[Nos. 30864-2-III; 30865-1-III. Division Three. November 14, 2013.]
Affirmed.
Brian T. Rekofke (of Witherspoon Kelley); Leslie R. Weatherhead and Geana M. Van Dessel (of Lee & Hayes PLLC); Mary H. Spillane (of Williams Kastner & Gibbs); and Megan Murphy (of Thorner Kennedy Gano), for appellants.
Mark D. Kamitomo (of The Markam Group Inc.); Jess G. Casey (of Casey Law Offices PS); and George M. Ahrend (of Ahrend Albrecht PLLC), for respondents.AUTHOR: Stephen M. Brown, J. WE CONCUR: Laurel H. Siddoway, A.C.J., George B. Fearing, J.Stephen M. Brown
(1) instructing the jury on a medical patient's lost chance of survival; (2) ruling res judicata precluded them from allocating fault to the physicians; (3) denying their motion for judgment as a matter of law; (4) denying their request for entry of judgment in their favor upon the special verdict; and (5) denying their request for a judgment award limited to the estate's damages or alternatively, 70 percent of both respondents' damages. We reject all of appellants' contentions and affirm. FACTS Q. Doctor, looking at this case and taking into account all of the records that you reviewed, do you have an opinion as to whether or not had Mrs. Dormaier been properly diagnosed with pulmonary embolus and treated with anticoagulation, whether she would have survived? A. It's been my experience over the entire time of my career that if we can diagnose this, we have a good chance once beginning therapy to take a mortality rate of possibly 70 to 80 percent and bring it down into the ten to 20 percent rate. . . . . Q. So based upon your earlier testimony, Doctor, if you factor out cardiopulmonary function people and the terminal illness people, my understanding is that the percentage of people that survive from this treatment is approximately 90 percent? A. Right. When you strip away the people who have very, very bad chronic medical conditions which lead them to have no reserve or people with cancers and other much more rare conditions that are life-threatening. Q. And in your opinion, would Mrs. Dormaier, if appropriately treated, have had a 90 percent chance of survival? A. I believe so. Report of Proceedings (RP) at 258-60. In this case, there is no issue for you to consider regarding the negligence, if any, of Daniel Canfield, MD or of Kenneth Hart, MD. You must not speculate regarding any such negligence, or the absence thereof, and must resolve the claims of the parties in this case based upon the evidence admitted, without regard to whether or not Dr. Canfield or Dr. Hart were negligent. You may consider the evidence regarding the conduct of Dr. Canfield and Dr. Hart, along with all other evidence in the case, in determining whether or not Mr. Misasi complied with the applicable standard of care. CP at 266; RP at 1433-34. If you find that Defendant Robert Masasi [sic] failed to comply with the applicable standard of care and was therefore negligent, you may consider whether or not his negligence proximately caused damages to Ruth Dormaier in the nature of loss or diminution of a chance to survive the condition which caused her death. If you find that such negligence proximately caused a loss or diminution of a chance to survive, then you will determine the magnitude of the loss or diminution by comparing two percentages: (1) Ruth Dormaier's chance of surviving the condition which caused her death as it would have been had defendant not been negligent, and (2) the chance of surviving as affected by any negligence you find on the part of defendant. The difference in the two percentages, if any you find, is the percentage of loss or diminution in the chance of survival. If you find that the loss or diminution of a chance to survive was in excess of 50%, then you have found that such negligence was a proximate cause of the death. On the other hand, if you find that the loss or diminution of a chance to survive was less than 50%, then any damages you find to have been experienced because of the death of Ruth Dormaier will be reduced by multiplying the total damages by the percentage of loss or diminution in the chance of survival. CP at 273; RP at 1438-39. QUESTION 1: Was defendant Robert Misasi negligent? ANSWER: Yes (write "yes" or "no") INSTRUCTION: If you answered "no" to Question 1, do not answer any other questions; sign this verdict form and notify the bailiff. If you answered "yes" to Question 1, proceed to Question 2. QUESTION 2: Was the defendant's negligence a proximate cause of the death of Ruth M. Dormaier? ANSWER: No (write "yes" or "no") INSTRUCTION: If you answered "no" to Question 2, proceed to Question 3. If you answered "yes" to Question 2, do not answer Question 3 or 4; proceed to Question 5. QUESTION 3: Was the defendant's negligence a proximate cause of a loss or diminution of Ruth M. Dormaier's chance to survive the condition which caused her death? ANSWER: Yes (write "yes" or "no") INSTRUCTION: If you answered "no" to Question 3, do not answer any other questions; sign this verdict form and notify the bailiff. If you answered "yes" to Question 3, proceed to Question 4. QUESTION 4: What do you find to be the percentage of loss or diminution in Ruth M. Dormaier's chance to survive proximately caused by the negligence of defendant? ANSWER: 70% (write a percentage) INSTRUCTION: Proceed to Question 5. QUESTION 5: What do you find to be the plaintiffs' amount of damages? ANSWER: Estate of Ruth M. Dormaier: $ 20,481.22 Lourence C. Dormaier: $ 1,300,000.00 INSTRUCTION: Proceed to Question 6. QUESTION 6: Was Robert Misasi the apparent agent of Samaritan Hospital? ANSWER: Yes (write "yes" or "no") INSTRUCTION: Sign this verdict form and notify the bailiff. CP at 357-58. At least 10 polled jurors ratified each answer. Appellants unsuccessfully requested a favorable judgment or limited judgment award. Had the jury found that the diminution of chance to survive was less than 50%, then the court would have been required to reduce the jury's finding of damages by that figure. However, where the reduction in chance to survive is itself found to be greater than 50%, it becomes, as a matter of law, a concurrent proximate cause of the death (or, of the "failure to survive"). CP at 1257-58. Accordingly, the trial court entered a $1,320,481.22 judgment for respondents without applying a 30 percent reduction. Mr. Misasi and Samaritan Hospital appealed. ANALYSIS A. Lost Chance Instruction (1) May a plaintiff argue the lost chance doctrine where the defendant's negligence reduced the decedent's chance of survival by greater than 50 percent? (2) Does substantial evidence support a lost chance instruction here? (3) Did respondents need to plead a lost chance of survival as a separate cause of action? [1-6] "Rather than full damages for the adverse outcome, the plaintiff is only compensated for the lost opportunity. The lost opportunity may be thought of as the adverse outcome discounted by the difference between the ex ante probability of the outcome in light of the defendant's negligence and the probability of the outcome absent the defendant's negligence." Mohr, 172 Wn.2d at 858 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM $ 26 cmt. n; see also Herskovits, 99 Wn.2d at 635 (Pearson, J., concurring) (quoting King, supra, 90 YALE L.J. at 1382). (1) where the defendant's negligence reduced the decedent's chance of survival by less than or equal to 50 percent, the loss of a chance is the injury and the plaintiff receives proportional compensation under the lost chance doctrine, but where the defendant's negligence reduced the decedent's chance of survival by greater than 50 percent, as a matter of law, the death remains the injury and the plaintiff receives all-or-nothing recovery under traditional tort principles; (2) the evidence supported a lost chance instruction; and (3) respondents did not have to plead a lost chance of survival as a separate cause of action because it was part of their wrongful death claim based on medical negligence. 1. Lost Chance Percentage The three cases where the chance of survival was greater than 50 percent . . . are unexceptional in that they focus on the death of the decedent as the injury, and they require proximate cause to be shown beyond the balance of probabilities. Such a result is consistent with existing principles in this state . . . . Id. at 631 (emphasis added). Thus, the plurality thought a greater than 50 percent reduction in the decedent's chance of survival was the same as proximate cause of the decedent's death under traditional tort principles. See id. 2. Substantial Evidence [7] [8] [9] 3. Pleading Requirements [10] [11-15] [16-19] [20] [21, 22] [23] B. Fault Allocation Rulings [24-27] [28] [29, 30] I suspect that it's about a 99 percent chance we're not going to apportion fault. . . . . . . . I don't think I'm going to apportion fault to either of these gentlemen . . . . . . . I don't think I'm going to apportion fault to Dr. Hart and Dr. Canfield. On the contrary, I think the position of Mr. Misasi, of the hospital is that none of the people involved in this case were negligent, including Mr. Misasi. . . . . . . . I don't anticipate anyone on the defense side saying that there was negligence committed by Dr. Hart . . . or by Dr. Canfield . . . because it is our position that the defendant, that all of the originally named defendants, none of them were negligent. RP at 82, 105, 108-10. After the trial court granted motions in limine 1 and 14, the parties revisited the ruling several times during trial, when appellants said, I believe I stood up when we were arguing your ruling and said, I will -- defendants will not apportion fault, we're not going to try to put Dr. Hart and Dr. Canfield on the verdict form. . . . . . . . I don't know that it makes a difference whether Dr. Hart and Dr. Canfield were negligent or not. I'm not going to apportion fault to them. . . . . . . . I'm not going to say they were negligent. . . . . . . . [M]y recollection of the ruling of the court was we could not apportion fault, we certainly aren't going to, we never were as to Dr. Canfield or Dr. Hart. RP at 670-71, 678, 962. When the trial court decided to instruct the jury not to consider whether Drs. Canfield and Hart were negligent, Mr. Misasi objected, arguing the instruction was irrelevant. [31] C. Judgment as a Matter of Law [32, 33] [34] [35, 36] [37, 38] If a patient presents symptoms of a pulmonary embolus, performing a computed tomography (CT) scan can show the blood clot in the lungs' blood vessels. A CT scan is the most common method of revealing a pulmonary embolus. It has a 90 percent success rate and takes about an hour. Mrs. Dormaier presented symptoms of a pulmonary embolus and pelvic pain. Samaritan Hospital had a CT scanner and Mrs. Dormaier's medical records indicate she could have undergone a CT scan. Performing a CT scan would have revealed Mrs. Dormaier's pulmonary emboli or pelvic deep venous thrombosis. If a patient presents a confirmed blood clot, administering heparin, an anticoagulant, can prevent additional clots from forming, prevent existing clots from growing and detaching, and promote dissolution of existing clots by allowing the body's natural mechanisms to operate unimpeded. Heparin is the fastest acting and most commonly used anticoagulant. It has a 90 percent success rate and takes hours or days. Administering Heparin would have significantly reduced Mrs. Dormaier's risk of a fatal pulmonary embolism. A patient presenting symptoms of a pulmonary embolus and no complicating terminal illness will have about a 90 percent chance of survival if properly diagnosed and treated. Properly diagnosing and treating a pulmonary embolus may reduce patient mortality from 70 or 80 percent to 10 or 20 percent, which the jury could reasonably infer increases patient survival from 20 or 30 percent to 80 or 90 percent. Mrs. Dormaier presented symptoms of a pulmonary embolus and no complicating terminal illness. She would have had a 90 percent chance of survival if properly diagnosed and treated. From this conclusion, the jury could reasonably infer all previously stated percentages applied to Mrs. Dormaier. Mrs. Dormaier's last pulmonary embolism was survivable and her death was preventable; the key was proper diagnosis and treatment. But "[t]aking her to the operating room was almost euthanizing her." RP at 395. Respondents' expert witnesses rendered each of the opinions above "to a reasonable degree of medical probability or certainty." RP at 260, 398, 604, 646, 925-26, 1166. D. Special Verdict Answers [39] [40-42] [43-45] [46-49] E. Damages [50] [51, 52] [53] "When a defendant's negligent action or inaction has effectively terminated a person's chance of survival, it does not lie in the defendant's mouth to raise conjectures as to the measure of the chances that he has put beyond the possibility of realization. If there was any substantial possibility of survival and the defendant has destroyed it, he is answerable." Id. at 625-26 (Pearson, J., concurring) (quoting Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1966)). Neither rationale is furthered by reducing recovery where the defendant's negligence proximately caused the decedent's death. SIDDOWAY, A.C.J., and FEARING, J., concur.