[No. 35880. Department Two. Supreme Court November 9, 1961.]
VIRGINIA A. IVERSON, Respondent, v. WAYNE M. GRAHAM,
Appellant.«*»
[1] APPEAL AND ERROR - ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR - FINDINGS - SETTING OUT VERBATIM - NECESSITY. In the application of Rule on Appeal 43, which provides that assignments of error directed to findings of fact will not be considered unless the finding is set out verbatim in the brief, the word "verbatim" is given its plain and ordinary meaning, and strict compliance with that meaning is essential to having such assignments of error considered by the court.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 546493, Malcolm Douglas, J., entered July 28, 1960. Affirmed.
Action on contract. Defendant appeals from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Warren Hardy and George Olson, for appellant.
Merges, Brain & Hilyer, by Gale P. Hilyer, for respondent.
PER CURIAM. -
[1] Experience dictated the use of the word "verbatim" in that portion of Rule on Appeal 43 (RCW Vol. 0), which reads:
". . . No error assigned to any finding or findings of fact made or refused will be considered unless so much of the finding or findings as is claimed to be erroneous shall be set out verbatim in the brief. . . ." We can only repeat that verbatim means "verbatim." The assignments of error directed to the findings of fact which were not set out verbatim will not be considered. Beagle v. Beagle (1961), 57 Wn. (2d) 753, 757, 359 P. (2d) 808; San Juan Cy. v. Hage (1960), 57 Wn. (2d) 905, 357 P. (2d) 166; Ennis v. Ring (1959), 56 Wn. (2d) 465, 472, 341 P. (2d) 885; Steele v. Queen City Broadcasting Co. (1959), 54 Wn. (2d) 402, 404, 341 P. (2d) 499; Wilson v. Elwin (1959), 54 Wn. (2d) 196, 338 P. (2d) 762; Timm v. Gilliland (1959), 53 Wn. (2d) 432, 334 P. (2d) 539; Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Department of
* Reported in 366 P. (2d) 213.
[1] See Am. Jur., Appeal and Error § 772.
Nov. 1961] IVERSON v. GRAHAM. 97
Labor & Industries (1953), 43 Wn. (2d) 584, 262 P. (2d) 536; Paulson v. Higgins (1953), 43 Wn. (2d) 81, 260 P. (2d) 318.
This case presents an opportunity to again emphasize this portion of Rule on Appeal 43, without working a hardship on an appellant inasmuch as an affirmance was inevitable. The appellant was confronted with an insuperable legal barrier of a judgment in another action in which the court, entering the judgment, had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter of the controversy. Appellant urged that judgment Was of no effect, because of certain claimed irregularities divesting the court of jurisdiction, conceding that he could not attack that judgment collaterally in the present action, unless the court was without jurisdiction to enter that judgment. While these claimed irregularities, in the other action, might have furnished the basis for a direct attack by an aggrieved party, they clearly did not divest the court of jurisdiction.
Judgment affirmed.