7 Wn.2d 40, MCCORMICK LUMBER COMPANY et al., Appellants, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES et al., Respondents
[No. 27994.      En Banc.           Supreme Court      January 7, 1941.]
MCCORMICK LUMBER COMPANY et al., Appellants, v.
           THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES
                et al., Respondents.«1»

In that case, a machinist was engaged with the aid of two assistants, in changing the main gear on a locomotive crane. The work entailed exceptionally strenuous and unusual exertion on the part of the machinist in lifting a section of a cogwheel. After the task had been completed and the workman had gone home, he complained of pain in his chest and in the region of his heart. He returned to his place of employment on the third day thereafter, and, while engaged in doing some comparatively light work, suddenly collapsed, and eleven hours later died. A post-mortem examination disclosed that death had resulted from a thrombus, or blood clot, which had completely blocked the right coronary artery. Although there was considerable expert testimony to the contrary, the joint board found, in effect, that the decedent's exertion was a material factor causative of the thrombus which ended the workman's life. The board thereupon entered an order granting the widow's claim for pension. The superior court affirmed the order, and the employer appealed from the court's judgment. In affirming the judgment, this court said:

"The workmen's compensation law was enacted in furtherance of sound public policy for the benefit of those who engage in extrahazardous employments. It applies to all alike, the young and the old, the weak and the strong, the healthy and the diseased. One of the hazards of employment to a workman afflicted with disease is that his work may involve exertions and strains which his weakened constitution may be unable to withstand. An injury which a workman sustains in the course of his employment is compensable under the act if it results from any shock, strain, or exertion which he is then unable to endure in his condition of

McCORMICK LBR. CO. v. DEPT. OF LABOR & IND. 59
Jan. 1941] Opinion Per STEINERT, J.

health, whatever that may be. [Citing practically all of the cases mentioned above.]"

As has already been indicated, it is appellant's position that the rule to be adduced from the foregoing authorities is that an injury resulting from physical exertion, coupled with a previous diseased condition of the workman, is not "traumatic" within the meaning of Rem. Rev. Stat., § 7675, unless the exertion is violent or strenuous, or is performed under unusual conditions; and that ordinary work, or work performed in the manner to which the workman is accustomed, without extra strain or overexercise, even though it be coupled with a preexisting disease, however serious or acute, cannot be held to be the cause of an "injury" within the meaning of the workmen's compensation act.

[2] It is true that, in practically all of the cases hereinbefore cited, there was some strain or effort beyond that ordinarily employed by the particular workman. However, the rule which this court has repeatedly and emphatically stated in those same decisions was not limited to those conditions. What this court has positively declared as its accepted rule, under both the original and the present definition of "injury" is this: An accident arises out of the employment when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or the condition of the workman's health.

To say now that some unusual effort or strain is necessary to render death compensable, would not only be in direct conflict with the plain and emphatic language of our holdings, but would also introduce an element of uncertainty and confusion, in that every ease would present a problem as to the standard to be used in determining whether or not, in a given instance, the exertion was unusual, and whether or not the workman was expending only the ordinary exertion

60 McCORMICK LBR. CO. v. DEPT. OF LABOR & IND.
Dissenting Opinion Per SIMPSON, J. [7 Wn. (2d)

required in a particular line of employment. The rule above stated has been accepted in this state after much discussion and diversity of opinion. It is now firmly established, and we see no reason for departing from it.

Since the board found that there was a causal relation between the workman's exertion and his death, and since the evidence supports that finding, the case is within the accepted rule.

The judgment is affirmed.

BLAKE, C. J., MAIN, BEALS, JEFFERS, MILLARD, and DRIVER, JJ., concur.

SIMPSON, J. (dissenting) - I am of the opinion that the majority has failed to properly interpret the provisions of our workmen's compensation act, in so far as the act deals with the purposes underlying it and the definition of that which is meant to be compensable thereunder. It is, of course, obvious that the definition of a compensable injury under the act requires an inquiry into both the wording of the section dealing therewith and the wording of the sections setting forth the basic, fundamental objectives sought by the framers of the act.

It must be remembered that the act was passed to replace the common law right of action, which the workman might have for injuries occasioned by the negligence of the employer or his fellow workmen, and to compensate the employee for industrial accidents, in which no negligence was present. The act was not passed to guarantee a life insurance or a pension to the employee. State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 466. The intent of the legislature was simply to provide payment for accidental injuries occurring in extrahazardous employment.