CITE: 105 Wn.2d 78, 711 P.2d 993
STATE FINANCE COMMITTEE v. O'BRIEN
CAUSE NUMBER: 51945-5
FILE DATE: January 9, 1986
CASE TITLE: The State Finance Committee, Petitioner, v.
Robert S. O'Brien, as Treasurer, Respondent.
[1] Statutes - Validity - Presumption - Burden of Proof. A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and a party challenging a statute has a heavy burden of proving its invalidity.
[2] Statutes - Subjects and Titles of Acts - Construction. Const. art. 2, 19, which limits a bill to one subject which must be expressed in its title, is liberally construed in favor of the validity of the legislation.
[3] Statutes - Subjects and Titles of Acts - Title - Test. The requirement of Const. art. 2, 19 that the subject of a bill be expressed in its title is satisfied if the title, however broad, gives fair notice to legislators and the public of the object of the legislators' consideration.
[4] Statutes - Subjects and Titles of Acts - Subject - Test. The requirement of Const. art. 2, 19 that a bill have only a single subject is satisfied if, giving deference to the Legislature's determination, there is a rational unity between the overall general subject of the bill and the particular subjects to which the subdivisions of the bill pertain.
NAMES OF CONCURRING OR DISSENTING JUDGES: Callow and Goodloe, JJ., and Schumacher, J. Pro Tem., dissent by separate opinion; Dolliver, C.J., and Durham, J., did not participate in the disposition of this case.
NATURE OF ACTION: Original action to compel the state treasurer to sign resolutions authorizing the sale of state bonds. The legislation authorizing the sale was titled "an act relating to capital projects".
Supreme Court: Holding that the legislation complied with the subject and title requirements of Const. art. 2, 19, the court GRANTS the requested relief.
COUNSEL: KENNETH O. EIKENBERRY, ATTORNEY GENERAL, and ELVIN J. VANDEBERG and CLIFFORD D. FOSTER, JR. (of KANE, VANDEBERG, HARTINGER & WALKER), SPECIAL ASSISTANTS, for petitioner.
KENNETH O. EIKENBERRY, ATTORNEY GENERAL, and DAVID E. WALSH, DEPUTY, for respondent.
EDWARD L. FLEISHER and MARTIN H. BROWN on behalf of the Legislature, amici curiae for petitioner.
AUTHOR OF MAJORITY OPINION: Brachtenbach, J.-
MAJORITY OPINION: This is an original action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the state treasurer to sign resolutions authorizing the sale of state bonds.
The petitioner correctly and precisely states the issues:
" Whether chapter 4, Laws of 1985, 1st ex. sess.,
which authorizes the state to issue bonds for a number
of capital projects, violates Const. Art. 2, 19 because
it embraces more than one subject or is not properly titled?
The writ shall issue.
The issues arise from Const. art. 2, 19: "No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title."
The title to the bill at issue provides that it is "an act relating to capital projects . . ." Lines 6 and 7 of the first section of the bill authorize the State Finance Committee to issue general obligation bonds of the State in the amount of $285,851,000 to finance projects therein described.
[1, 2] The two issues are title and subject matter. Our decision is made with two long-established premises in mind. First, the statute is presumed to be constitutional and the challenger bears a heavy burden to overcome that presumption. Second, article 2, section 19 is to be liberally construed in favor of the validity of the legislation. STATE HIGHER EDUC. ASSISTANCE AUTH. v. GRAHAM, 84 Wn.2d 813, 529 P.2d 1051 (1974); STATE v. GRISBY, 97 Wn.2d 493, 647 P.2d 6 (1982), CERT. DENIED, 459 U.S. 1211, 75 L. Ed. 2d 446, 103 S. Ct. 1205 (1983).
[3, 4] Examining the title it admittedly is broad in scope, but so be it. In a comprehensive opinion, 90 pages including the dissent, this court dealt with the title issue. GRUEN v. STATE TAX COMM'N, 35 Wn.2d 1, 22, 211 P.2d 651 (1949), OVERRULED ON OTHER GROUNDS IN STATE EX REL. STATE FIN. COMM. v. MARTIN, 62 Wn.2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963). We there said, and it is still good law:
" Titles to statutes may be general or restrictive;
or, in other words, broad or narrow, since the legislature
in each case has the right to determine for itself how
comprehensive shall be the object of the statute. And
it also has a wide discretion in the particularity of
the title selected to express it, provided that, by a
fair construction, such title complies with the constitutional
provision in question.
GRUEN, at 22.
This title gave fair notice to legislators and the public that the Legislature was considering capital projects. That, in fact, is what it was considering. Turning to the subject matter issue, the Attorney General argues that the act authorizes a wide range of capital projects with separate and distinct purposes. It is correct that the authorized capital projects range from fisheries to educational facilities. However, it is equally true that the overall subject is singular- capital expenditures to carry out legitimate governmental purposes.
In a landmark decision by Justice Hamilton, this court established the fundamental rules about subject matter. KUECKELHAN v. FEDERAL OLD LINE INS. CO. (MUT.), 69 Wn.2d 392, 403, 418 P.2d 443 (1966).
We said:
" The basic purposes of the constitutional mandate
regarding the title to legislation is to enlighten the
legislature and the general public as to what matters
are being considered for legislation and to prevent logrolling
in the legislative process. YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASS'N
v. STATE, 62 Wn.2d 504, 383 P.2d 497 (1963). However,
this constitutional requirement is to be liberally construed
so as not to impose awkward and hampering restrictions
upon the legislature. DECANO v. STATE, 7 Wn.2d 613,
110 P.2d 627 (1941). Consequently, the legislature is
deemed the judge of the scope which it will give to the
word "subject." MARSTON v. HUMES, 3 Wash. 267, 28 Pac.
520 (1891), OVERRULED ON OTHER GROUNDS, IN RE SHILSHOLE
AVE., 101 Wash. 136, 172 Pac. 338 (1918). So long as
the title embraces a general subject, it is not violative
of the constitution even though the general subject contains
several incidental subjects or subdivisions. ROBISON
v. DWYER, 58 Wn.2d 576, 364 P.2d 521 (1961); WASHINGTON
TOLL BRIDGE AUTHORITY v. STATE, 49 Wn.2d 520, 304 P.2d
676 (1956). All that is required is that there be some
"rational unity" between the general subject and the incidental
subdivisions. If this nexus can be found, the act will
survive the light of constitutional inspection. STATE
EX REL. TOLL BRIDGE AUTHORITY v. YELLE, 61 Wn.2d 28,
377 P.2d 466 (1962).
A branch of government which is independent and coequal, which the judiciary is, must respect the decisions of an also independent and coequal branch, which the Legislature is. Absent a clear violation of the constitution, which we do not perceive here, the Legislature is entitled to determine what is within the "subject" of a bill. It did so and we should not inquire further.
The writ shall issue.
CONCURRING JUDGES: Utter, Dore, Pearson, and Andersen, JJ., and Hamilton, J. Pro Tem., concur.
AUTHOR OF DISSENTING OPINION: Callow, J. (dissenting)-
DISSENTING OPINION: Article 2, section 19 of the Washington State Constitution reads:
" Bill to contain one subject. No bill shall embrace
more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in
the title.
The title of House Bill 1328 reads as follows:
" AN ACT Relating to capital projects authorized in
the state capital budget acts; amending RCW 75.48.020,
28A.47.792, 28A.47B.010, 28B.10.850, 28B.14C.010, and
43.83.150; adding a new chapter to title 43 RCW; and declaring
an emergency.
There is no reference in the title to the incurrence of debt by the issuance and sale of $285,851,000 of general obligation bonds. A BILL'S ONE SUBJECT MUST BE EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE
The test of the sufficiency of the expression of the subject of a bill is that it must give notice of its object so as to reasonably lead to an inquiry into its contents. In other words, the title of the bill should reasonably inform a reader about the subject matter of the bill. FLANDERS v. MORRIS, 88 Wn.2d 183, 558 P.2d 769 (1977); BREWSTER PUB. SCHS. v. PUD 1, 82 Wn.2d 839, 514 P.2d 913 (1973); STATE SCH. DIRECTORS ASS'N v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & INDUS., 82 Wn.2d 367, 510 P.2d 818 (1973); AMERICAN FED'N OF TEACHERS, YAKIMA LOCAL 1485 v. YAKIMA SCH. DIST. 7, 74 Wn.2d 865, 447 P.2d 593 (1968); STATE v. LOUNSBERY, 74 Wn.2d 659, 445 P.2d 1017 (1968); TREFFRY v. TAYLOR, 67 Wn.2d 487, 408 P.2d 269 (1965), APPEAL DISMISSED, 385 U.S. 10, 17 L. Ed. 2d 10, 87 S. Ct. 70 (1966). STATE v. WINTERS, 67 Wn.2d 465, 466-67, 407 P.2d 988 (1965), APPEAL DISMISSED, 384 U.S. 208, 16 L. Ed. 2d 481, 86 S. Ct. 1461 (1966), stated:
"[T]he purposes of [article 2, section 19] are to:
1. Protect members of the legislature against provisions
in bills of which the title gives no intimation.
2. Apprise the public concerning subjects of legislation
being considered.
3. Prevent hodgepodge or logrolling legislation.
With equal frequency it has been said that a title
complies with the constitution if it gives notice that
would lead to an inquiry into the body of the act, or
indicates to an inquiring mind its scope and purpose.
(Footnote omitted.)
House Bill 1328 deals with the issuance of general obligation bonds and the funding for a myriad of capital projects. The title of the bill gives no notice of the authorization of general obligation bonds to provide for funding those projects which would impose a $285 million debt upon the State. While it is proper for the Legislature to refer to sections of the revised code in the title of an act, this cannot take the place of the constitutional requirement that the title must contain some statement indicating the actual content of the bill. STATE EX REL. SEATTLE ELEC. CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT, 28 Wash. 317, 68 P. 957 (1902).
If notice were to be given to the members of the Legislature and to the general public of the subject of the bill, there should have been added to its title the phrase, "and providing for the funding thereof by the issuance and sale of general obligation bonds." When the Code Reviser published the contents of the bill as chapter 4 of Laws of 1985, 1st Ex. Sess., the insufficiency of the title apparently was recognized and the words "bonds for capital projects" were added as a heading at the beginning of the chapter long after the passage of the bill by the Legislature. The session laws reflect this at page 2289, in the following form.
"
CHAPTER 4
[House Bill No. 1328]
BONDS FOR CAPITAL PROJECTS
AN ACT Relating to capital projects authorized in
the state capital budget acts; amending RCW . . .
HB 1328 concerns the issuance of bonds to fund innumerable capital improvements for the executive and administrative departments of state government. The term "Capital Budget" in the title provides no notice that the capital projects will be paid for by the sale of bonds, yet every act that the bill amends (now amending sections of the Revised Code of Washington) contained the word "bond" in its title. SEE Laws of 1969, ch. 13; Laws of 1973, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 135; Laws of 1977, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 308; Laws of 1979, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 230; Laws of 1980, ch. 141.
The contents of the bill were in the following format:
" Sec. 1. The state finance committee is authorized
to issue general obligation bonds of the state of Washington
in the sum of two hundred eighty-five million eight hundred
fifty-one thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may
be required, to finance the projects authorized in section
2 of this act and all costs incidental thereto.
. . .
Sec. 2. Bonds issued under section 1 . . . are subject
to the following conditions and limitations:
(1) General obligation bonds . . . in the sum of thirty
eight million fifty-four thousand dollars . . . for the
purpose of providing funds for the department of general
administration . . .
(2) General obligation bonds . . . in the sum of four
million six hundred thirty-five thousand dollars, . .
. for . . . a Washington state agricultural trade center
. . .
(3) General obligation bonds . . . in the sum of thirty
eight million seven hundred sixty-two thousand dollars
. . . for the purpose of providing funds for the department
of social and health services and the department of corrections
to perform capital projects . . .
(4) General obligation bonds . . . in the sum of three
million two hundred thirty thousand dollars . . . for
the purpose of providing funds for the department of ecology,
parks and recreation commission, department of fisheries,
department of game, and the department of natural resources
to acquire real property and perform capital projects
. . .
The bill continues for section after section in the same recitations regarding the authorization of the issuance of general obligation bonds. The bill dealt with the issuance of general obligation bonds and the title should have said so.
It is a commonsense requirement that the title of a bill expressly indicate its content without the need to search further, or to imagine all of the possible subjects which might be encompassed under a particular title. The news media reports the titles of bills, and the titles only, from time to time for the information and edification of the general public. The titles of the bills alone are printed as an index for those interested in legislation. The passage of bills is often upon a reading of the bill by title only. When that title does not indicate that the bill is an indebtedness authorization or a spending bill, it may well escape the notice of those that the framers of the constitution meant to inform.
The majority relies upon GRUEN v. STATE TAX COMM'N, 35 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 211 P.2d 651 (1949) which quotes from STATE EX REL. STATE TOLL BRIDGE AUTH. v. YELLE, 32 Wn.2d 13, 24-26, 200 P.2d 467 (1948), as follows:
" "The purposes of this constitutional mandate are
threefold: (1) to protect and enlighten the members of
the legislature against provisions in bills of which the
titles give no intimation; (2) to apprise the people,
through such publication of legislative proceedings as
is usually made, concerning the subjects of legislation
that are being considered; and (3) to prevent hodge-podge
or log-rolling legislation. We have declared that when
laws are enacted in violation of this constitutional mandate,
the courts will not hesitate to declare them void.
"Another rule which has been frequently stated by
this court is that the title of an act need not be an
index to the contents of the legislation that follows,
nor need it express in detail every phase of the subject
which is dealt with by the enactment, but that it is sufficient
if the title gives such notice as should reasonably lead
to an inquiry into the body of the act itself, or indicates,
to an inquiring mind, the scope and purpose of the law.
[Citing cases.]
"In applying this latter rule, however, there is
a distinction between the effect of a broad, general title
and that of a narrow, restricted one. If the title is
general and comprehensive, it will be given a liberal
construction; in such case, no elaborate statement of
the subject of the act is necessary, and a few well-chosen
words suggestive of the general subject treated is all
that is required. If, however, the title is a restricted
one, it will not be regarded so liberally, and provisions
which are not fairly within such restricted title will
not be given force."
It is recognized that the application of these rules can be restrictive or flexible, but it is submitted that they should not be so interpreted as to weaken Const. art. 2, 19 to the extent that its "threefold" purposes will not be accomplished. SEE KUECKELHAN v. FEDERAL OLD LINE INS. CO. (MUT.), 69 Wn.2d 392, 418 P.2d 443 (1966).
A "capital project" is any physical public betterment or improvement. GERGES v. KOCH, 62 N.Y.2d 84, 464 N.E.2d 441, 476 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1984); STATE EX REL. SULLIVAN v. BURNS, 51 Ariz. 384, 77 P.2d 215 (1938). The word "capital" may have different meanings when used in different connections. COMMISSIONER OF CORPS. & TAXATION v. FILOON, 310 Mass. 374, 38 N.E.2d 693 (1941). The term can refer to property, money, wealth, the place where legislative and executive offices are located, the sum total of corporate stock, or that portion of the produce of the industry of a country that may be made directly available to finance production. Black's Law Dictionary (5th rev. ed. 1979); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY. It usually refers to many things other than the funding of projects by the issuance of bonds. It is argued that the subject matter of the bill is included in the words "Capital Projects". If that construction is to be the future guide to the interpretation of Const. art. 2, 19, then such general undescriptive topics as "state business" and "legislative concerns" may well be approved bill titles in the years to come.
When the State Constitution was formulated it borrowed heavily from the Organic Act which established the territorial government of Washington. In the act we find in section 6
"To avoid improper influences, which may result from intermixing
in one and the same act such things as have no proper
relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one
object, and that shall be expressed in the title.
I submit that to embrace in one bill the issuance of bonds for the funding of projects for the Department of Social and Health Services, for Fisheries, for Higher Education, and for an agricultural trade center, among others, covers more than one subject. HARLAND v. TERRITORY, 3 Wash. Terr. 131, 144, 13 P. 453 (1887), though handed down nearly 100 years ago, is applicable today. It finds no difference in the terms "object" and "subject" and states in part, quoting from decisions of other states:
" "The purpose to be effected by this section was
to prevent the incorporation in one bill of provisions
of a nature totally diverse and without necessary connection,
with a view to effect a general combination of the particular
friends of each measure, and thereby secure their enactment,
when some or all of them would likely fail if left to
stand on their own merits; and also the entrapping of
legislators into the support of a bill into which by dexterous
management some insidious provision had been inserted
of which the title gave no intimation." [Texas.]
"These provisions were adopted to prevent the legislature
from passing what are commonly known as 'omnibus bills.'"
[Arkansas.]
"The object of this provision was, that neither the
members of the legislature nor the people should be misled
by the title." [New York.]
"The intent of this provision of the constitution
was to prevent the union in the same act of incongruous
matters, and of objects having no connection or relation.
And with this it was designed to prevent surprise in legislation,
by having matters of one nature embraced in a bill whose
title expressed another." [Iowa.]
"The object of this constitutional provision was
to require so clear an expression of the subject of the
bill in the title, that it would at once apprise legislators
and others interested of the precise subject of the proposed
legislation." [Missouri.]
HARLAND v. TERRITORY, SUPRA, was overruled by MARSTON v. HUMES, 3 Wash. 267, 28 P. 520 (1891), which held that so long as the title embraces but one subject it is acceptable even though the bill contains any number of sub-subjects. With this I cannot quarrel. However, neither MARSTON nor later cases permit the true content of a bill to be unexpressed in its title, nor do MARSTON and the following cases grant approval to omnibus-catchall bills.
LOGROLLING
HB 1328 is a bill abounding in the possibilities for logrolling which Const. art. 2, 19 was designed to avoid. Logrolling has been defined as the exchange of political favors, especially the trading of votes among legislators to achieve the passage of projects of interest to one another. It is the combining together of two or more legislators for the assistance of one another when their votes should be cast independently. The purpose of Const. art. 2, 19 was to require that any subject of legislation pass or fail on its own merits. It was the purpose of article 2, section 19 to discourage legislators from voting for the unwise or improvident projects of others in order to secure votes for their own particular projects. STATE v. WINTERS, 67 Wn.2d 465, 407 P.2d 988 (1965), APPEAL DISMISSED, 384 U.S. 208, 16 L. Ed. 2d 481, 86 S. Ct. 1461 (1966); ROBISON v. DWYER, 58 Wn.2d 576, 364 P.2d 521 (1961).
There is no showing that that was done here, and, indeed, it would not be the function of this court to inquire into the inner workings of the Legislature in any case. It is, however, the function of the court to look to the compliance by the Legislature with Const. art. 2, 19. That the bill was in the form in which logrolling was a possibility is underscored by the comment of a legislator made during floor discussion (as reflected by the record submitted to us), when it was said:
". . . HB 1328 is the capital budget. This is where
we got lots of fun with the capital budget out here, we
found a few things in it for everybody, . . .
KUECKELHAN v. FEDERAL OLD LINE INS. CO. (MUT.), SUPRA at 403, was relied upon by the majority. That decision as quoted held that the purpose of Const. art. 2, 19:
"is to enlighten the legislature and the general public
as to what matters are being considered for legislation
and to prevent logrolling in the legislative process.
ARTICLE 2, SECTION 19, AND AMENDMENT 60
The majority pays no heed to the argument of the Attorney General that when article 8, section 1 (as changed by amendment 60) and article 2, section 19 of the Washington State Constitution are read and applied together to HB 1328, the specter is raised that the debt limitations of amendment 60 could be threatened by the consolidation of the authorization of numerous bond issues into one bill. It is argued that especially when legislative bills create long-term debt, each subject must be covered in a separate bill.
In 1972 amendment 60 was added to the Washington State Constitution by a vote of the people of the state. The purpose of the amendment was stated to be the reduction of the interest costs of future bonding and the restriction of the Legislature's ability to incur state debt without the approval of the voters. It was stated in the Official Voters Pamphlet, at 51, that the then existing limitation on the incurrence of debt had been ineffective. The explanation of HJR 52, which became amendment 60, was stated in part as follows:
"This new provision would allow the legislature to authorize
such indebtedness as would be governed by the amendment
only by a three-fifths majority vote in both houses.
In addition, such indebtedness could only be authorized
by the legislature to the extent that the aggregate of
all such debts . . . would not require annual debt service
payment (i.e., principal and interest) to exceed nine
percent of the average amount of general state revenues
for the period of three fiscal years immediately preceding
the contracting of the particular debt.
The passage of HB 1328 may ultimately menace the constitutional debt ceiling of amendment 60. It is because of that risk that it is proper when bills include debt authorization through the issuance of bonds that Const. art. 2, 19 be strictly construed and each bill contain a bond authorization relating to only one subject. As stated in the discussion in the House on June 10, 1985:
"We are doing something very significant here this morning.
We're passing bonds to fund the capital budget but without
any recognition of what this is doing to us in the next
biennium, but more importantly, the following biennium.
And if we look at this, the action today of the previous
bill, and this bill will, if we do our traditional funding
mechanism, put us in jeopardy of having no funds available
for water cleanup or for other water projects in this
state, but more importantly, in the next biennium, the
following biennium, 1987-89, our Centennial, will drive
us right up to the debt ceiling. We have already authorized
this legislature body more bonds than we can issue by
our statutory or Constitutional debt ceiling. And while
this may be good practice, to authorize things our Finance
Committee cannot spend because we're up against the bond
ceiling, I don't think it's the wisest choice to do.
I am voting no on this, because I believe that we, the
legislature, should set some priorities. We the legislature
should have public hearing and look at the bonds that
have been authorized, and we determine what priorities
should be issued for those bonds and not let [SIC] it
up to the Finance Committee.
Transcript of House Floor Debate at 3-4 (June 10, 1985).
The authorization and control of indebtedness is the responsibility of the Legislature. This responsibility cannot be passed on to the State Finance Committee. It is conceded by the requirement of a 60 percent vote of both House and Senate that the indebtedness incurred by HB 1328 is limited by the prohibition against the incurrence of debt which will cause the maximum annual debt service on all outstanding general obligation debt to exceed 9 percent of the arithmetic mean of general state revenues for the preceding 3 fiscal years.
HB 1328 was an omnibus bill "with a little something for everyone." As such it violated the one subject rule by consolidating multiple projects into one all inclusive bill. As stated in BLAINE v. SEATTLE, 62 Wash. 445, 447-49, 114 P. 164 (1911):
"If, then, the method adopted in this instance of submitting
these eight propositions to the voter and compelling him
to assent to or dissent from each and all of them or lose
his vote is inconsistent with the constitution and laws
of the state, it must fail. The constitutional inhibition
as to such indebtedness as is here sought to be created
is that no city shall for any purpose become so indebted
in any manner, without the assent of three-fifths of the
voters, voting at an election held for that purpose.
What is the meaning of this provision, if not that no
city, whatever its purpose may be, however needful or
meritorious may be the object, however necessary to the
safety, good health, or general welfare of its citizens,
may not incur an indebtedness beyond the one and one-half
per cent of its taxable property, unless three-fifths
of the voters shall assent? What is the public policy
created by such a provision, if not that the voter shall
freely, voluntarily, and with a full knowledge of the
purpose of the election and the object to be attained
thereby, consent to the laying of this additional burden
of taxation upon his property? . . .
How can a voter express his free and intelligent
assent to such an additional burden of taxation when,
in order to so express it, he is compelled to express
a like assent to other measures, with which he is not
in sympathy nor accord, and against which, if given the
opportunity, he would cast his vote. Here we have eight
separate and distinct propositions upon which as a whole
the voter must assent or dissent. Some he favors, others
he is opposed to; and yet, in order to express his assent
upon those he favors, and which in his judgment are needful
for the city's growth and prosperity, he must likewise
express, not an intelligent nor free, but a controlled
and compelled assent to measures he deems harmful. .
. .
The vice of this method adopted by the city to compel
an affirmative vote on all eight measures is readily apparent
upon an examination of the propositions submitted, propositions
in which there is nothing in common, nor any such unity
of interest as would lead any one to either favor or disfavor
all eight measures.
The legislative action proposed in BLAINE contained the same flaws and fatal contamination as that before us. The same precepts and mandates should apply to the issue here.
I would hold that HB 1328 contained more than one subject and that its subject was not expressed in its title.
I would dismiss the action and would not require the State Treasurer to sign the State Finance Committee resolutions.
CONCURRING JUDGES: Goodloe, J., and Schumacher, J. Pro Tem., concur with Callow, J.
POST-OPINION INFORMATION: