[No. 9309. Department One. April 25, 1911.]
JOHN J. PETH et al., Respondents, v. EDDIE E. SPEAR et al,
Appellants. «1»
CHARITIES - CREATION - PURPOSE OF TRUST - EDUCATION. A
charitable trust for educational purposes is created by
conveyances in trust for the benefit of the membership of a
brotherhood for the purpose of a communal industrial institution
and the education of the people in the principles of socialism.
CHARITIES - BENEFICIARIES - CERTAINTY. A conveyance for
charitable purposes, in trust for the membership, now existing or
hereafter to exist, of an unincorporated brotherhood, is not
invalid because the beneficiaries are an unascertained or
uncertain body or class, that being characteristic of charitable
trusts.
CHARITIES - CESSATION OF USE - QUIETING TITLE - ANSWER. In an
action to quiet title, an answer alleging that a charitable trust
had failed by reason of the fact that the beneficiaries had
procured a dissolution of the society through the courts, and a
judicial sale of the land, which was void, does not show that the
title reverted to the donors of the trust, but only shows a
cessation of the uses for which the property was devoted, and is
insufficient, on demurrer, to show title in the successors of the
donors.
«1» Reported in 115 Pac. 164.
292 PETH v. SPEAR.
Opinion Per FULLERTON, J. 63 Wash.
Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Skagit
county, Joiner, J., entered May 24, 1910, upon findings in
favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before the
court without a jury, in an action to quiet title. Affirmed.
Parker & Brown, for appellants.
Million, Houser & Shrauger, for respondents.
FULLERTON, J. - The respondents brought this action
against the appellants, Eddie E. Spear, David H. Barry,
Inza J. Barry, his wife, and others, to quiet title to certain
real property situated in Skagit county. The complainants
did not attempt to deraign their title in their complaint, but
alleged generally that they were the owners in fee simple of
the land in question, that they were in possession and
entitled to the possession of the same, and that the appellants
claimed some title, interest or estate in the premises adverse
to them, which claim, they further alleged, was invalid,
unlawful, and of no effect. The prayer of the complaint was for
a decree quieting title to the property in the plaintiffs against
the claims of the defendants. Of the persons made
defendants and served with process, the appellants above named
alone appeared. They filed an answer to the complaint,
putting in issue the allegations of title and ownership in the
plaintiffs, admitting, however, their possession of the lands;
and by way of an affirmative answer, deraigned the source of
the plaintiffs' title as well as their own, averring that they
had an equitable title to the property superior to the title
of the plaintiffs. The trial court sustained a demurrer to
the affirmative answer, and after the election of the
appellants to stand thereon, tried the issues raised by the
allegations of the complaint and the denials thereof contained in
the answer, finally entering a decree quieting title to the
premises as prayed for in the complaint. The question for
determination therefore is, does the affirmative answer show
such title to the premises in the appellants as entitles them
to question the title and possession of the respondents.
PETH v. SPEAR. 293
Apr. 1911 Opinion Per FULLERTON, J.
In the affirmative answer it was alleged, in substance, that
on December 30, 1897, certain named persons purchased
portion of the land in question, and caused it to be deeded
to one G.E. Pelton, who took it and held it in trust for the
purchasers, agreeing to convey it at such time to such
persons and on such conditions as the purchasers should direct.
That on the next day, pursuant to the direction of the
purchasers, Pelton conveyed the property to certain named
persons, some seven in number, in trust for the benefit of the
"membership now existing and hereafter to exist of the
Brotherhood of the Co-Operative Commonwealth," which is
described as an "unincorporated association or body of
persons acting together for the purpose of owning, acquiring,
operating, conducting and maintaining a communal
industrial institution, and the education of the people in the
principles of socialism." On June 1, 1898, the remainder of
the tract in question was deeded to a body of seven trustees,
all of whom are named in the body of the deed. The persons
named as trustees, however, are not the same as those named
in the first deed, three of those first named being omitted and
three others substituted. The conditions of the latter deed
were the same as the first.
As to the manner in which the trust was administered
the trustees, the answer is somewhat meager. It can be
gathered therefrom, however, that the trustees permitted
any one who claimed to belong to the general class above
described to enter upon and occupy the premises for such
period of time as be desired to stay on payment of a certain
membership fee. As to the immediate management of the
brotherhood's internal affairs, such as the uses to which the
land should be put, the number of hours any one should labor,
and the character of the labor each should perform, seems to
have been left to the members themselves.
It appears that the brotherhood during its earlier history
enjoyed fair prosperity. The land was cleared and brought
into a high state of cultivation, and useful and extensive
294 PETH v. SPEAR.
Opinion Per FULLERTON, J. 63 Wash.
buildings and other improvements were constructed thereon.
It is alleged, however, that dissensions gradually began to
creep in; that the brotherhood gradually filled up with a
class of persons having none of the virtues of industry
possessed by the earlier members; that these newer members soon
began to put in practice vices not in consonance with the laws
of the land, nor in consonance with the more strict ideas of
the earlier members; that the result was the division of the
membership into factions, which engaged in bitter quarrels
and riotous actions over the right to the management and
control of the organization and the possession of its property;
that these finally became so bitter that a resort to an action
in court was had, in which a receiver was appointed, the
property sold, and the proceeds divided up between the
several members of the brotherhood, which then dispersed.
It is then alleged that the plaintiffs derive their title
through this sale; that the title so acquired is invalid and
void for want of jurisdiction of the court making the sale,
over the persons in whom the legal and equitable title to the
property was vested, such persons not being parties to the
proceedings under which the property was sold; that the
defendants named, appellants here, are the successors in
interest of the persons who originally paid the purchase price
of the land; that as such they have the superior equitable title
to the property against all the world; and that they are
entitled to a decree transforming their equitable title into a
legal title, and awarding the possession of the property to
them.
Based on the facts recited, the appellants argue that the
uses expressed in the trust deeds are not charitable; that the
trust is void because there are no ascertained beneficiaries,
and no beneficiaries capable of ascertainment for whose benefit
the trust can be enforced; that since the trust expressed is
void, the transaction resulted in an implied trust, in which
the trustees named in the deed held the legal title for the
benefit of the persons who paid the purchase price; and since
PETH v. SPEAR. 295
Apr. 1911 Opinion Per FULLERTON, J.
the appellants are the successors in interest of such persons,
they are now entitled to declare the trust at an end and have
the legal title of the trustees conveyed to them, and such
rights in the property as pertain to and follow the legal and
equitable title.
But we think the appellants are mistaken in their
contention that the use for which the property was donated by their
predecessors in interest was not a charitable use. Since the
purpose of its donors was to provide a place where the
doctrines of socialism could be taught by example as well as
by precept, the trust can be said to belong to that species
of charitable trusts known as educational. As such it is
among the objects enumerated as charitable by the statute
of 43 Eliz., c. 4, and within practically all the definitions
of a charitable use as announced by the authorities. As is
said in 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (3d ed.), SS 1023:
"Gifts, devises, and bequests in trust for educational
purposes are valid, since they are all clearly within the spirit of
the statute. This class embraces all trust for the founding,
endowing, and supporting schools and other similar institutions
which are not strictly private; for the establishment of
professorships, and maintenance of teachers; for the education
of designated classes of persons, as the poor children of
a town; for the promotion of science and scientific studies;
and generally for the advancement of knowledge, learning,
and education."
Nor is the trust rendered invalid by the fact that the
beneficiaries of the trust are an indefinite number of persons or
of an uncertain body or class. Indeed, these requisites are
essential to a charitable trust.
"One of the distinguishing elements of a 'charitable' as
compared with an ordinary trust consists in the generality,
indefiniteness, and even uncertainty which is permitted in
describing the objects and purposes or the beneficiaries. From
the very definition of a 'charitable trust' the beneficiaries are
always an uncertain body or class; but the doctrine goes
further than this. If the donor sufficiently shows his intention
to create a charity, and indicates its general nature and
296 PETH v. SPEAR.
Opinion Per FULLERTON, J. 63 Wash.
purpose, and describes in general terms the class of
beneficiaries, the trust will be sustained and enforced, although
there may be indefiniteness in the declaration and description,
and although much may be left to the discretion of the
trustees." 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (3d ed.),
SS 1025.
So in Russell v. Allen 107 U.S. 163, it was said:
"By the law of England from before the Statute of 43 Eliz.
c. 4, and by the law of this country at the present day (except
in those states in which it has been restricted by statute or
judicial decision, as in Virginia, Maryland, and more recently
in New York), trusts for public charitable purposes are
upheld under circumstances under which private trusts would
fail. Being for objects of permanent interest and benefit to
the public, they may be perpetual in their duration, and are
not within the rule against perpetuities; and the instruments
creating them should be so construed as to give them effect
if possible, and to carry out the general intention of the
donor, when clearly manifested, even if the particular form
or manner pointed out by him cannot be followed. They
may, and indeed must, be for the benefit of an indefinite
number of persons; for if all the beneficiaries are personally
designated, the trust lacks the essential element of indefiniteness,
which is one characteristic of a legal charity. If the founder
describes the general nature of the charitable trust, he may
leave the details of its administration to be settled by trustees
under the superintendence of a court of chancery; and an
omission to name trustees, or the death or declination of the
trustees named, will not defeat the trust, but the court will
appoint new trustees in their stead."
Since, therefore, the trust was valid, and the uses for which
the property was donated were capable of being carried into
effect, it follows that the trust is still in existence and the
appellants are without interest, unless it can be said that the
purposes of the express trust have failed. As to this the
answer is silent. The only allegation in the answer on this
subject is that certain of the so-called beneficiaries of the
trust procured a dissolution of the society through the courts,
sold the trust property, divided the proceeds among themselves,
and left the land. If this proceeding was invalid, as
STATE v. MORROW. 297
Apr. 1911 Syllabus.
the appellants contend, then there has been no sale of the
property or dissolution of the society, and hence no failure of
the purposes of the trust. On the other hand, if the
proceedings be valid, then there was a valid disposition of the
property which cut off the appellants' interests and they cannot
recover in any event. But we think a proper construction of
the answer is that there has been only a cessation of the use
for which the property was originally donated, and that
such use can be resumed again at any time by the trustees
named in the deeds.
This view of the case renders it unnecessary to discuss the
validity of the respondents' title. Since the appellants have
none, they cannot question the possession which concededly
the respondents have. The judgment is affirmed.
DUNBAR, C.J., PARKER, J. and MOUNT, JJ., concur.