[No. 81005-2. En Banc.]
Argued March 11, 2008. Decided June 5, 2008.
TCAP CORPORATION ET AL., Respondents, v. GEORGE GERVIN ET AL., Appellants.
[1] Statutes — Construction — Question of Law or Fact — Review — Standard of Review. Statutory construction is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.
[2] Judgment — Enforcement — Governing Law. Judgments and their enforcement are governed by statute in Washington.
[3] Statutes — Construction — Unambiguous Language — Plain Meaning — In General. An unambiguous statute is applied according to its plain meaning.
[4] Judgment — Foreign Judgment — Enforcement — Registered Foreign Judgment — Expiration — Expiration of Underlying Judgment. Under RCW 6.17.020(7), a registered foreign judgment cannot extend past the lifetime of the underlying judgment and expires concomitantly with the expiration of the underlying judgment if it has not already expired.
Nature of Action: Action to enforce a registered foreign judgment. The judgment creditor sought and obtained a writ of execution in 2004 directing the sale of the judgment debtor's interest in a Washington partnership. Although the registered foreign judgment had not yet reached its 10-year judgment lifetime, the underlying judgment had expired in 2001. In 2006, the judgment creditor filed the writ of execution. The day before the execution sale, a federal judge enjoined the sale for 45 days. The registered foreign judgment reached its 10-year anniversary during the stay. The judgment debtor filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the writ purported to sell an interest that could not be executed upon and that the 10-year judgment lifetime had expired. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the writ complied with the provisions of the Washington Limited Partnership Act and that the judgment lifetime could be equitably tolled. That same day, the debtor filed a notice of appeal, challenging the denial of the motion to quash the writ of execution, and moved the Court of Appeals to stay execution until the appeal was resolved. Over the next several months, state and federal courts enjoined the creditor from enforcing the writ. Eventually, the writ was returned unfulfilled, but the trial court issued a new writ of execution. The debtor moved to quash that writ on the same grounds as the previous writ.
Superior Court: The Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 96-2-11938-1, Kathryn J. Nelson, J., on November 9, 2006, denied the judgment debtor's motion to quash the writ.
Supreme Court: Holding that the registered foreign judgment expired when the underlying judgment expired in 2001 and that the writs of execution were issued on an expired judgment and are therefore invalid, the court reverses the trial court's order and quashes the outstanding writs of execution.
Michael B. Gillett- (of The Gillett Law Firm), for appellants.
Christopher E. Allen- (of Morton McGoldrick, PS) and Joanne Henry- (of Sloan Bobrick & Kesling), for respondents.
Robert G. Sieh- and Catherine Wright Smith- on behalf of 401 Group, amicus curiae.
En Banc
¶1 SANDERS, J. — In 2006 and 2007 TCAP Corporation, f/k/a Transamerican Capital Corporation (TCAP), the plaintiff-creditor, sought and was granted two different writs of execution in an attempt to collect an outstanding judgment entered against George Gervin, the defendant-debtor. These writs ordered the sheriff to seize and sell Gervin's entire limited partnership interest in the 401 Group in an execution sale. This case requires us to determine whether the registered foreign judgment was enforceable even though the Texas judgment upon which it was based had expired.
¶2 We hold a registered foreign judgment in Washington expires, and therefore becomes unenforceable, under RCW 6.17.020(7) RCW 6.17.020(7). FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶3 This case involves a procedural history so extensive even the barristers of Bleak House would blush. ¶4 Plaintiff-creditor TCAP RCW 6.36.025(1). ¶5 In 1997 Gervin filed for relief under chapters 7 and 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. In 1998 the bankruptcy court entered an order determining Gervin's outstanding IRS (Internal Revenue Service) liens had priority over the TCAP judgment, and both the IRS liens and the TCAP judgment survived the bankruptcy action. In 2000 the IRS filed a motion requesting disbursement of the funds accumulated by the partnership. The motion was granted and the funds disbursed. This satisfied the IRS liens, leaving the registered foreign judgment as the only outstanding judgment. ¶6 In 2001 the Texas judgment against Gervin, which served as the basis of the registered foreign judgment, expired and could not be revived. Although this fact determines the issue before us, the parties continued litigating attempts to execute on the debt. ¶7 In 2004, three years after the Texas judgment expired, Gervin's wife filed an adversary complaint in federal bankruptcy court for the Western District of Texas. The bankruptcy court enjoined TCAP from executing against Gervin's interest in the 401 Group on several occasions for periods of months over the next several years. ¶8 Also in 2004 the Pierce County Superior Court entered an "Order Directing Sale of Partnership Interest" on TCAP's motion. This order directed the issuance of a "Writ of Execution" to the Pierce County Sheriff's Department to sell Gervin's interest in the 401 Group. ¶9 In 2006, two years after the Pierce County order and five years after the underlying judgment expired, TCAP filed a writ of execution ordering the Pierce County Sheriff's Department to execute on Gervin's entire limited partnership interest in the 401 Group. The day before the execution sale a federal judge in Texas enjoined the sale for 45 days. The registered foreign judgment celebrated its 10-year anniversary during this stay. ¶10 Gervin filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming the writ purported to sell an interest that could not be executed upon, and the 10-year Washington judgment lifetime expired. Pierce County Superior Court denied this motion, holding the writ complied with the provisions of the Washington Limited Partnership Act, chapter 25.10 RCW, and the judgment lifetime could be equitably tolled under Hensen v. Peter, 95 Wash. 628, 164 P. 512 (1917). That same day Gervin filed his notice of appeal, challenging the denial of the motion to quash the writ of execution, and moved the Court of Appeals to stay execution until the appeal was resolved. ¶11 Over the next several months state and federal courts enjoined TCAP from enforcing the writ against Gervin. The injunctions were not continuous, however, leaving periods of time during which TCAP could attempt to enforce the writ. Eventually, the writ was returned unfulfilled, but the trial court issued a new writ of execution. Gervin moved to quash that writ on the same grounds as the previous writ. The trial court denied Gervin's motion again and Gervin appealed. ¶12 The Court of Appeals consolidated Gervin's appeals. Pursuant to RAP 4.4 STANDARD OF REVIEW ANALYSIS ¶15 However, this is limited by RCW 6.17.020(7), which provides the lifetime of a registered foreign judgment cannot extend beyond the lifetime of the underlying judgment. Except as ordered in RCW 4.16.020(2) or (3), chapter 9.94A RCW, or chapter 13.40 RCW, no judgment is enforceable for a period exceeding twenty years from the date of entry in the originating court. Nothing in this section may be interpreted to extend the expiration date of a foreign judgment beyond the expiration date under the laws of the jurisdiction where the judgment originated. RCW 6.17.020(7); see also RCW 6.36.035(3)(c) ("Nothing in this section may be interpreted to extend the expiration date of a foreign judgment beyond the expiration date under the laws of the jurisdiction where the judgment originated."). ¶16 Since the language of RCW 6.17.020(7) is unambiguous, we look no further than its plain meaning to determine the effect of the statute. ¶17 TCAP argues a registered foreign judgment "stands alone as an independent judgment" and is not affected by RCW 6.17.020(7). Br. of Resp't Cadles of Grassy Meadows II, LLC, Assignee of TCAP Corp., at 32 (Wash. Ct. App. 35567-1-II (2007)). In support TCAP cites two Washington cases ¶18 The Washington cases cited by TCAP were decided before the legislature limited the duration of the registered foreign judgment through RCW 6.17.020(7) and cannot inform our understanding of the statute. Similarly the cases from foreign jurisdictions do not apply a provision similar to RCW 6.17.020(7). As these cases do not relate to RCW 6.17.020(7), they are unpersuasive. ¶19 Because the lifetime of a registered foreign judgment cannot extend past the lifetime of the underlying judgment, we must determine when the lifetime of the underlying judgment expired. ¶20 The Texas judgment underlying the registered foreign judgment expired in 2001, 12 years after it was originally entered. In Texas a creditor must file a writ of execution within 10 years or the judgment becomes dormant and is not subject to execution unless revived. TEXAS CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 34.001(a). "A dormant [Texas] judgment may be revived by scire facias . . . brought not later than the second anniversary of the date that the judgment becomes dormant." ¶21 At oral argument TCAP conceded the Texas judgment became dormant and expired. Because the record contains no record of any attempt by TCAP to revive the judgment, ¶22 Although the Texas judgment expired before the enactment of RCW 6.17.020(7), the statute by its terms applied to the registered foreign judgment, which was in force when the statute became effective. RCW 6.17.020(8) ("The chapter 261, Laws of 2002 amendments to this section apply to all judgments currently in effect on June 13, 2002 . . . ."). ¶23 We hold RCW 6.17.020(7) prohibits a registered foreign judgment from extending beyond the lifetime of the original judgment. Therefore, a registered foreign judgment expires concomitantly with the expiration of the underlying judgment, if not before the underlying judgment. Since the Texas judgment, and therefore the registered foreign judgment, expired years before the first writ of execution was filed, the writs of execution here were based on an expired judgment. Time has expired on regulation play, and there is no overtime. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court and quash the outstanding writs of execution. Game over. ALEXANDER, C.J., and C. JOHNSON, MADSEN, CHAMBERS, OWENS, FAIRHURST, J.M. JOHNSON, and STEPHENS, JJ., concur.