9 Wn.2d 188, THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, on the Relation of Adjustment Department of Olympia Credit Bureau, Inc., Appellant, v. ELLIS C. AYER, as Clerk of the Superior Court for Thurston County, Respondent
[No. 27820. En Banc.      Supreme Court      June 10, 1941.]
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, on the Relation of
          Adjustment Department of Olympia Credit Bureau, Inc.,
           Appellant, v. ELLIS C. AYER, as Clerk of the
               Superior Court for Thurston County,
                     Respondent.«1»

If this were the only difficulty, it could be readily solved as a similar difficulty was solved in the very recent case of State ex rel. Wilson v. King County, 7 Wn. (2d) 104, 109 P. (2d) 291; that is, by the application of the general rule that a proviso which appears to be repugnant to the enacting clause, may be treated as an exception thereto, if it be not contra to the whole thereof, but merely limits its application. But, unfortunately, the matter is not so simple as that; for, not content with saying, in the first section of the act, that the state shall be subject to garnishment in the justice court, and following it with an emphatic proviso, in the same section, that it shall not, the legislature proceeded to again say, in the next section, that it should. At least, it is so said by plain implication;

194 STATE EX REL. OLYMPIA CREDIT BUR v. AYER.
Opinion Per ROBINSON, C. J. [9 Wn. (2d)

for, it is therein provided that, when the state is garnisheed, no regular judgment shall be entered against it, but

" . . . the judge of the superior court, or justice of the peace shall by written order command the auditing officer, or body of such state of Washington to audit and pay to the judgment creditor the amount due from the garnishee to the principal defendant, . . . " (Italics ours.)

We are, therefore, brought face to face with another established rule of construction, to the effect that, where different parts or sections of the same statute are in conflict, the latest in order of position will prevail. State ex rel. Tacoma R. & P. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 101 Wash. 601, 172 Pac. 890. This rule, however, as is the case with many other rules of construction, is not inflexible, and, if the first of conflicting clauses is clear and explicit, and the other, less so, the former, notwithstanding its position, will prevail over the latter. Black on Interpretation of Laws (2d ed.), 327. We are of the opinion that, as between the proviso of the first section and the implied provision of the second section, that is the case here; and we are further of the opinion that the specific proviso of the first section should be regarded as an exception to the general provision thereof, and accordingly hold that the act does not authorize a justice court to issue a writ of garnishment against the state.

[5] Suppose a judgment of a justice court be filed in a superior court, - Does the act authorize the issuance of a writ of garnishment, founded thereon, against the state? Section 680-3 provides, in part:

"The venue of such garnishment proceeding shall be the same as the original action. The writ shall be issued by the court having jurisdiction of such original action . . ."

STATE EX REL. OLYMPIA CREDIT BUR. v. AYER 195
June 1941] Opinion Per ROBINSON, C. J.

The difficulty arises out of the first sentence of § 680-3, rather than the second. The second sentence of the section reads, in part: "The writ shall be issued by the court having jurisdiction of such original action." As we have seen earlier in the opinion, we have long ago held that, when a transcript of a judgment rendered in a justice court is filed in the superior court, the justice court loses all jurisdiction over the action and the judgment becomes "to all intents and purposes the judgment of the superior court," and execution may be issued upon it as upon other superior court judgments. Grant v. Cole, supra. We have also held that it is so far the judgment of the superior court that an attack upon it is a direct attack, Noerdlinger v. Huff, supra, and other courts have held that the superior court may modify such a judgment or grant other relief against it or strike it from the docket. 34 C. J. 93, § 252. We think it must be held that the superior court, in such a case, has "jurisdiction of the original action." If it has not, no other court has, for the jurisdiction of the justice court has wholly ceased.

The first sentence of § 680-3 offers greater difficulty. "The venue of such garnishment proceeding shall be the same as the original action." Does it mean that the venue of the garnishment proceeding must be the same as the original venue of the action to which it is ancillary, or that the venue must be where the venue of the original action is at the time the writ is applied for? Strictly speaking, the venue of an action is the place where it is tried, but the word is also very commonly used to designate the court which has jurisdiction of the action. When a transcript of a justice court judgment is filed in the superior court, the justice court loses all jurisdiction over the cause and the superior court acquires it. It seems permissible to say that the venue of that action has been shifted to, and now is in.

196 STATE EX REL. OLYMPIA CREDIT BUR. v. AYER.
Concurring Opinion Per MILLARD, J. [9 Wn. (2d)

the superior court; that is, the superior court has become the venue of the original action. It would seem, at the time the writ of garnishment was applied for, that the venue of the original action was in the superior court of Thurston county. It was there, or nowhere, for that was the only court that had jurisdiction of the action.

The respondent has cited Thompson v. Kirkpatrick, 18 Ark. 580, and Weimeister v. Singer, 44 Mich. 406, 6 N. W. 858. The statutes involved in these cases are sufficiently different from our own as to render those decisions of little or no persuasive force.