CITE: 100 Wn.2d 230, 668 P.2d 584
STATE v. SHARON
CAUSE NUMBER: 49392-8
FILE DATE: August 25, 1983
CASE TITLE: The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Allen
Wayne Sharon, Petitioner.
[1] Juveniles - Juvenile Court - Decline Hearing - Previous Declination - Effect - Due Process. Under RCW 13.40.020(10) a declination of juvenile court jurisdiction as to a particular charge against a person divests the juvenile court of jurisdiction in all subsequent prosecutions of that person. Due process is afforded with regard to the permanent declination if the record of the declination hearing indicates an exercise of discretion and application of appropriate due process standards.
NATURE OF ACTION: The defendant was charged in juvenile court with second degree burglary. When a previous declination of juvenile court jurisdiction was discovered, the State sought dismissal so as to file the charge in adult court.
Superior Court: The Superior Court for King County, No. 81-8-05257-8, Terrence A. Carroll, J., on January 22, 1982, refused to dismiss the charge.
Court of Appeals: Holding that the previous declination of jurisdiction was permanent and that there was no denial of due process, the court REVERSED the trial court at 33 Wn. App. 491.
Supreme Court: Holding that the previous declination of jurisdiction divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction as to this charge and that due process had been afforded, the court AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals.
COUNSEL: JULIE A. KESLER of WASHINGTON APPELLATE DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, for petitioner.
NORM MALENG, PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, and BARBARA B. LINDE, DEPUTY, for respondent.
AUTHOR OF MAJORITY OPINION: Brachtenbach, J. -
MAJORITY OPINION: Petitioner was charged with second degree assault in Lewis County. The juvenile court declined jurisdiction on the basis that "the juvenile system is unable to control respondent's assaultive behavior." There is no challenge to the validity of that decline order.
About 7 months later petitioner was charged with second degree burglary in King County Juvenile Court, the prosecutor being unaware of the earlier Lewis County decline. Upon learning of the prior decline order, the prosecutor moved for dismissal in juvenile court with intent to file the charges in adult court. The juvenile court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed. STATE v. SHARON, 33 Wn. App. 491, 655 P.2d 1193 (1982). We affirm the Court of Appeals.
We agree with and only summarize the analysis of the Court of Appeals.
[1] First, the statute vested jurisdiction in the juvenile court of "any individual who is under the chronological age of eighteen years and WHO HAS NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY TRANSFERRED TO ADULT COURT". (Italics ours.) RCW 13.40.020(10).
We find the statute unambiguous. Once a juvenile offender has been transferred to adult court, that person no longer meets the definition of a "juvenile" over which the juvenile court has jurisdiction. We may not believe that this is the best approach to the treatment of juvenile offenders, but it is a matter within the discretion of the Legislature to determine the manner of treatment of juvenile offenders.
The only other challenge by petitioner is that this result is a denial of due process. We again agree with the analysis of the Court of Appeals on this issue. We additionally answer petitioner's extensive reliance on KENT v. UNITED STATES, 383 U.S. 541, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84, 86 S. Ct. 1045 (1966). The original decline decision is not challenged. KENT does not mandate an additional decline hearing on subsequent offenses. Inherent in this conclusion is the assumption that at the original decline hearing the court exercised discretion and applied the due process requirement of KENT. If the record affirmatively indicates such exercise of discretion and consideration of the KENT standards, the statute then controls without constitutional violation.
We affirm the Court of Appeals.
CONCURRING JUDGES: Williams, C.J., and Rosellini, Stafford, Utter, Dolliver, Dore, Dimmick, and Pearson, JJ., concur.
POST-OPINION INFORMATION: