5, 1916.]
      THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, on the Relation of J. E. Willis.,
          Plaintiff, v. D. W. MONFORT, as Auditor of Lewis
                     County, Respondent. «1»

JUDGES - ELIGIBILITY - SUSPENSION - CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
Under the rule that the reason and intention of the lawgiver
controls the strict letter of the law when the latter would lead
to palpable contradiction and absurdity, an attorney who is
suspended from practice at the time he becomes a candidate or is
required to qualify is not eligible to the office of superior
court judge, under Const., art. 4. SS 17, which provides that no
person shall be eligible to such office "unless he shall have been
admitted to practice" in the courts of record; since the
constitution defines a personal status which must continue and the
eligibility ceases when the status ceases, and any other
construction would lead to absurdity.


Appeal from an order of the superior court for
Lewis county, D. F. Wright, J., entered August 11, 1916,
dismissing an application for a writ of mandamus to compel
the placing of relator's name upon the ballot as a
candidate for the nomination of superior judge. Affirmed.
-Counsel

J. E. Willis, in propria persona.

Forney & Ponder and C. D. Cunningham, for respondent.

MOUNT

MOUNT, J. - This is an appeal front an order of
the lower court dismissing the petition of the relator for a writ
of mandamus to compel the auditor of Lewis county to
print the name of the relator upon the ballot as a candidate
for the nomination of superior judge. It appears from the
petition, that the relator is a citizen of the United States
and of this state and a qualified voter in Lewis comity;
that he is, and was at all times stated in the application,
duly admitted to practice law in the courts of record of
this state; that, in the month of July, he flied his declaration
of candidacy and tendered to the auditor the fees provided
by law therefor, but after the filing of such declaration, the


«1» Reported in 159 Pac. 889.

                STATE EX REL. WILLIS v. MONFORT.           5
 Sept. 1916               Opinion Per MOUNT, J.

county auditor notified relator that he would not print
relator's name upon the ballot to be used at the primary
election in September. The petition also shows that, on the
14th day of July, 1916, after a trial in an action wherein
the state of Washington upon the relation of the Lewis
County Bar Association was petitioner and the relator was
the respondent, a judgment was entered in that case
suspending the relator from the practice 9f law in this state
for a period of one year from the date of that decree. On
these facts, the lower court was of the opinion that the
relator was not eligible to be a candidate for the office of
judge of the superior court, and for that reason sustained
the demurrer.

This involves the construction of SS 17 of art. 4 of the
constitution, which reads:

"Sec. 17. Eligibility of Judges. No person shall be
eligible to the office of judge of the supreme court or judge
of a superior court unless he shall have been admitted to
practice in the courts of record of this state or of the
territory of Washington."

It is insisted by the appellant that this section of the
constitution should be given a strict construction, as was
done in the case of State ex rel. Reynolds v. Howell,
70 Wash. 467, 126 Pac. 954, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1119. It is
no doubt correct to say that a constitutional provision
should be given a strict construction, especially where its
terms are clear; but the rule is that the reason and intention
of the lawgiver will control the strict letter of the law when
the latter would lead to palpable injustice, contradiction and
absurdity. 1 Kent, Commentaries, 462; Heydenfeldt v. Daney
Gold & Silver Min. Co., 93 U. S. 634.

It is argued by the appellant that, because the
constitutional provision uses the words, "No person shall be
eligible to the office of judge of a superior court unless he
shall have been admitted to practice in the courts of record
of this state," it means that every person who has heretofore

 6    STATE EX REL. WILLIS v. MONFORT.
                     Opinion Per MOUNT, J.           93 Wash.

been admitted to practice law in the courts of record of this
state is eligible to the office of judge of the superior court,
no matter what may occur thereafter. We think it would
be absurd to say that this provision of the constitution
means that, when a person has been admitted to practice in
the courts of record of this state and subsequently he has
been disbarred for cause or his admission vacated, he is still
eligible to the office of superior judge by reason of his
original status. The construction of this constitutional
provision contended for by the appellant leads to that absurdity.
When the constitution was framed and when it was adopted,
it was clearly not the intention of the people in adopting it
to authorize a person to be elected judge who was not, at
the time of his election, entitled to practice as an attorney
in the courts of record in the state. This provision of the
constitution, in our opinion, defines a personal status which
must continue, and when the status ceases to continue the
person is ineligible. We think no other reasonable
construction can be placed upon this provision.

No authorities directly in point have been called to our
attention. The case of Brown v. Woods, 2 Okl. 601, comes
nearer to the point than any other to which we have been
referred. That was a case where there was a statute
providing "that no person shall be eligible to the office of
county attorney who is not duly admitted to practice as an
attorney in some court of record in this territory." A disbarment
proceeding had been instituted against the petitioner, Woods,
in that case and he was suspended from practice. Before the
trial was had he was elected county attorney, and the court
in that case, in passing upon his eligibility to hold the office,
said:

"The evident purpose and intention of the legislative act,
with reference to eligibility of a person to the office of county
attorney, was not only that he should possess qualifications to
perform the duties of the office of county attorney, but that
there should be a judgment and determination of a court

                STATE EX REL. WILLIS v. MONFORT.               7
 Sept. 1916               Opinion Per MOUNT, J.

that he does possess the moral and mental qualifications of an
attorney; that there should be a determination of a court
that he was a person of good moral character, and learned
and skilled in the legal profession. It requires that he 'shall
have been duly admitted to practice' and then specifies the
particular duties that he is required to perform. The
statute, it is true, does not say in terms that he must not have
been disbarred from practice in the very court in which the
law requires him to perform certain professional duties, but
the terms of the act show that this was within the reason and
intention of the legislature. It was within the purpose and
spirit of the act, and that which is within the reason, purpose
and intention of the language used is as much within the act
as though it were a part of the language itself."

That reasoning is applicable to this case. We think it is
clear that the constitution meant to say that no person is
eligible to the office of judge of the superior court unless he
shall have been admitted to practice in the courts of record
in this state, which means that he not only shall have been
but that he is, at the time he becomes a candidate or is
required to qualify as such judge, entitled to practice in the
courts of this state. The fact that the petitioner is
suspended rather than disbarred for all time is of no special
importance, because, under his suspension, he is disbarred
during that time from practice in the courts and from being
eligible to any office or employment by reason of the fact
that he had at one time been admitted to practice. When
he was suspended from exercising the rights of an attorney
at law, that suspension was as effective during the time
thereof as a removal.

In view of the conceded fact that the relator is suspended,
it follows that he is not eligible to hold office at the time he
is required to qualify, and that he is not eligible to become a
candidate upon the ticket. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Howell,
supra. The respondent was therefore justified in refusing
to print his name upon the ballot.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

MORRIS, C.J., MAIN, ELLIS, and FULLERTON, JJ., concur.