Spkane Grain & Fuel Co. v. Lyttaker, 59 Wash. 76, 109 Pac. 316

           SPOKANE GRAIN & FUEL CO. v. LYTTAKER.      77
 June 1910          Opinion Per RUDKIN, C. J.

Cassius E. Gates and Martin & Todd, for appellants.

Herchmer Johnston, for respondents.

 78    SPOKANE GRAIN & FUEL CO. v. LYTTAKER.
                Opinion Per RUDKIN, C.J.           59 Wash.

be revised or amended by mere reference to its title, but the
act revised or the section amended shall be set forth at full
length;" and, second, that it was repealed by the later act of
August 28, 1909, Laws of Special Session, 1909, p. 71.
We will first consider the constitutionality of the act, for, if
invalid, the question of its repeal becomes immaterial. The
mischief against which the above constitutional provision is
directed was thus defined by Judge Cooley in People v.
Muhaney, 13 Mich. 481:

"This constitutional provision must receive a reasonable
construction, with a view to give it effect. The mischief
designed to be remedied was the enactment of amendatory
statutes in terms so blind that legislators themselves were
sometimes deceived in regard to their effect, and the public,
from the difficulty in making the necessary examination and
comparison, failed to become apprised of the changes made
in the laws. An amendatory act which purported only to
insert certain words, or to substitute one phrase for another
in an act or section which was only referred to but not
republished, was well calculated to mislead the careless as to
its effect, and was, perhaps, sometimes drawn in that form
for that express purpose. Endless confusion was thus
introduced into the law, and the constitution wisely prohibited
such legislation. But an act complete in itself is not within
the mischief designed to be remedied by this provision, and
cannot be held to be prohibited by it without violating its
plain intent."
See, also, Warren v. Crosby, 24 Ore. 558, 34 Pac. 661; Ex
parte Pollard, 40 Ala. 77; Lockhart v. City of Troy, 48 Ala.
579; Gandy v. State, 86 Ala. 20, 5 South. 420; State ex rel.
Bragg v. Rogers, 107 Ala. 444, 19 South. 909, 32 L. R. A.
520; Snyder v. Compton, 87 Tex. 374, 28 S. W. 1061; Clark
v. Finley, 93 Tex. 171, 54 S. W. 344; State ex rel. Farmers'
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 48 Neb. 870, 67 N. W. 876; St. Louis
etc. R. Co. v. Paul, 64 Ark. 83, 40 S. W. 705, 62 Am.
St. 154, 37 L. R. A. 504; Evernham v. Hulit, 45 N.J.
L. 53; Denver Circle R. Co. v. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403, 15 Pac.
714; Baum v. Raphael, 57 Cal. 861; Shields v. Bennett, 8

           SPOKANE GRAIN & FUEL CO. v. LYTTAKER.      79
 June 1910          Opinion Per RUDKIN, C. J.

W. Va. 74; King v. Pony Gold Min. Co., 24 Mont. 470, 62
Pac. 788; Parker-Washington Co. v. Kansas City, 75 Kan.
722, 85 Pac. 781; State v. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 459, 44 N. E.
469, 33 L. R. A. 313; In re Dietrick, 32 Wash. 471, 73 Pac.
506; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Pierce County, 51 Wash. 12,
97 Pac. 1099, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 286; Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, p. 180 et seq.

In Warren v. Crosby, supra, the court said:

"The question, therefore, to be determined is whether the
general act comes within the scope of the constitutional
provision invoked. The language of the provision is both
prohibitory and mandatory. By its terms it inhibits the
revision or amendment of any act by mere reference to its
title, and requires that the act revised or section amended
shall be inserted at length. It does not purport to limit or
restrict the power of the legislature in the enactment of
laws. It relates only to the mode or form in which the
legislative power shall be exercised. Its prohibition is against
legislation effected by modes not in conformity with its
requirements. The evil it sought to remedy is the mode in
which the legislative power was sometimes exercised in the
enactment of revisory or amendatory laws. This evil, as is
well known, was the practice of amending or revising laws
by additions or other alterations, which, without the
presence of the original law, were usually unintelligible. Acts
were passed, amending an existing statute by substituting
one phrase for another, or by inserting a sentence, or by
repealing a sentence, or a part of a sentence, in some portion
or section thereof, which, as they stood, often conveyed no
meaning, and, without examination and comparison with the
original statute, failed to give notice of the changes effected.
By such means an opportunity was afforded for incautious
and fraudulent legislation, and endless confusion was
introduced into the law. Legislators were often deceived, and the
public imposed on by such modes of legislation. To prevent
these consequences, and to secure a fair and intelligent
exercise of the lawmaking power, was the object of the
constitutional provision in question. This object it accomplished by
imposing a limitation, not on the power of the legislature to
make laws, but upon the mode in which that power should be
exercised in the enactment of amendatory or revisory laws.

 80    SPOKANE GRAIN & FUEL CO. v. LYTTAKER.
                Opinion Per RUDKIN, C.J.           59 Wash.

If the act is in itself complete and perfect, and is not
amendatory and revisory in its character, it is not interdicted by
this provision, although it amends by implication other
legislation upon the same subject. Such an act, although it
may operate to change or modify prior acts, is not within
the mischief designed to be remedied by said section 22."

In Ex parte Pollard, supra, the court said:

"It was never intended by the constitution that every law
which would affect some previous statute of variant
provisions on the same subject should set out the statute or
statutes so affected at full length. If this were so, it would
be impossible to legislate. The constitutional provision
reaches those cases where the act is strictly amendatory or
revisory in its character. Its prohibition is directed against
the practice of amending or revising laws by additions or
other alterations, which without the presence of the original
are usually unintelligible. If a law is in itself complete and
intelligible, and original in form, it does not fall within the
meaning and spirit of the constitution."

In State ex rel. Bragg v. Rogers, supra, the court said:

"All the purposes of the present act could doubtless have
been accomplished by an act strictly and in form
amendatory - by setting out the existing statutes, amending and
re-enacting them, but it is obvious the amendatory act would
have been cumbersome, and not more intelligible than is the
present act. Whether an amendatory act, or an original act
should be employed, was matter of legislative judgment and
discretion, which the courts cannot control."

In Snyder v. Compton, supra, the court said:

"It is not meant by this provision that every act which
amends the statutory law shall set out at length the entire
law as amended. Under such a rule legislation would in
many instances be impracticable. This is especially the case
in this state, where the existence of the common law is due to
statutory enactment. The practice which it was the purpose
of the provision in question to prohibit was that of
amending a statute by referring to its title, and by providing that
it should be amended by adding to or striking out certain
words, or by omitting certain language, and inserting in
lieu thereof certain other words. It was not intended to

           SPOKANE GRAIN & FUEL CO. v. LYTTAKER.      81
 June 1910          Opinion Per RUDKIN, C. J.

prohibit the passage of a law which declared fully its provisions
without direct reference to any other act, although its effect
should be to enlarge or restrict the operation of some other
statutes."

In St. Louis etc. R. Co. v. Paul, supra, the court said:

"Appellants deny that the legislature has the power to
amend their charters, except by enacting and publishing at
length so much thereof as is amended. This contention is
based on a section of the constitution which provides that
'no law shall be revived, amended, or the provisions thereof
extended or conferred by reference to its title only; but so
much thereof as is revived, amended or extended or
conferred, shall be enacted and published at length.' But it is
not correct. It is well settled in this and other states, where
such constitutional limitations are in force, that a statute
repeals, or operates as an amendment of, a prior law on the
same subject, to the extent that they are in conflict, although
the latter is not mentioned in the former."

In King v. Pony Gold Min. Co., supra, the court said:

"The act of 1898 does not purport to be an amendment
to or a revision of section 540, supra; it is an additional and
independent piece of legislation, which impliedly amended,
and hence repealed, so much of section 540 as is in conflict
with it, leaving section 540 otherwise operative."

In Parker-Washington Co. v. Kamas City, supra, the
court said:

"It is argued that the act of 1905 amends various specific
sections of the statute relating to cities of the first class, the
language of which is closely followed in the corresponding
sections of the new act, only such alterations being made as
are necessary to accomplish the object already indicated -
a change in the method of paying for public improvements
in cities having a population of over 50,000; that the new
act contains no reference to the old one, does not accomplish
its repeal, and is therefore within the letter and spirit of the
prohibition quoted. It is needless at this time to go into a
discussion of the purpose and effect of the provision of the
constitution referred to. That it has no application to
amendments by implication is well settled. . . . The act

 82    SPOKANE GRAIN & FUEL CO. v. LYTTAKER.
                Opinion Per RUDKIN, C.J.           59 Wash.

of 1905 in a sense amends various sections of the earlier act,
but it does so by implication; it does not cover their entire
subject-matter and hence does not supersede them, but merely
restricts the field of their operation; it is a complete and in
a sense an independent enactment, which requires no
reference to any other statute to make its meaning clear. The
objection made to it in this respect is therefore not well
taken."

It seems to us the foregoing authorities demonstrate that
the act in question is not violative of the constitutional
provision under consideration. Nearly every legislative act of
a general nature changes or modifies some existing statute,
either directly or by implication, and as said by the court in
Ex parte Pollard, supra, "Whether an amendatory or an
original act should be employed is a matter of legislative
judgment and discretion which the courts cannot control."
The purpose of the constitutional provision was to protect
the members of the legislature and the public against fraud
and deception; not to trammel or hamper the legislature in
the enactment of laws. If the act in question were entitled an
act to amend the lien laws of the state, by proper reference,
its validity could not be called in question, yet, what
additional information would such a title or such an act bring
home to either the legislature or the public. True, such an
amendment would-direct attention to the existing laws on
the subject, but such was not the object or purpose of the
framers of the constitution. So long as a legislative act is
complete in itself, and has a sufficient title, it satisfies the
requirements of the constitution, whether it contains much
or little. The legislature may embody all legislation relating
to a given subject in a single act, or it may cover the subject
by a succession of acts. This is entirely a matter of
legislative discretion over which we can assume no control.

In State v. Gerhardt, supra, the supreme court of Indiana
collated a long list of statutes of that state which would be
violative of the constitution, if construed according to the
appellants' contention here, and no doubt an equally long

           SPOKANE GRAIN & FUEL CO. v. LYTTAKER.          83
 June 1910          Opinion Per RUDKIN, C. J.

list might be selected from our own session laws. Many acts
of a general nature relating to municipal corporations and
kindred subjects change and modify existing laws and
charter provisions by implication, but such amendments have
never been deemed violative of the constitution. People v..
Mahaney and Warren v. Crosby, supra.

The appellants rely largely on the case of Copland
Pirie, 26 Wash. 481, 67 Pac. 227, 90 Am. St. 769, and it
must be conceded that their contention finds support in that
decision. It was there held that the act of 1897 (Laws 1897,
p. 93, relating to exemptions of personal property was
amendatory of section 486 of Hill's Statutes and Codes
(Rem. & Bal. Code, SS 568), and was therefore void, because.
not enacted according to the requirements of the constitution.
If the act of 1897 was strictly amendatory in its character,
the conclusion of the court was unavoidable, but the
legislature in its wisdom did not see fit to enact it in that
form, and it may well be doubted whether the court did not go too
far in limiting and restricting the legislature as to the mode
it might pursue in the enactment of laws. Lockhart v. City.
of Troy, supra.

In the course of its opinion in the case cited this court
said:

"In construing similar constitutional provisions the courts
seem generally to have held that this requirement does not
apply to supplemental acts not in any way modifying or
altering the original act, nor to those merely adding sections
to an existing act, nor to acts complete in themselves, not
purporting to be amendatory, but which by implication
amends other legislation on the same subject."

The rule there stated is no doubt the correct one, but was
not the act of 1897 a supplementary act within the meaning
of that rule? It in no wise altered or amended existing laws,
but simply increased the existing exemptions, by adding a
new exemption of a different kind. The decision in Copland
v. Pirie was controlled largely by the decision of the United
States district court for this district, in In re Beulow, 98.

 84    SPOKANE GRAIN & FUEL CO. v. LYTTAKER.
                Opinion Per RUDKIN, C.J.           59 Wash.

Fed. 86, construing the same statute. That court proceeded
upon the theory that "The new act is not complete, but
refers to a prior statute, which is changed, but not repealed by
the new act, so that the full declaration of the legislative will
on the subject can only be ascertained by reading both
statutes, the very obscurity and the tendency to confusion
will be found which constitutes the vice prohibited by this
section of the constitution." But how often must we look
to two or more acts to ascertain the full declaration of the
legislative will. No one will for a moment doubt the power
of the legislature to exempt homesteads by one act, house,
hold goods by another, farming implements by a third, and
so on; yet the full declaration of the legislative will on the
subject of exemptions co. uld only be gathered by referring
to these several acts. Followed to its logical conclusion, this
argument would compel the legislature to embody in a single
enactment, or in amendments thereto, all legislation relating
to a single subject. Such was not the object or purpose of
the provision in question. So long as a legislative act is
complete in itself and does not tend to mislead or deceive, it
is not violative of the constitution.

Turning now to the act before us, we find it complete in
every detail. No person of ordinary intelligence can mistake
its meaning. We know full well what the legislature intended,
without referring to any other act or statute. Of course it
does not embody the entire lien law of the state, but the
constitution does not require that it should. We are therefore
of opinion that the act is valid, and that the demurrer was
properly sustained, unless the act was repealed by
subsequent legislation, a question we will next consider.

At the special session of 1909 an act was passed similar
in many respects to the act of March 4, 1909 (Rem. & Bal.
Code, SS 1133). In general terms the first four sections
of the latter act required the lien claimant, at or before
the delivery of supplies or materials, to mail or deliver to the
owner, or to certain designated persons for him, a written

           SPOKANE GRAIN & FUEL CO. v. LYTTAKER.          85
 June 1910          Opinion Per RUDKIN, C. J.

notice, stating that materials and supplies have been
delivered or ordered for use on his property, and that a lien may
be claimed therefor. The 5th section of the act repeals the
act of March 4, 1909 supra, and the 6th section declares an
emergency. The governor vetoed the first four sections of
the act and approved the last two, so that the act as
approved by the governor reads as follows:

"An act relating to materialmen's liens and the
enforcement thereof, and declaring an emergency.

"Be it enacted by the legislature of the state of
Washington:

"Sec. 5. Chapter 45, found on pages 71 and 72 of Laws
1909, be and the same is hereby repealed.

"Sec. 6. An emergency exists, and this act shall take effect
immediately." Laws of Extraordinary Session, 1909, page
71.

In approving and disapproving laws, in the exercise of his
constitutional prerogative, the executive is a component part
of the legislature, and his powers are limited and defined by
'the constitution. In the exercise of the veto power the
executive can have no greater power than the executive and the
legislature combined, yet if the legislature had enacted the
law in question, in the form in which it left the executive
office, there could be no question as to its invalidity. It is
now a repealing law pure and simple, and its only object is
not expressed in its title, as required by section 19 of article
2 of the state constitution.

"We do not wish to be understood as saying that it
necessary in all cases that the repeal of a given statute should
be expressed *in terms* in the title. If the subject of a statute
is to repeal another statute, then manifestly that subject
must be fairly expressed in the title. If, however, the
repealing act is upon the same subject as the act repealed, the
repeal is properly connected with the subject-matter and the
repealing section is valid notwithstanding the title is silent
on that subject." Howlett v. Cheerham, 17 Wash. 626, 50 Pac. 522.

 86    FORRESTER v. RELIABLE TRANSFER CO.
                     Syllabus.                    59 Wash.

As originally passed, the provision repealing inconsistent
laws was connected with the subject-matter of the act and
properly within the title, but all affirmative legislation was
wiped out by the veto, and the repealing clause was left
standing alone. The repealing clause was a mere incident to
The affirmative legislation contained in the act, and when the
latter fell under the veto the former fell with it. In other
words, when the executive approved the repealing section he
approved something that his veto had already destroyed.
The legislature attempted to substitute one act for another
and the executive had a right to place his veto on the
substitution, but he could not defeat the one act by his veto, and
The other by approving the repealing clause.

We are therefore of opinion that the attempted repeal of
The act of March 4, 1909, is a nullity, and the judgment of
The court below is accordingly affirmed.

GOSE, FULLERTON, CHADWICK, and MORRIS, JJ., concur.