[No. 11297. En Banc. January 9, 1915.]
WILLIAM BERG, Respondent, v. YAKIMA VALLEY CANAL
COMPANY, Appellant. «1»
WATERS AND WATER COURSES - IRRIGATION - MUTUAL WATER
COMPANIES - WATER AS APPURTENANT TO LAND - RIGHTS OF LESSEE.
The owner of shares of stock in a mutual water company, each
of which constitutes a water right for one acre of land,
entitling him to a given quantity of water actually carried in
the company canal for the irrigation of the lands described in
the certificate, holds such water right as appurtenant to his
land; and provisions in a lease of the land, showing an intent
of the parties that the lessee should be entitled to one-half
the water right of the lessor, would operate as an assignment
of the water right and pass same to the lessee as an appurtenance
to the land; thus placing the lessee in such privity to the
contract between the owner of the land and the water company
as would entitle him to a right of action against the water
company for negligence in failing to properly maintain and keep
in repair the irrigation ditch.
SAME - MUTUAL WATER COMPANIES - TRANSFER OF STOCK ON BOOKS
- NECESSITY. The failure of a holder of stock in a mutual water
company to have the same transferred to his name upon the books
of the corporation, after sale and assignment to him, would not
affect the right of a lessee of the land and water rights to
maintain
«1» Reported in 145 Pac. 619.
452 BERG v. YAKIMA VALLEY CANAL CO.
Syllabus. 83 Wash.
an action against the company for negligence, where the company
had already recognized the rights of his lessor by furnishing him
the amount of water represented by his stock, and had never
refused to furnish the lessee on the ground that the stock had
not been transferred on the books of the corporation.
SAME - FAILURE TO FURNISH WATER - NEGLIGENCE - LIABILITY. A
mutual water company organized for the purpose of supplying water
to its stockholders is required to exercise reasonable care in
maintaining its ditch in proper repair and in furnishing each
stockholder his proportionate share of water, and failure therein
constitutes negligence for which it may be made to respond in
damages at the suit of a stockholder or of a lessee in privity
with him (CHADWICK, CROW, FULLERTON, and MOUNT, JJ., dissenting).
SAME - NEGLIGENCE - EVIDENCE - SUFFICIENCY. Negligence in the
maintenance and operation of an irrigation ditch is established
where it appears that the company failed to clean out the ditch
in the fall when it had a right to shut off the water for the
purpose of cleaning out and making repairs; that no repair work
was done during the winter, but was put off until spring, and
then the water was shut off for repairs in disregard of the
rights of patrons; that defendant did not supply the plaintiff
with his proportionate share of the water that came down the
ditch, but permitted stockholders occupying lands further up the
ditch to take more than they were entitled to, and that by reason
thereof plaintiff lost a large portion of his nursery stock.
DAMAGES - EXCESSIVENESS - LOSS OF GROWING CROP. A judgment
for $18,500, for damages as the result of the loss of nursery
stock cannot be regarded as excessive, where the plaintiff's
evidence of the value of the nursery stock in its condition at
the time of its loss by reason of failure to receive water was
uncontroverted; in view of the proper measure of damages for the
loss of a growing crop being either its value at the time of
the loss, or the market value at the time of maturity, less
the cost of tilling, harvesting and marketing.
APPEAL AND ERROR - INADEQUATE DAMAGES - FINDING - SUFFICIENCY
OF EVIDENCE. A finding by the court, who has viewed the land, as
to the amount of damages incurred from loss of a growing crop
through defendant's negligence, will not be disturbed as
inadequate, although the evidence is sufficient to sustain a
finding in a greater sum.
COSTS - ALLOWANCE ON CROSS-APPEALS. Where both parties appeal
and neither prevails, costs will not be allowed in the appellate
court.
BERG v. YAKIMA VALLEY CANAL CO. 453
Jan. 1915 Opinion Per MAIN, J.
Cross-appeals from a judgment of the superior court for
Yakima county, Grady, J., entered December 19, 1912,
awarding damages to the plaintiff, in an action for breach
of contract, tried to the court. Affirmed.
Englehart & Rigg (A. L. Agotin, of counsel), for
appellant.
Tomas H. Wilson and Bogle, Graves, Merritt & Bogle,
for respondent.
MAIN, J. - The purpose of this action was to recover
damages alleged to be due to the negligence of the defendant in
failing to properly maintain and keep in repair an irrigation
ditch. The cause was tried to the court sitting without a
jury. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff in the sum of
$18,500. The defendant appeals.
The facts are substantially as follows: The defendant,
Yakima Valley Canal Company, is a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the state of Washington. The
object for which this corporation was formed, as set out in
its articles, was to construct, maintain, and operate a canal
to carry water for irrigation and domestic purposes from
the Naches river, in the county of Yakima, to the lands
owned by its stockholders, situated in that county and in
township 13, range 18 E., W. M. The water was to be
furnished at cost to the owners of lands upon the line of the
canal or lateral branches, who should share in the cost of
construction, or become owners of the corporate stock. By the
amended articles of incorporation, the capital stock of the
corporation was $4,200, divided into 4,200 shares of the par
value of $1 per share. No dividends were to be paid upon
this stock. The canal, after it was constructed, was to be
maintained and kept in repair by assessments each year made
upon the stockholders. The certificates of stock which were
issued provided that the owner of the shares therein specified,
in accordance with the articles of incorporation and the
454 BERG v. YAKIMA VALLEY CANAL CO.
Opinion Per MAIN, J. 83 Wash.
by-laws, was entitled for every share of stock to one forty-two
hundredth part of the volume of water carried by the canal,
so long as the water should be used upon the land described
upon the back of the certificate.
On March 31, 1909, one William Steward became the
owner, by purchase from E. B. Preble, of certain lands which
were under the ditch. The certificates of stock which entitled
Preble to water to be used upon this land were on this date
assigned to Steward, but were not transferred upon the books
of the corporation until February 21, 1911. On the 27th
day of November, 1909, Steward leased, for a period of two
years, one hundred acres of the land above mentioned to
William Berg, the plaintiff. This lease provided that Berg
would plant the land leased in apple trees of specified
varieties, and would cultivate and care for the same during the
period covered by the lease in a good and husbandlike
manner. During the time covered by the lease, Berg had the
right to plant the entire tract to nursery stock, provided he
should not plant any nursery stock, or any other crops,
nearer than three feet distant from the apple trees. The
lease also provided that Berg should have the right to use a
specified portion of the water from the Yakima Valley Canal
Company, which was then owned by Steward and covered by
the certificates which had been assigned and delivered to him
by Preble. Berg was a nurseryman, and immediately entered
into possession of the land for the purpose of engaging
in the nursery business somewhat extensively. During the
spring of the year 1910 he planted approximately seventy
acres of land in nursery stock. For this purpose he employed
about twenty-five men.
Berg claims that the defendant company was negligent in
failing to properly maintain and take care of the irrigation
ditch during the previous fall and winter, and for that reason
he did not receive sufficient water during the spring of 1910
to grow the nursery stock which he had planted. By reason
BERG v. YAKIMA VALLEY CANAL CO. 455
Jan. 1915 Opinion Per MAIN, J.
of the shortage of water, Berg claims damages in the sum
of $73,150.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court, at the request of
one party and with the consent of the other, in company
with a representative of each, examined the land. Other
facts will be mentioned as they may become pertinent in
connection with the consideration of the points urged for a
reversal.
The questions to be determined are: First, the right of the
plaintiff to maintain this action. Second, is the defendant
company liable in damages for negligently failing to
properly maintain and keep in repair the irrigation ditch? Third,
does the evidence sustain the charge of negligence? And
fourth, the amount of the damages.
I. In order to reach the real question in the case without
unnecessary preliminary discussion, it will be admitted, for
the purposes of this opinion, (a) that the Yakima Valley
Canal Company is what is known as a mutual ditch company
- that is, that the company was formed for the purpose of
supplying water to its stockholders only, and not to the
public generally; (b) that the action must be rounded either
in tort or contract; (c) that the present action is not one
sounding in tort; (d) that an action based upon a contract
must be brought by one who is either a party or stands in
a relation of privity; and (e) that Berg was not a party to
the contract. If, therefore, the present action can be
maintained by Berg, it is upon the ground of privity. Whether
that relation existed between Berg and the canal company
depends upon whether, when Berg took his lease, a right to
the water passed to him as an appurtenance to the land. It
will hardly be denied that, if the water right passed as an
appurtenance to the land, his right to maintain the action is
well rounded.
In a mutual company, the stock certificate represents the
water right. A transfer or sale of the certificate may be
made separate from the land for use on other land, and will
456 BERG v. YAKIMA VALLEY CANAL CO.
Opinion Per MAIN, J. 83 Wash.
transfer the water right. But where it has not been thus
sold or transferred, the question whether the water right is
appurtenant to the stockholder's land is generally a question
of fact, as is also whether on a sale or transfer of the land,
the water right passes as an appurtenance. In 2 Wiel,
Water Rights in the Western States (3d ed.), SS 1269,
speaking upon this question, the author states the rule as follows:
"So long as the company remains purely a mutual one,
the certificate of stock represents the water right. A
transfer or sale of the certificate is governed by much the same
rules as those elsewhere considered regarding transfers of
water rights. Whether the water right is appurtenant to
the stockholder's land is a question of fact in each case, as is
also whether on a sale of the land the water right passes as
appurtenance. A sale of the certificate may be made separate
from the land for use on other land and will transfer the
water right, where the change does not injure other existing
water users by the new place of use (who alone, however, can
raise the objection that they are injured), the transfer being
complete when (and not until) entered on the books of the
company. On the other hand, in the absence of any separate
sale of the certificate or of any other evidence of any express
intention to make a severance, a sale of the land on which the
water is used will carry the water right and right to the
certificate as an appurtenance."
In the present case, the water right, as evidenced by the
certificate, was appurtenant to the land. The amended
articles of incorporation specify that:
"Each share of stock of this corporation shall constitute a
water right for one acre of land, and shall, when duly issued
and delivered, vest in the lawful owner thereof, his heirs and
assigns, title to one forty-two hundredth (1-4200) part of
the water at any time actually carried by said canal. . ."
The by-laws of the corporation adopted by the stockholders
specify the form of the certificate. The certificate
provides that the owner of each certificate of stock shall be
entitled to:
"One forty-two hundredth part of the volume of water
carried by the canal of said corporation for each share of
BERG v. YAKIMA VALLEY CANAL CO. 457
Jan. 1915 Opinion Per MAIN, J.
stock represented by this certificate, so long as he shall use
said water upon the land described in the certificate upon
the back hereof, and no longer, provided, however, that no
water can be taken from said canal by virtue of the ownership
of said stock until the certificate upon the back hereof has
been filled out, signed and sealed by the secretary of this
corporation."
The land formerly owned by Preble and transferred to
Steward, was described upon the back of the certificates as
issued to Preble and assigned and delivered to Steward at
the time of the purchase of the land by him. Considering
the respective provisions of the articles of incorporation,
the by-laws and the stock certificate, it is plain that it was
the intention to make the water right represented by the
stock appurtenant to the land.
But it is contended that, even if the water is appurtenant
to the land, it did not pass to Berg under the terms of the
lease, in which it was provided:
"That he (Berg) will accept as the full water right for
said land one-half of the water right now owned and held
by said first party (Steward) to wit, one-half of one hundred
shares of capital stock in the Yakima Valley Canal
Company's main canal."
For what purpose was this provision placed in the lease?
Steward desired the land leased planted in apple trees. Berg
agreed to plant the trees, tend, irrigate and care for the
same during the period covered by the lease. Berg had the
right for his own purposes of planting the entire tract to
nursery stock, except that he should not encroach upon the
apple trees closer than three feet. The use of the water upon
the land was absolutely essential to any practical attempt to
carry out the provisions of the lease. Without the water,
the purpose could not be accomplished. While the language
used is not as specific as it could have been, it is yet quite
sufficient to make the intention of the parties evident. The
lease transferred to Berg the right to use the water as
therein specified. The lease, for the period of time covered by
458 BERG v. YAKIMA VALLEY CANAL CO.
Opinion Per MAIN, J. 83 Wash.
operated as an assignment of the water right as therein
provided. In 3 Kinney, Irrigation and Water Rights (2d ed.),
SS 1484, it is said:
"So, again, where a tract of land is conveyed, 'with the'
water right appurtenant thereto,' or a similar expression
used in the deed, and the shares of stock representing the
water right were not assigned to the purchaser, such a
conveyance must be deemed in law an assignment, and the
purchaser can compel a transfer of the stock and delivery to him
of all water which was actually appurtenant to the land at
the time of the transfer."
The water, as appurtenant to the land, having passed
Berg by virtue of the lease, established his privity, and as a
result his right to maintain the action. In Booth v.
Chapman, 59 Cal. 149, the defendant had agreed to sell to the
plaintiff 20 acres of land with the water right appurtenant.
The water right had been purchased by Chapman from an
incorporated irrigation ditch company. The plaintiff not
receiving the amount of water which he claimed he was
entitled to brought an action against his vendor. The court
there held that the action could not be maintained, but should
have been brought against the corporation which controlled
the water. It was said:
"The contract was delivered to the plaintiff, and by
virtue of it he took and still retains possession of the land,
and as we construe the contract he became thereby invested with
the water right appurtenant to the land. If so, he must look
to the corporation which controls the water for the pro rata
share belonging to said lot. It does not anywhere appear
in the record that the defendant ever agreed to deliver any
water to the plaintiff; and the court did not so find."
As sustaining the contention that Berg cannot maintain
the action, the authorities cited by the defendant which most
nearly approach the question will here be considered. They
are: Knowles v. Leggett, 7 Colo. Ap. 265, 43 Pac. 154;
Barstow Irr. Co. v. Cleghon (Tex. Civ. App.), 93 S. W.
1023; First Nat. Bank of Longmont v. Hastings, 7 Colo.
BERG v. YAKIMA VALLEY CANAL CO. 459
Jan. 1915 Opinion Per MAIN, J.
App. 129, 42 Pac. 691; Oligarchy Ditch Co. v. Farm Inv.
Co., 40 Colo. 291, 88 Pac. 443; George v. Robinson, 23 Utah
79, 63 Pac. 819; 3 Farnham, Waters and Water Rights, p.
2001.
In both the Knowles and Barstow cases, the courts were
considering leases where the owner of land had undertaken to
furnish the tenant with a certain amount of water. In
neither case was it attempted in the lease to transfer the
water right to the lessee. There is an obvious distinction
between a contract whereby the landlord undertakes to furnish
water to his tenant and a contract whereby he attempts to
transfer the right to the water itself to the tenant, as in
the present case.
In the First Nat. Bank and Oligarchy Ditch Co. cases,
there will be found language sustaining the defendant's
contention. But in neither case was it necessary in deciding the
cause then before the court to pass upon the question. In
the First Nat. Bank case, there stood, in the name of one
Dickson, stock upon the books of the ditch company. The
bank brought suit and attached the stock. Prior to this time,
the land on which the water represented by the stock was
used had been sold and transferred by Dickson to a third
person. Construing a statute then in force in the state of
Colorado, it was held that an attaching creditor was not
required to look beyond the books of the corporation to
determine who owned the stock. In the Oligarchy Ditch Co.
case, there were two corporations, one known as Oligarchy
Ditch Company, which was the owner of a ditch with an
appropriation of water attached thereto; the other was the
Oligarchy Extension Ditch Company. The latter corporation
owned no water right and was organized solely as a
conduit company. The stock in the extension company did not
represent independent water rights, but only the right to
carry water obtained from the Oligarchy Ditch Company.
It was held that a deed conveying the land, together with all
the rights to use water for irrigating the premises, did not
460 BERG v. YAKIMA VALLEY CANAL CO.
Opinion Per MAIN, J. 83 Wash.
include stock in the extension company. This company
owning no water right, but being only a carrying company, it is
plain that the right to have water carried which the stock
represented would not pass as appurtenant to the land.
There would seem to be a distinction between stock in a ditch
company which represented the right to the water which had
been appropriated and owned by the company, and stock in
a corporation which owned no water rights, and only carried
water for its members which they owned evidenced by
certificates of stock in another corporation.
Farnham on Waters and Water Rights, supra, states the
doctrine broadly that water represented by shares of stock
cannot be said to be appurtenant to land. In support of this
statement the case of George v. Robinson, supra, only is cited.
An examination of that case will disclose that it does not
support the declaration of the text writer. There the
question arose between the vendor and the vendee of land. The
vendee claimed the right to water as appurtenant under the
covenant of warranty. Nowhere in the deed was there any
express reference to water rights or water for irrigation or
other purposes. It was held that the right to the water did
not pass under the warranty. Had the right to the water
been expressly mentioned or referred to in the deed, as it was
in the Berg lease, the court there recognized that the rule
would have been different when it said:
"From an examination of the evidence, the conclusion is
irresistible that the water rights, in question, were treated
by the owners as personal property, constituted no park of
the realty, and not being expressly mentioned or referred to
in the deed, were not conveyed with the land, and that there
is no proof that warranted the court in finding that the water
was appurtenant to the land, or that the water rights were
included in the warranty."
But even if it were conceded that the authorities just
reviewed do support the defendant's contention, we yet think
the rule stated by Wiel, supra, is rounded upon the better
BERG v. YAKIMA VALLEY CANAL CO. 461
Jan. 1915 Opinion Per MAIN, J.
reason and in its practical operations would be more just and
equitable. To cause arid lands to become valuable for
agricultural purposes, water is absolutely essential. The doctrine
which makes it a question of fact whether the water right is
appurtenant to the land and whether it passes by a lease or
other conveyance, seems to us sound.
Some claim is made that the corporation cannot be held
liable because the stock still stood upon its books in the name
of Preble. But this objection is not well founded. Prior to
the time of the lease from Steward to Berg, the company had
recognized the right of Steward in furnishing him water
which was represented by the certificates. As to Berg, the
officers and representatives of the corporation at no time
refused to furnish him water because the stock had not been
transferred upon the books of the corporation. There was
no dispute between them and him as to the amount of water
to which he was entitled. Had the officers of the company
refused to furnish him water until the stock had been
transferred upon the books of the company, a different question
would be presented, upon which we now express no opinion.
II. It is argued that a corporation organized for the
purpose of furnishing water to its stockholders is not liable even
to the stockholders on the ground of negligence, and
therefore it would not be liable at the suit of a tenant. It must
be admitted that, if the corporation would not be liable to its
stockholders, a tenant of a stockholder would stand in no
more advantageous relation. Little space need be devoted
to the discussion of this question. One of the purposes of the
corporation set out in its articles was "To construct,
maintain and operate a canal to carry water for irrigation and
domestic purposes . . . to lands owned by its stockholders."
By the by-laws, it was provided that one of the
purposes for which the annual water rental was charged was
to meet the maintenance and operation of the canal. The
rule is that, where a corporation is organized for the purpose
of supplying water to its stockholders, it is its duty to
462 BERG v. YAKIMA VALLEY CANAL CO.
Opinion Per MAIN, J. 83 Wash.
exercise reasonable care in maintaining the ditch in proper repair
and to see that each stockholder receives his proportionate
share of the water. Failing in this duty the corporation is
guilty of negligence, and may be compelled to respond in
damages at the suit of a stockholder. O'Connor v. North
Truckee Ditch Co., 17 Nev. 245, 30 Pac. 882; Rocky Ford
Canal, Reservoir, Land, Loan & Trust Co. v. Simpson, 5 Colo.
App. 80, 86 Pac. 688.
In the O'Connor case, speaking upon this question, it was
said:
"The stated objects of the corporation, as expressed in the
certificate and the stipulations in the deed, clearly define the
duties imposed upon the corporation. By the terms and
conditions thereof the corporation is bound to keep the main
ditch supplied with water, and to regulate and divide its use
among the several stockholders in accordance with their
respective interests, and it must necessarily follow that for any
neglect or failure to properly discharge its duty in this
respect, it would be liable to the stockholder who is injured
thereby to the extent of the damages suffered by him."
III. It is next claimed that the evidence does not show
negligence. the trial court found that the defendant was
chargeable with negligence in two respects, first, that it failed
to properly care for its canal during the fall of 1909 and
the following winter and spring; that this negligence
consisted in omitting to clean the canal so that it would carry
the quantity of water that it was intended to carry, and that
by reason of this negligence the plaintiff did not receive the
water as early in the spring as it wits needed and as it was
the duty of the defendant to furnish it; and second, that the
defendant did not supply the plaintiff with his proportionate
share of the water that came down the ditch, but permitted
other stockholders occupying lands further tip the ditch to
take a greater portion of the water than they were entitled
to; and that by reason of this negligence the plaintiff lost a
portion of his nursery stock.
BERG v. YAKIMA VALLEY CANAL CO. 463
Jan. 1915 Opinion Per MAIN, J.
The trial judge filed in the case a written opinion.
Speaking on the question of negligence, he therein said:
"The testimony of the officers in charge of the company
during the spring of 1910, shows a clear case of negligence
of a very pronounced kind. Very little effort was made to
clean out any part of the ditch during the fall of 1909 after
the time when it had a right to shut off the water for the
purpose of cleaning out and making repairs. No repair
work seems to have been done during the winter. It was all
put off until the spring and then the directors seem to have
taken their time about everything. They turned the water
on when it suited their pleasure and shut it off to make
repairs which might have been made before, showing an utter
disregard for the rights of the patrons of the company. No
shortage of water is claimed, no serious breaks in the ditch,
causing unavoidable delays, in fact, no substantial reason is
shown wily water should not have been delivered by the first
of April, and delivered with reasonable continuity throughout
the entire season sufficient to have prevented the loss sustained
by the plaintiff."
The views of the trial judge as expressed in the findings of
fact and in the written opinion are abundantly sustained by
the evidence. It would unnecessarily prolong this opinion
and serve no useful purpose to review the testimony upon
this question.
IV. The defendant in its brief proclaims vigorously
against the amount of the judgment. But this invective
overlooks the evidence in the record. The plaintiff's evidence
shows the value of the nursery stock in its condition at the
time of its loss by reason of the failure to receive water. The
defendant offered no directly controverting evidence. The
proper measure of damages for the loss of a growing crop is
the value of the crop at the time of the loss. This value may
be arrived at either by evidence showing the reasonable value
of the crop upon the land at the tithe, or the market value at
the time of maturity, less the cost of tilling, harvesting and
marketing. Shotwell v. Dodge, 8 Wash. 337, 36 Pac. 254;
464 BERG v. YAKIMA VALLEY CANAL CO.
Dissenting Opinion Per CHADWICK, J. 83 Wash.
Fuhrman v. Interior Warehouse Co., 64 Wash. 159, 116 Pac.
666, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 89.
The defendant offered evidence tending to show the
inadaptability of the land for the purpose of producing
nursery stock. The trial court, after the conclusion of the trial,
as already stated, viewed the land. The plaintiff is
prosecuting a cross-appeal claiming that the court erred in not
making the award of damages sufficiently large. It is true
that the evidence in the record would have sustained a larger
verdict, had the cause been tried to a jury and such a verdict
returned. This, however, would not be a reason for our
disturbing the judgment of the trial court.
Both parties having appealed, and neither having
prevailed, no costs will be allowed in this court.
The judgment will be affirmed.
ELLIS, GOSE, MORRIS, and PARKER, JJ., concur.
CHADWICK, J. - I dissent from the holding
of the majority. Lack of time, owing to the change to be
made in the personnel of this court within the next few days,
prevents me from elaborating my views or going into the
authorities. It will be enough to say that this action is
brought against a mutual ditch company, not organized for
profits, of which Steward was a member. Upon the theory of
the majority, he is as guilty of negligence as any other
member of the company and could not maintain an action in his
own behalf. Berg stands in his shoes and can claim no
greater right against the company than Steward could claim.
Furthermore, a mutual ditch company should not be held to
answer for the torts of one or more of its members. To do
so, would charge the innocent as well as the guilty and put
upon the innocent the burden of keeping a private contract
made by one of the co-owners and in which they had no
interest whatever.
In consultation I asked the majority to tell me, or to state
in the opinion, how the judgment in this case could be
LAUER v. NORTHERN PAC. R. CO. 465
Jan. 1915 Syllabus.
executed. The question was not answered nor has it been
answered in the opinion. The answer to that question furnishes
the key to the whole superstructure of this case. As it now
stands, plaintiff has a judgment, which, in my opinion is a
paper judgment which cannot be enforced by taking the
property or money of the unoffending members. They owed Berg
no contract duty, and no implied duty, and the water which
they had bought and paid for is as essential to the tillage of
their land as it was to the land leased by Steward to Berg.
Surely no court will ever hold that the judgment can be
executed by a sale of the ditch property. If it should, then
may the property of the innocent and unoffending be taken
at will, and justice will be a name without substance.
CROW, C.J., FULLERTON, and MOUNT, JJ., concur with
CHADWICK, J.