Opinion Information Sheet
| Docket Number: | 60723-5 |
| Title of Case: | Arthur West & Walter Rl Jorgensen Et Al, Appellants V Port Of Olympia, Respondent |
| File Date: | 07/21/2008 |
| Appeal from Thurston Superior Court | |
| Docket No: | 06-2-00141-6 |
| Judgment or order under review | |
| Date filed: | 05/04/2006 |
| Judge signing: | Honorable Richard D Hicks |
| Authored by | C. Kenneth Grosse |
| Concurring: | Linda Lau |
| Stephen J Dwyer |
Counsel for Appellant(s) | |
| Philip Albert Talmadge | |
| Talmadge Fitzpatrick | |
| 18010 Southcenter Pkwy | |
| Tukwila, WA, 98188-4630 | |
| Emmelyn Hart-Biberfeld | |
| Talmadge Law Group PLLC | |
| 18010 Southcenter Pkwy | |
| Tukwila, WA, 98188-4630 | |
| William John Crittenden | |
| Attorney at Law | |
| 927 N Northlake Way Ste 301 | |
| Seattle, WA, 98103-3406 | |
Counsel for Defendant(s) | |
| Arthur West (Appearing Pro Se) | |
| 120 State Avenue Ne, 1497 | |
| Olympia, WA, 98501 | |
Counsel for Respondent(s) | |
| Carolyn A. Lake | |
| Goodstein Law Group PLLC | |
| 1001 Pacific Ave Ste 400 | |
| Tacoma, WA, 98402-4440 | |
| Eric J Camm | |
| The Otto Law Group PLLC | |
| 601 Union St Ste 4500 | |
| Seattle, WA, 98101-1359 | |
| Matthew R Hansen | |
| Graham & Dunn PC | |
| 2801 Alaskan Way Ste 300 | |
| Seattle, WA, 98121-1128 | |
| Jeffrey August Beaver | |
| Graham & Dunn PC | |
| Pier 70 | |
| 2801 Alaskan Way Ste 300 | |
| Seattle, WA, 98121-1128 | |
Counsel for Respondent Intervenor(s) | |
| Jeffrey August Beaver | |
| Graham & Dunn PC | |
| Pier 70 | |
| 2801 Alaskan Way Ste 300 | |
| Seattle, WA, 98121-1128 | |
| Matthew R Hansen | |
| Graham & Dunn PC | |
| 2801 Alaskan Way Ste 300 | |
| Seattle, WA, 98121-1128 | |
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Allied Daily Newspapers of Wash | |
| Michele Lynn Earl-Hubbard | |
| Allied Law Group, LLC | |
| 12354 30th Ave Ne | |
| Seattle, WA, 98125-5406 | |
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Newspaper Publishers Assoc | |
| Michele Lynn Earl-Hubbard | |
| Allied Law Group, LLC | |
| 12354 30th Ave Ne | |
| Seattle, WA, 98125-5406 | |
Amicus Curiae on behalf of The League of Women Voters of Washington | |
| Leslie Jean Olson | |
| Olson & Olson PLLC | |
| 1601 5th Ave Ste 2200 | |
| Seattle, WA, 98101-1625 | |
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Coalition for Open Government | |
| Michele Lynn Earl-Hubbard | |
| Allied Law Group, LLC | |
| 12354 30th Ave Ne | |
| Seattle, WA, 98125-5406 | |
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Evergreen Freedom Foundation | |
| Michael J Reitz | |
| Attorney at Law | |
| 2403 Pacific Ave Se | |
| Olympia, WA, 98501-2065 | |
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Newspaper Publishers Association | |
| Michele Lynn Earl-Hubbard | |
| Allied Law Group, LLC | |
| 12354 30th Ave Ne | |
| Seattle, WA, 98125-5406 | |
Counsel for Other Parties | |
| Arthur West (Appearing Pro Se) | |
| 120 State Avenue Ne 1497 | |
| Olympia, WA, 98501 | |
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
ARTHUR S. WEST, )
) No. 60723-5-I
Appellant, )
) DIVISION ONE
and )
) PUBLISHED OPINION
)
DAVID KOENIG, )
)
Appellant, )
)
and )
)
WALTER R. JORGENSEN, an )
?
individual, and EVE JOHNSON , an )
individual, )
)
Appellants, )
)
v. )
)
PORT OF OLYMPIA, a Washington )
municipal corporation, )
)
Respondent, )
)
and )
)
WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY, a )
Washington corporation, )
) FILED: July 21, 2008
Respondent. )
GROSSE, J. ? This case involves three separate public disclosure
requests for documents from the Port of Olympia (Port) regarding its lease
?
Eve Johnson is substituted as appellant in this matter for the League of Women
Voters of Thurston County by order of this court dated November 15, 2007.
No. 60723-5-I/2
negotiations with Weyerhaeuser Company. Because the Port had already
executed the lease with Weyerhaeuser at the time of this request, the Port?s
reliance upon that exemption to withhold records was improper. Once an
agency implements a policy or recommendation, records pertaining to that policy
or recommendation no longer fall within the ambit of the deliberative process
exemption of the public records act (PRA).1 We reverse and remand to the trial
court to determine whether any of the other exemptions claimed by the Port are
applicable.
FACTS
Walter Jorgensen and Eve Johnson2 (together Jorgensen), Arthur West,
and David Koenig, each made separate requests to the Port seeking public
disclosure of records pertaining to its lease negotiations with Weyerhaeuser.
The lease was executed on August 22, 2005. West made his initial request on
November 2, 2005, Jorgensen on January 6, 2006, and Koenig on January 17,
2006.
West requested the Port provide him with all relevant records including
?[a]n index to, and all Port records concerning, the recent repaving project and
other developments required in the Port?s recent contract with Weyerhaeuser,
including all correspondence, written or electronic.? West also requested any
records relating to the Port?s compliance with the State Environmental Policy Act
1 Chapter 42.56 RCW.
2 Eve Johnson is substituted for the League of Women Voters of Thurston
County.
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No. 60723-5-I/3
(SEPA).3 The Port responded by letter on November 16, 2005, declaring that
there was no index of the records, no paving project, and no SEPA records
associated with the lease. The Port did, however, enclose copies of the signed
Weyerhaeuser lease and its SEPA policy.
Dissatisfied with the Port?s response, West filed a pro se complaint in
Thurston County Superior Court contending the Port had wrongfully withheld
records in violation of the PRA. West made several further demands for
disclosure from the Port and served it with a show cause order setting a hearing
date for January 27, 2006. The Port disclosed some additional records and
provided West with a privilege log (and later a second privilege log) for those
documents it believed exempt from disclosure. The show cause hearing was
rescheduled to February 17, 2006, and Weyerhaeuser intervened later that
month.
Meanwhile, on January 6, 2006, Jorgensen also requested records from
the Port relating to the Weyerhaeuser lease. On January 11, the Port
responded, requesting additional time to review and prepare the records. The
Port subsequently disclosed a number of records on January 17 and 23, 2006.
On January 24, Jorgensen filed a complaint in the trial court alleging the Port
violated the PRA. Jorgensen also filed a motion to show cause and the Port
produced privilege logs on January 25 and 27, 2006.
On February 7, 2006, the Port presented the court with 2,409 pages of
3 Chapter 43.21C RCW.
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No. 60723-5-I/4
sealed documents that it claimed were exempt from disclosure along with related
privilege logs and requested in camera review for both the Jorgensen and West
actions. The trial court ruled that the Port had failed to respond to Jorgensen?s
records request in a timely manner and continued the show cause hearing. The
court also awarded Jorgensen costs and reasonable attorney fees to that date.
Weyerhaeuser then intervened in the Jorgensen action.
The Jorgensen and West actions were consolidated on March 3, 2006.
That same day, the Port disclosed a number of other documents. Weyerhaeuser
filed a brief arguing that specific documents were exempt from disclosure as
proprietary, private, and confidential.
After its in camera review of the 2,409 pages, the trial court issued a 51-
page memorandum decision. While the court found a number of documents to
be disclosable in their entirety or with redactions, it found that most of the
documents fell within the deliberative process and research data exemptions to
the PRA. The vast majority of the documents found exempt appear to pertain to
the lease negotiations and included earlier versions of the final lease signed on
August 22, 2005. The trial court found a number of documents exempt as
attorney-client communications. Additionally, the court found some documents
exempt as trade secrets.
On April 13, 2006, the Port produced 217 pages of documents ordered
released by the court. West, joined by Jorgensen, moved to have documents
disclosed that the Port had failed to release as ordered. The Port conceded that
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No. 60723-5-I/5
it had overlooked some records and released them.
Jorgensen, West and the Port all moved for reconsideration. Apart from
ordering the disclosure of a few additional documents, the trial court generally
denied the parties? claims on reconsideration. West then moved to have the
remaining records released under SEPA which the court denied.4 Jorgensen,
acting through new counsel, Philip Talmadge and Emmelyn Hart-Biberfeld,
moved for public disclosure penalties and attorney fees. The trial court
determined that records were improperly withheld for a total of 123 days.5 The
court set the penalty at $60 per day for each day the documents were withheld.
The trial court also reduced the amount of attorney fees requested both in hours
and in hourly fee charged by the attorneys.
Meanwhile, back on January 17, 2006, David Koenig submitted his own
public records request to the Port also seeking records related to the
Weyerhaeuser lease. The Port responded on January 19 and subsequently
sent Koenig a series of privilege logs that appeared to be identical to those filed
in the Jorgensen/West litigation. In April 2006, Koenig filed a complaint in the
trial court and Weyerhaeuser again intervened. The parties stipulated to the
entry of orders and rulings on disclosure identical to those made in the
Jorgensen/West action. Judgment was entered for Koenig for $9,360 in attorney
4 The court denied the motion in an oral ruling on July 7, 2006, though filing of
the written order was delayed until September 15, 2006, due to the untimely
death of Bernie Friedman, Jorgensen?s original attorney. Reconsideration was
denied on September 26, 2006.
5 The penalty period ran from January 28, 2006, the day the Port made its last
initial disclosure, to May 30, 2006, the date of its last disclosure.
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No. 60723-5-I/6
fees and costs and $6,960 in penalties (116 days at $60 per day).
The parties filed separate notices of appeals with the Washington
Supreme Court. West?s and Jorgensen?s suits were automatically consolidated
on appeal because they were consolidated at the trial court.6 The Supreme
Court denied direct review and transferred the case to the Court of Appeals,
Division Two. Division Two consolidated the Koenig appeal with
Jorgenson/West and then transferred the case to this court. Along the way,
several motions and rulings have been made, many of which involved pro se
litigant Arthur West.7 West?s objection to attorney fees has been dismissed
because of lack of standing.
ANALYSIS
The PRA ??is a strongly worded mandate for broad disclosure of public
records.??8 The legislation had its origins in an initiative put forth by Washington
citizens.9 The legislature clearly intended that exemptions to disclosure should
be narrowly construed.10
6 RAP 3.3(a).
7 West made several motions to this court all of which were denied. This court
retained the issue of whether terms should be awarded to Jorgensen?s attorneys
for the time spent on what amounted to frivolous motions. We grant Jorgensen?s
motion for terms and refer the matter to a commissioner to establish the amount
of attorney fees that should be awarded Jorgensen for their response to the
motions.
8 Soter v. Cowles Publ?g Co., 162 Wn.2d 716, 730, 174 P.3d 60 (2007) (quoting
Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wn.2d 123, 127, 580 P.2d 246 (1978)).
9 Initiative 276. Official Voters Pamphlet, 1972 General Election, November 7,
1972, at pages 10, 108.
10 King County v. Sheehan, 114 Wn. App. 325, 338, 57 P.3d 307 (2002) (?the
thrice-repeated legislative mandate that exemptions under the public records act
are to be narrowly construed?).
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No. 60723-5-I/7
Deliberative Process Exemption
The trial court found many of the documents exempt from disclosure
under the PRA?s deliberative process exemption. RCW 42.56.28011 provides:
Preliminary drafts, notes, recommendations, and intra-
agency memorandums in which opinions are expressed or policies
formulated or recommended are exempt under this chapter, except
that a specific record is not exempt when publicly cited by an
agency in connection with any agency action.
The purpose of this exemption is to permit ?frank and uninhibited discussion
during the decision-making process.?12 To come within the ambit of this
exemption, an agency must show:
· the records contain pre-decision opinions or recommendations
expressed as part of the deliberative process, and
· disclosure would be harmful to the deliberative or consultative
function of the process, and
· disclosure would interfere with the flow of recommendations,
observations, and opinions, and
· the records reflect policy recommendations and opinions and are
not simply the raw factual data underlying a decision.[13]
Records which contain subjective evaluations are not exempt if they are treated
as raw data and are not the subject of further deliberation and consideration.14
However, once the agency implements the policies or recommendations such
records are no longer exempt under the deliberative process exemption.15 Here,
11 Effective July 1, 2006, the public disclosure provisions formerly recodified in
chapter 42.17 RCW were made part of the newly named public records act and
codified in chapter 42.56 RCW (Laws of 2005, ch. 274, § 103). The applicable
statutory language is substantively the same.
12 Hearst Corp., 90 Wn.2d at 132.
13 Progressive Animal Welfare Soc?y (PAWS) v. University of Wash., 125 Wn.2d
243, 256, 884 P.2d 592 (1994).
14 PAWS, 125 Wn.2d at 256-57.
15 PAWS, 125 Wn.2d at 257.
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No. 60723-5-I/8
since the lease was executed prior to the records requests, documents relating
thereto were no longer covered by this exemption.
In upholding the Port?s nondisclosure of records, the trial court relied
extensively on this court?s decision in The American Civil Liberties Union of
Washington (ACLU) v. City of Seattle.16 The trial court?s ruling clearly indicates
that it viewed the deliberative process exemption as having been extended by
this court in that case. But, the trial court misread ACLU in finding the
deliberative process exemption applicable here.17 The records sought in ACLU
were lists of issues drawn up by a union and the City of Seattle for purposes of
contract negotiations. The court reasoned that the disputed lists were the
starting point of the negotiation process and the disclosure could negatively
impact that process. In reaching that decision, the ACLU court noted that ?labor
negotiations are an ongoing process? in which the participants ?must respond to
the ever-changing tableau of collective bargaining,?18 and further, that such a
tableau would not be complete until the parties adopted a contract.19
Here, the trial court extended ACLU?s reasoning to the Port because the
Port was constantly involved in the process of negotiating leases with different
tenants. The trial court reasoned that although the Port?s negotiations with
Weyerhaeuser for this particular lease were complete, public disclosure of
certain documents might adversely impact the Port?s ability to get the ?best deal?
16 121 Wn. App. 544, 89 P.3d 295 (2004).
17 ACLU, 121 Wn. App. 544.
18 ACLU, 121 Wn. App. at 553.
19 ACLU, 121 Wn. App at 554.
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No. 60723-5-I/9
in future negotiations. For instance, the Port could be disadvantaged in future
lease negotiations if the other party knew what terms or provisions the Port may
be willing to deviate from in its standard lease.
But the ACLU decision did not go so far. There the court stated:
This ongoing process involves negotiators and City officials in what
is the essence of the deliberative process. Until the results of this
policy-making process are presented to the city council for
adoption, politicization and media comments will by definition
inhibit the delicate balance ? the give-and-take of the City?s
positions on issues concerning the police department.[20]
Thus, the ACLU court impliedly held that the exemption applied only until the
results of the policy-making process were presented to the city council for
adoption. Here, the Port has already executed the lease. As noted in
Progressive Animal Welfare Society (PAWS) v. University of Washington,
?[o]nce the policies or recommendations are implemented, the records cease to
be protected under this exemption.?21 PAWS and ACLU both dictate our holding
that the deliberative process exemption was no longer applicable to the records
pertaining to the Weyerhaeuser lease. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court
to determine whether any of the other exemptions claimed by the Port are
applicable.
Other Exemptions
The trial court found a number of records non-disclosable as attorney-
client communications and trade secrets. The PRA does not require disclosure
20 ACLU, 121 Wn. App at 554 (emphasis added).
21 125 Wn.2d at 257 (citing Brouillet v. Cowles Publ?g Co., 114 Wn.2d 788, 799-
800, 791 P.2d 526 (1990)).
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No. 60723-5-I/10
of records either exempt or prohibited from disclosure under other statutes.22
Communications between an attorney and their client are statutorily privileged.23
And, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act protects trade secrets.24 Jorgensen does
not contend that the trial court erred in finding a number of documents non-
disclosable as attorney-client communications and trade secrets.25 Thus, we did
not consider the trial court?s specific rulings regarding those exemptions.
In addition to the deliberative process exemption, the Port also claimed
several documents equally exempt under the research data exemption.26 In its
ruling regarding some documents, the trial court correctly found the research
data exemption not applicable. Research data was defined in Servais v. Port of
Bellingham as a ??body of facts and information collected for a specific purpose
and derived from close, careful study, or from scholarly or scientific investigation
or inquiry.??27
However, the record before us indicates that the trial court did not
necessarily consider other exemptions claimed by the Port once it found the
deliberative process exemption applied. In its March 29, 2006 order, the trial
court noted:
22 RCW 42.56.070(1).
23 RCW 5.60.060(2)(a).
24 Chapter 19.108 RCW.
25 West does argue that the attorney-client privilege is inapplicable, but his
briefing is inadequate to merit review. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley,
118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).
26 RCW 42.56.270(1) states that ?research data obtained by any agency within
five years of the request for disclosure when disclosure would produce private
gain and public loss.?
27 127 Wn.2d 820, 832, 904 P.2d 1124 (1995).
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No. 60723-5-I/11
[T]his court did not address every reason why an exemption might
be claimed in every case unless it was necessary to rule out a
claim. Once an exemption was determined it was not necessary
for the court to engage in any further analysis that achieved the
same result. Sometimes the court did address all the arguments
when the exemption could have been claimed on more than one
basis but this was to offer future guidance of a general nature for
subsequent rulings herein and not considered necessary in every
instance.
As a result, these issues will have to be addressed on remand should the parties
pursue them.
Weyerhaeuser also asserted several items exempt as trade secrets.
Trade Secrets are defined under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), chapter
19.108 RCW. To fall within the ambit of the trade secret exemption such
information must be ??novel? in the sense that the information must not be readily
ascertainable from another source.?28 The definition of a trade secret is a matter
of law under the UTSA, but the determination of whether specific information is a
trade secret is a factual question.29 Weyerhaeuser requests that we sustain the
trial court?s findings and conclusions regarding the applicability of the UTSA to
those documents. However, the parties did not appeal from those rulings and
we will not consider them on appeal.
SEPA
West argues that SEPA30 mandates that all documents relating to the
Weyerhaeuser lease be disclosed. To support this proposition West cites two
28 Spokane Research & Defense Fund v. City of Spokane, 96 Wn. App. 568,
578, 983 P.2d 676 (1999).
29 Ed Nowogroski Ins., Inc. v. Rucker, 137 Wn.2d 427, 971 P.2d 936 (1999).
30 Chapter 43.21C RCW.
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No. 60723-5-I/12
cases, neither of which are apropos to the case at bar. The court in Norway Hill
v. King County Council evaluated the information the government should
consider in its decision-making, not the extent such information should be
disclosed to the public.31 Likewise, King County v. Washington State Boundary
Review Board is inapposite.32 That case dealt with evaluating the type of
information government bodies should consider in their decision-making
processes, not whether such information should be disclosed.
West fails to cite any specific provisions of SEPA that mandate unlimited
disclosure. Indeed, the Department of Ecology?s own regulations require it to
comply with the PRA. SEPA is not applicable here and does not provide for
more disclosure than the PRA.
Penalty
Jorgensen and West contend the trial court erred when it failed to assess
a daily penalty for each individual record withheld. Koenig disagrees, but
requests he be treated equally in the event Jorgensen and West prevail on this
claim. RCW 42.56.550(4) provides that in addition to attorney fees and costs,
?[i]t shall be within the discretion of the court to award such person an amount
not less than five dollars and not to exceed one hundred dollars for each day? a
record is improperly withheld. The court in Yousoufian v. Ron Sims held that
under the PRA ?penalties need not be assessed per record, and that trial courts
must assess a per day penalty for each day a record is wrongfully withheld.?33
31 87 Wn.2d 267, 272, 552 P.2d 674 (1976).
32 122 Wn.2d 648, 664, 860 P.2d 1024 (1993).
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Here, the records reviewed by the trial court were in packets and comprised of
multiple pages. The court clearly found the Port had improperly withheld
documents and acted contrary to the express purpose of the PRA. However, the
court also found the Port?s behavior was not so egregious as to mandate the
maximum penalty. The trial court chose to impose a daily penalty rather than a
per record penalty.
We review a trial court?s award of statutory public disclosure penalties for
an abuse of discretion.34 A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is
manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds.35 We do not
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court?s but seek only to determine if
substantial evidence supports the trial court?s conclusion.36 Here, however, we
are unable to determine whether the trial court would have assessed that same
penalty had it applied the correct legal standard in reviewing the documents
withheld by the Port. Thus on remand, the trial court may choose to impose a
more stringent penalty.
Attorney Fees
While the award of attorney fees under the PRA is not discretionary, the
amount awarded is.37 Mahler v. Szucs requires a court to use the lodestar
method in determining the amount of an award of attorney fees and costs.38
33 152 Wn.2d 421, 425, 98 P.3d 463 (2004).
34 Yousoufian, 152 Wn.2d at 431.
35 King County v. Seawest Inv. Assocs., LLC, 141 Wn. App. 304, 314, 170 P.3d
53 (2007).
36 Kunkel v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 114 Wn.2d 896, 903, 792 P.2d 1254 (1990).
37 Amren v. City of Kalama, 131 Wn.2d 25, 35, 929 P.2d 389 (1997).
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Under this method, a court must determine whether counsel expended a
reasonable number of hours in securing a successful recovery for the client,
exclude any duplicative or wasteful hours, and determine the reasonableness of
counsel?s hourly rate.39
Here, the trial court awarded fees in an amount less than the request,
both for the hours spent and for the hourly charge. Jorgensen does not dispute
the trial court?s ruling on the number of hours for which fees should be awarded,
only the hourly fee restriction imposed.
Jorgensen requested an attorney fee award of $300 per hour for
Freidman and Talmadge and $225 per hour for Hart-Biberfeld. The Port?s
attorneys were billing $200 per hour pursuant to a retainer agreement. The
court limited attorney fees to $250 per hour for all attorneys.
Jorgensen argues that the trial court?s restriction on attorney fee amounts
to those charged by Olympia-based attorneys might deter lawyers in larger
markets from bringing PRA cases as suits of this nature will almost inevitably be
brought in Thurston County. But the trial court did not make its award solely on
that basis.
The trial court made the following findings of fact with regard to the
attorney fees:
12. Washington courts have adopted the lodestar method to
assess reasonable attorney fees in public records cases. This
methodology is a guiding light and not an anchor. It requires the
Court to determine what a reasonable hourly rate is in the
38 135 Wn.2d, 398, 433, 957 P.2d 632 (1998).
39 Mahler, 135 Wn.2d at 433-34.
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community for work of this nature, taking into account the
uniqueness of the question, the novelty of the issues, the
experience of the attorneys , and the venue in which the parties
find themselves. A lodestar award is arrived at by multiplying a
reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably worked.
13. Bernard Friedman?s rate of $300 per hour is not
reasonable for a case of this nature. Although Philip Talmadge
can bill $300 per hour for work that requires his special expertise,
that rate is unreasonable in a case of this type. $250 per hour for
Emmelyn Hart-Biberfeld is a reasonable hourly rate given that she
performed the majority of the work on the motion. The court
therefore finds that the reasonable hourly rate for all attorneys is
$250.00
14. The next step in the lodestar calculation is to determine
the reasonable number of hours expended by counsel. The Court
is not required to accept unquestioningly fee affidavits from
counsel. From the Court?s previous experience in this case and in
private practice, the Court finds that 6 hours per day for two
working weeks, or a total of 60 hours of attorney time, is
reasonable for the work of the Talmadge Law Group.
15. The reasonable number of hours for Mr. Friedman to
have expended in this case, from start to finish, is 150 hours.
Clearly, the trial court considered the various factors enumerated in
Mahler. Hence, we cannot say that the limitation imposed on attorney fees was
an abuse of discretion.
Jorgensen and Koenig request an award of attorney fees on appeal. As
the prevailing parties they are entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to
RAP 18.1.40 Because we are otherwise remanding this matter, we also remand
for a determination by the trial court of attorney fees and costs at the conclusion
of all proceedings.
40 PAWS v. University of Wash., 114 Wn.2d 677, 690-91, 790 P.2d 604 (1990).
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No. 60723-5-I/16
We affirm the trial court?s ruling in part and reverse and remand this
cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WE CONCUR:
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