26 Wn.2d 819, SWEDISH HOSPITAL, et al., v. DEPT. LABOR AND INDUSTRIES
[No. 29890. En Banc.      Supreme Court      January 3, 1947.]
SWEDISH HOSPITAL, SEATTLE GENERAL HOSPITAL, YOUNG
      MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION, WAR & COMMUNITY
      CHEST, AMERICAN WHITE CROSS ASSOCIATION, BOY SCOUTS
      OF AMERICA, CAMP FIRE GIRLS, COMPASS CENTER,
      DEACONESS SETTLEMENT, EAST SIDE SERVICE MEN'S CLUB,
      EDUCATIONAL CENTER, FAMILY SOCIETY, GIRL SCOUT
      COUNCIL, GOODWILL INDUSTRIES, HIGHLINE YOUTH
      ACTIVITIES COUNCIL, JEWISH WELFARE SOCIETY, MEDINA BABY
      HOME, RUTH SCHOOL FOR GIRLS, SALVATION ARMY,
      SEATTLE CHILDREN'S HOME, SEATTLE DAY NURSERY,
      SERVICE MEN'S CLUB, THEODORA HOME, TRAVELERS AID
      SOCIETY, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON YMCA, URBAN LEAGUE,
      WASHINGTON CHILDREN'S HOME SOCIETY, WASHINGTON
      SOCIETY FOR MENTAL HYGIENE, and YOUNG WOMEN'S
      CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION, Respondents, v. THE
      DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, Appellant.«1»

"`(5) The section of our constitution above referred to was undoubtedly framed for the purpose of avoiding confusion, ambiguity, and uncertainty in the statutory law through the existence of separate and disconnected legislative provisions, original and amendatory, scattered through different volumes or different portions of the same volume. Such a provision, among other things, forbids amending a statute simply by striking out or inserting certain words, phrases, or clauses, a proceeding formerly common, through which laws became complicated and their real meaning often difficult of ascertainment. The result desired by such a provision is to have in a section as amended a complete section, so that no further search will be required to determine the provisions of such section as amended.'

"There is no reference to any title in this statute; considered as an amendment it changes Rem. Rev. Stat., Sec. 7673, where `extrahazardous' is made the test for the application of the act; Sec. 7674, where `extrahazardous' is defined; and a list of the occupations included in the term is given; Sec. 7675, which limits `employees' to those engaged in `trade or business'; and Sec. 7676, where the rates per workman hour are set forth in detail; it adds `nonprofit' employees and introduces `hazardous,' an entirely new class unknown to the Workmen's Compensation Act. Actually, at least four of the basic paragraphs of the original act are radically changed by the new statute when it is considered as an amendment."

Later on in the Opinion, the trial court ruled as follows:

"A consideration of all the cases cited and the construction placed upon the act by the department compels the conclusion that this is an amendment to the original Workmen's Compensation Act. Considered as an amendment, the act fails to comply with the constitutional requirement that `the act revised or the section amended, shall be set forth at full length.'"

Jan. 1947] SWEDISH HOSPITAL ETC. v. DEPT. L. & I. 827

As we have seen, the question as to whether or not the act offends as against Art. II, § 37, of the constitution, has been by-passed in this court, and we will not express an opinion upon it. We say it has been by-passed because the appellant has urged upon us in its final brief that "Chapter 89 is supplemental and not an amendment. Chapter 89 is complete in itself."

[2] The general rule under which appellant seeks to classify the act is stated in 59 C. J. 873, § 457, as follows:

"Supplemental Acts - Statement of Rule. Supplemental legislation complete in itself and not requiring reference to any other law to determine its scope and meaning, . . . . is not amendatory legislation."

In analyzing the act in his memorandum opinion, the trial judge considered the contention upon which the appellant now relies, and said, in part:

"Assuming this statute to be an original act and not an amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act.

"The uncertain character of this statute appears promptly; it defines neither hazardous nor extrahazardous; it creates no fund and provides no source from which a fund could be accumulated; it only grants to employees an admission to the benefits of the compensation act; it does not put any duty on any employer and only by reference to Ch. 74 of 1911 Laws does it grant anything; it does not make the `benefits' exclusive and, unlike the basic principle of the compensation act, does not protect the employer from damage suits in the event the assessments are paid. It is obvious that this statute is intelligible only when read into the original compensation act to which it refers. . . . It is true, as said in argument, that the department, a purely administrative agency, will manufacture rules and regulations to make this statute operate. In fact, it has already done so. It decided that someone must pay, preferably the employer, although the statute does not so state. It is willing to construe the admission to `benefits' to include the proposition that the employer must pay assessments and it has even included all employees, hazardous or not, and excluded churches, although they are included in the term `charitable institutions,' and the act in question does not make any such exception. The question here is not what the administrative agency is willing to or can do; it is rather why is the plain language of the constitution not followed; recent experience

828 SWEDISH HOSPITAL ETC. v. DEPT. L. & I. [26 Wn. (2d)

has shown that administrative agencies, given the opportunity, will always make rules enough to insure their perpetuation. It is still the law of this state that an administrative agency `has no inherent power or authority other than that necessarily incidental to its express and delegated powers.' Wishkah Boom Co. v. Greenwood Tbr. Co., 88 Wash. 568. If this is to be considered as an original statute, complete in itself, none of the authority now being claimed by the administrative board was mentioned in it."

[3] In contending here that chapter 89 is a complete act, the appellant relies on the case of Spokane Grain & Fuel Co. v. Lyttaker, 59 Wash. 76, 109 Pac. 316, which it rightly characterizes as the leading case on this subject in this state. In describing the act, held complete in that case, the opinion says:

"Turning now to the act before us, we find it complete in every detail. No person of ordinary intelligence can mistake its meaning. We know full well what the legislature intended, without referring to any other act or statute."

This language states the tests to be applied in determining whether an act is complete. They are: Can a person of ordinary intelligence mistake its meaning? Can we know what the legislature intended, without referring to any other act or statute? As we have already shown, counsel representing the appellant say in their final brief:

"Chapter 89 is complete in itself it has only one purpose and that purpose only to bring in the men and women who receive pay from charitable institutions for working around machinery or as janitors or in hazardous occupations."

The department's counsel, and presumably the department also, so thought when their final brief was filed; but when the auditor of the department issued the order of April 12, 1945, he clearly thought that the legislative intention was vastly broader than that, and the joint board of the department must also have so thought when it affirmed the order and dismissed the respondents' appeal therefrom on August 6, 1945. All of these persons are of much more than average intelligence; yet it is evident that they were mistaken as to the meaning of the act at one time or the other. We, as we have hereinbefore indicated, think that the legislative intent

Jan. 1947] SWEDISH HOSPITAL ETC. v. DEPT. L. & I. 829

was in some respects even broader than indicated in the order; for, in our opinion, churches and church organizations are undoubtedly "charitable institutions," and within the intended purview of the act.

Can we know what the legislature intended without referring to any other act or statute? The testimony of the auditor of the department who issued the order of April 12, 1945, repeatedly shows that, in order to draw the order, he was compelled to refer to other statutes. We quote one instance only:

"Q. And in Petitioners' Exhibit 1 [the order of April 12, 1945] I note paragraph 3 you say `All employees of such organizations that receive remuneration in any form are to be included' that is (1) and then in (2) you say `All employees, regardless of their duties, are to be reported under the one class.' Why did you make such designation under this particular classification, under 60-2? A. Chapter 89 of the laws of 1945 reads as follows: `Every person employed in a hazardous and/or extra-hazardous occupation by an individual, firm, association or corporation operating a charitable or nonprofit institution, enterprise, business or establishment, shall be entitled to the benefits of Pierce's Perpetual Code 702 to 718, Chapter 74, Laws of 1911, and all amendments thereto relating to compensation for injured workmen.' Under the terms of that Act it then became necessary to define hazardous and extra-hazardous occupations within the meaning of the preexisting statute. And in Section 7674 [the 1911 act] we read that `There is a hazard in all employment.' Therefore it became my duty to interpret Chapter 89 to mean all occupations of employees of charitable and non-profit institutions as covered by the Act. . . . Q. Now Mr. Graves, you found no guide or standard in Chapter 89, did you, that would serve as a standard or guide for you in fixing the classification. A. None whatever. Q. Then you did the only thing you saw to do, is to turn to that section of the existing statute of the Workmen's Compensation Act and try to apply the guide that you found there? A. That is correct. Q. That guide, of course, is that portion of Section 7676 - A. 7674."

We do not wish to be understood as criticizing the department. It is in evidence that it did not sponsor or have anything to do with the enactment of chapter 89, Laws of 1945. It was its duty to attempt its enforcement, and its inability

830 SWEDISH HOSPITAL ETC. v. DEPT. L. & I., [26 Wn. (2d)

to do so without referring to other legislative acts or itself exercising legislative power is due to the fact that the act is not a complete act. It is clear that neither the department nor the members of this court can (adopting the language of the Lyttaker opinion) "know full well what the legislature intended, without referring to any other act or statute," and we are strongly inclined to think that the trial judge has fairly well demonstrated that this cannot be done even by reference to prior acts or statutes.

[4, 5] We are further of the opinion that chapter 89 violates § 19 of Art. II of the constitution. That section reads as follows: "No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title."

This provision, or its equivalent, is found in all, or nearly all, state constitutions, and it has been discussed in a wilderness of decisions, including a great many of our own. It is universally agreed that one of the principal objects of this constitutional provision is to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually had, of the bills being considered, to the end that persons or institutions affected by such bills may have an opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they so desire. Such publication is usually, if not almost universally, made by publishing the titles.

Paradoxical as it may seem at first blush, a broad and comprehensive title is more likely to run the gauntlet of this constitutional provision than a restricted one. This is very clearly set out in the case of DeCano v. State, 7 Wn. (2d) 613, 627, 110 P. (2d) 627:

"The legislature may, if it chooses, adopt a very broad and comprehensive title in a bill, in which case great liberality will be indulged to hold that any subject reasonably germane to such title may be embraced within the body of the bill. If, however, the legislature sees fit to use a restricted title, in which the language is of specific, rather than generic, import, the title will not be regarded so liberally, and provisions of the bill not fairly embraced therein cannot be given force." (Italics ours.)

This is repeated in almost identical language in State ex rel. Gebhardt v. Superior Court, 15 Wn. (2d) 673, 131 P.

Jan. 1947] SWEDISH HOSPITAL ETC. v. DEPT. L. & I. 831

(2d) 943, decided in 1942. For further cases to the same effect, see Hacker v. Barnes, 166 Wash. 558, 7 P. (2d) 607, 80 A. L. R. 1212. We requote the title and the body of the act:

"AN ACT giving workmen's compensation benefits to persons engaged in hazardous and extrahazardous occupations in charitable institutions.

Clearly, the title is very restrictive. It gives notice of a proposed bill that affects "charitable institutions" only, and no other, but in the body of the act it is made applicable to individuals, firms, associations, or corporations operating nonprofit institutions, businesses, or establishments. The number of nonprofit corporations alone, sought to be brought into the act, is very great, such as lodges, granges, chambers of commerce, service clubs, community water systems, golf clubs, athletic clubs, sportsmen's clubs, and dozens of other types too numerous to mention, including that somewhat nebulous type known in the vernacular as "bottle clubs." As to the point under discussion, the trial judge said in his opinion:

"This statute, in its title, refers only to `charitable institutions.' In the text it adds `nonprofit institutions.' There is a wide distinction in this state between these two kinds of organizations; charitable institutions are to be incorporated under Sec. 3863, and nonprofit corporations are required to conform to Sec. 3888 of Rem. Rev. Stat.; charitable corporations pay no annual license fee but nonprofit corporations are required to make an annual contribution to the state treasury; there are other vital differences unnecessary to mention here."

Generally speaking, there is an even wider distinction. For the most part, charitable institutions derive their operating revenue from endowments, charitable gifts, or by way of the collection plate or community chest drive. It will be

832 SWEDISH HOSPITAL ETC. v. DEPT. L. & I. [26 Wn. (2d)

assumed that, by their ideals at least, they are debarred from taking advantage of opportunities offered by law to nonprofit organizations by chapter 119, Laws of 1937, p. 468 (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 2472-1 [P.P.C. § 118-209]), which makes it a felony for any person to have a slot machine in his possession, but permits a club, as defined in § 3, chapter 62, Laws of 1933, Ex. Ses., p. 173, as amended by § 1, chapter 158, Laws of 1935, p. 494 (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 7306-3 [P.P.C. § 678-117]), to own and operate such instrumentalities. The definition of "club," as defined in the statute, above cited, is as follows:

"`Club' means an organization of persons, incorporated or unincorporated, operated solely for fraternal, benevolent, educational, athletic or social purposes, and not for pecuniary gain." (Italics ours.)

That definition embraces a wide variety and enormous numbers of nonprofit organizations. The title to the act is insufficient, and its provisions concerning nonprofit organizations and institutions "cannot be given force." DeCano v. State, supra. See, also, Petroleum Lease Properties Co. v. Huse, 195 Wash. 254, 80 P. (2d) 774.

[6, 7] Does the above ruling render the entire act unconstitutional? It is said in 11 Am. Jur. 857, § 162: