19 Wn.2d 326, A. S. CORY, Appellant, v. F. L. NETHERY et al., Respondents
[No. 29042. Department One. Supreme Court October 28, 1943.]
A. S. CORY, Appellant, v. F. L. NETHERY et al., Respondents. «1»

"In this connection, it should be noted that, in applying the general rules in question, this court has observed a wellmarked line of distinction between broad, general titles on the one hand and narrow, restricted titles on the other. The legislature may, if it chooses, adopt a very broad and comprehensive title in a bill, in which case great liberality will be indulged to hold that any subject reasonably germane to such title may be embraced within the body of the bill. If, however, the legislature sees fit to use a restricted title, in which the language is of specific, rather than generic, import, the title will not be regarded so liberally, and provisions of the bill not fairly embraced therein cannot be given force. This rule was concisely expressed in Hacker v.

Oct. 1943] CORY v. NETHERY. 331

Barnes, 166 Wash. 558, 7 P. (2d) 607, 80 A. L. R. 1212, in the following language:

"`In its decisions, this court has tended to uphold general titles to statutes, while closely scrutinizing specific or restricted titles. Northern Cedar Co. v. French, 131 Wash. 394, 230 Pac. 837; National Assn. of Creditors v. Brown, 147 Wash. 1, 264 Pac. 1005; National Assn. of Creditors v. Pendleton, 158 Wash. 137, 290 Pac. 987; In re Hulet, 159 Wash. 98, 292 Pac. 430.'"

In the enactment of chapter 98 of the Laws of 1911, the legislature saw fit to use a restricted title, and it will be seen therefrom that legislation with reference to drainage districts is not at all germane. If we should accept § 71 of chapter 98 of the Laws of 1911 as a repeal in its entirety of chapter 182 of the Laws of 1907, then it would be unconstitutional as to liens for assessments levied by drainage districts, for it would offend § 19 of Art. II of the constitution.

[4] We believe that, by the application of established rules of construction, it can be said that the 1911 legislature did not intend to repeal chapter 182 of the Laws of 1907 in so far as it applies to taxing entities other than cities and towns, even though the language of the repealing section, when read literally, includes such repeal. We think that the legislature, when legislating on the subject of local im provement assessments by cities and towns and providing a ten-year limitation for actions to enforce liens, could not have intended, in view of the acts of 1895 and 1907, to differentiate between assessment liens upon property in a city or town and those upon property located in a drainage or other similar district, provide a ten-year limitation for the former, and relegate the latter to the situation existing prior to the 1907 act, and thus recreate the evil which it corrected by that act. A repealing clause or section in an act is subject to the same rules of interpretation as any other clause or section therein. Express words of repeal must not be taken literally if, by so doing, the enactment is carried beyond the scope of its title and thereby other legislation is broken down or destroyed.

The situation here is substantially the same as that with

332 CORY v. NETHERY. [19 Wn. (2d)

which this court was confronted in Howlett v. Cheetham, 17 Wash. 626, 50 Pac. 522. In that case, it appears that, by an act passed in 1895, the office of commissioner of arid lands was created. By one of the sections of an act passed in 1897, the act of 1895 was expressly repealed. It was contended that the title of the later act was not sufficient to warrant the inclusion therein of any matter covered by the 1895 act. We said, p. 629:

"While it is a primary and general rule in the construction of statutes that effect should be given to words which are plain, unambiguous and well understood, according to their natural and ordinary sense and meaning, yet it is well settled that where the literal interpretation of a particular word or phrase is repugnant to the intent of the legislature. plainly manifested by the act taken as a whole, such interpretation ought not to prevail. The only object of construction is to ascertain the meaning and intention of the legislature, and when that intention is discovered it is controlling, although it may be contrary to the strict letter of the statute."

After quoting what was said by a New York court, we further said, p. 632:

"Applying the principles so clearly enunciated in the foregoing quotation, we are irresistibly forced to the conclusion that it was not the real intention of the legislation to repeal the act of March 22, 1895, notwithstanding the words of absolute repeal employed by the legislature. It will manifestly appear from an examination of this so-called repealing act, and from the history of its passage, that the legislature at the time of its final enactment did not have in mind either the office of arid land commissioner or the subject of arid lands."

[5] The doctrine of this case has not in any way been modified. It is based upon sound and logical reasoning, and it is applicable to this case. We, therefore, hold that chapter 182 of the Laws of 1907, providing for a limitation period of ten years in cases like the one before us, was not repealed by chapter 98 of the Laws of 1911.