Opinion Information Sheet
| Docket Number: | 84894-7 |
| Title of Case: | Stafne v. Snohomish County |
| File Date: | 03/08/2012 |
| Oral Argument Date: | 11/10/2011 |
| Appeal from Skagit County Superior Court | |
| 08-2-01379-3 | |
| Honorable John M Meyer | |
| Barbara A. Madsen | Signed Majority | |
| Charles W. Johnson | Majority Author | |
| Tom Chambers | Signed Majority | |
| Susan Owens | Signed Majority | |
| Mary E. Fairhurst | Signed Majority | |
| James M. Johnson | Signed Majority | |
| Debra L. Stephens | Signed Majority | |
| Charles K. Wiggins | Signed Majority | |
| Steven C. González | Did Not Participate | |
| Gerry L. Alexander, Justice Pro Tem. | Signed Majority |
Counsel for Petitioner(s) | |
| Bree Urban | |
| Civil Div Snohomish County Prosecutor's | |
| 3000 Rockefeller Ave | |
| Everett, WA, 98201-4046 | |
| John Roberts Moffat | |
| Civil Div Snohomish County Prosecutor's | |
| 3000 Rockefeller Ave | |
| Everett, WA, 98201-4046 | |
Counsel for Respondent(s) | |
| Scott Erik Stafne | |
| Stafne Law Firm | |
| 239 N Olympic Ave | |
| Arlington, WA, 98223-1336 | |
| Michael Barr King | |
| Carney Badley Spellman PS | |
| 701 5th Ave Ste 3600 | |
| Seattle, WA, 98104-7010 | |
| Scott E. Stafne (Appearing Pro Se) | |
| 8411 State Route 92 | |
| Suite 6 | |
| Granite Falls,, WA, 98252 | |
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington State Association of | |
| Timothy J. Donaldson | |
| Walla Walla City Attorney | |
| 15 N 3rd Ave | |
| Walla Walla, WA, 99362-1859 | |
| J Preston Frederickson | |
| City of Walla Walla | |
| 15 N 3rd Ave | |
| Walla Walla, WA, 99362-1859 | |
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Association of Prosec | |
| Darren E. Carnell | |
| Office of the Prosecuting Attorney | |
| 516 3rd Ave Rm W400 | |
| Seattle, WA, 98104-2385 | |
| Jennifer M Stacy | |
| King Co Prosecuting Attorney's Office | |
| 516 3rd Ave Rm W400 | |
| Seattle, WA, 98104-2362 | |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
SCOTT E. STAFNE, a single man, )
) No. 84894-7
Respondent and )
Cross Petitioner, )
)
v. ) En Banc
)
SNOHOMISH COUNTY and )
SNOHOMISH COUNTY PLANNING )
DEPARTMENT and TROY )
HOLBROOK, in his position as a )
Snohomish County Planner, )
)
Petitioners and )
Cross Respondents. )
______________________________ ) Filed March 8, 2012
C. JOHNSON, J.?This case involves whether a landowner seeking review
of a county?s decision not to adopt a proposed comprehensive plan amendment must
appeal to the growth management hearings board (growth board) before seeking a
remedy in superior court. This case also involves whether a party is entitled to a
constitutional writ of certiorari or declaratory relief under the circumstances of this
case.
Cause No. 84894-7
The superior court granted Snohomish County?s motion to dismiss Scott
Stafne?s land use petition and complaint. The Court of Appeals held that based on
its conclusion that appeal to the growth board would be futile, the complaint was
properly filed in superior court under the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), chapter
36.70C of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW) but affirmed the dismissal on
other grounds. Both parties were granted review. We affirm, but hold that decisions
related to amendment of comprehensive plans must be appealed to the growth board
under the procedures provided for in the Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter
36.70A RCW, and failure to do so precludes superior court review. We also hold
that a constitutional writ and declaratory relief are unavailable under the
circumstances of this case.
FACTS
Scott Stafne, the petitioner and attorney acting pro se throughout most of
these proceedings, owns a 20-acre lot in Twin Falls Estates, an area currently
designated under Snohomish County?s comprehensive plan as low density rural
residential. Stafne bought a section of land adjacent to his property from the
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) that was designated under the plan as
commercial forest land (CFL) and forest transition area (FTA), which is at issue in
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Cause No. 84894-7
this case.
Stafne sought and had been granted a boundary line adjustment allowing him
to incorporate the newly acquired land onto his existing lot, though the acquired
land retained its CFL and FTA status. In October 2007, Stafne submitted a docket
proposal to the Snohomish County Council (Council) requesting the Council
legislatively amend the County?s comprehensive plan to redesignate the CFL and
FTA portions of his property to low density rural residential. Stafne has generally
maintained that his acquired land should be redesignated because the land, which is
characterized by streams, wetlands, and very steep slopes, could not be considered
?forest land? under the GMA.1 Snohomish County considers such docket proposals
annually. Snohomish County Code (SCC) 30.74.015; RCW 36.70A.130(2)(a).
Stafne addressed the Council at the June 9, 2008, public hearing, arguing that
under the statute, his acquired land should not be designated forest land and
requested that the comprehensive plan be amended. He pointed out that the land had
been acquired from DNR because DNR had determined the land was not
appropriate for commercial logging. Stafne also argued the County?s planning
1 RCW 36.70A.030(8), in relevant part, defines ??[f]orest land?? as ?land primarily
devoted to growing trees for long-term commercial timber production on land that can be
economically and practically managed for such production.?
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Cause No. 84894-7
department, which conducts the initial review and evaluation of docket proposals
pursuant to SCC 30.74.030, erroneously relied on a previous definition of ?forest
land? when evaluating his proposal. On June 16, the Council adopted ?Amended
Motion No. 08-238,? approving the final list of proposals it decided to consider.
The Council decided not to place Stafne?s proposal on the final docket. Stafne did
not appeal the Council?s decision not to adopt his proposed amendment to the
growth board.
Instead, on July 18, 2008, Stafne filed a complaint and a land use petition in
superior court. He later amended his complaint to include requests for a statutory
writ of review, writ of mandamus, writ of prohibition, or a constitutional writ of
certiorari. He also sought a declaratory judgment that the land he acquired from
DNR did not meet the definition of ?forest land? under the GMA, and thus, could
not be designated CFL as a matter of law.
The County moved to dismiss Stafne?s lawsuit (1) under Civil Rule (CR)
12(b)(6), arguing that the decision to amend a comprehensive plan is a legislative
act and the courts have no power to grant legislative relief, and (2) under CR
12(b)(1), arguing that petitions alleging GMA noncompliance must be appealed to
the growth board before the superior court can have subject matter jurisdiction.
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Cause No. 84894-7
Stafne filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment on his declaratory
judgment action. The superior court granted the County?s motion to dismiss and
denied Stafne?s motion.
Stafne appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed but held that Stafne was not
required to exhaust administrative remedies by seeking review at the growth board
because such review would be futile, and as a result, LUPA was his exclusive
means to obtain review in superior court. Nevertheless, the court held that Stafne?s
land use petition was untimely and affirmed the trial court. Further, the court held
that the trial court did not err in denying Stafne?s request for writ of mandamus or
prohibition and that Stafne was not entitled to declaratory judgment on summary
judgment because LUPA was an adequate alternative remedy. Stafne v. Snohomish
County, 156 Wn. App. 667, 234 P.3d 225 (2010).
Both parties sought this court?s review. Both petitions were granted under
limited review. Stafne v. Snohomish County, 171 Wn.2d 1008, 249 P.3d 183
(2011).
ISSUES
1. Whether a jurisdiction?s decision related to a comprehensive plan amendment
must be appealed to the growth board under the GMA or whether relief can
be sought in superior court under LUPA.
2. Whether a superior court has jurisdiction to review such decisions under its
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Cause No. 84894-7
constitutional writ authority.
3. Whether Stafne is entitled to declaratory judgment as to the legal
consequences of the County?s boundary line adjustment, specifically the CFL
and FTA designation of the incorporated land.
ANALYSIS
As mentioned, we granted both parties? petitions for review. We begin our
analysis with the issues raised by the County, because if we agree with the County,
Stafne?s arguments will necessarily fail. Though the County agrees with the result
the Court of Appeals ultimately reached, it generally disagrees with two sections of
the court?s analysis. First, the County disagrees with the court?s conclusion that a
legislative decision not to adopt a proposed comprehensive plan amendment can
qualify as a ?land use decision? appealable under LUPA. The County contends that
this conclusion disregards the express statutory provisions and conflicts with the
Court of Appeals, Division Three?s decision in Coffey v. City of Walla Walla, 145
Wn. App. 435, 187 P.3d 272 (2008), which held that a superior court has no
jurisdiction to review comprehensive plan decisions under LUPA. Second, the
County disagrees with the court?s discussion of the growth board?s jurisdiction and
conclusion that Stafne was excused from appealing to the growth board because
review there would have been futile.2 The County argues that this conclusion is in
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Cause No. 84894-7
tension with our decision in Torrance v. King County, 136 Wn.2d 783, 966 P.2d
891 (1998), where we held that decisions related to comprehensive plans must be
appealed to the growth board first pursuant to the procedures in the GMA.
At the outset, it is crucial to recognize that the GMA and LUPA are separate
and distinct statutory schemes, with each containing expressly different review
procedures. Generally, under the GMA, counties and cities required or choosing to
plan under the act must each maintain a comprehensive plan, a generalized
coordinated land use policy statement. RCW 36.70A.030(4). The comprehensive
plan must include maps and ?descriptive text covering objectives, principles, and
standards used to develop the comprehensive plan.? RCW 36.70A.070. These maps
can include a future land use map depicting how property is designated in the
jurisdiction; the designations guide how property may thereafter be zoned by the
jurisdiction.
Comprehensive plans are subject to continuing review and evaluation. Plans
are amended by legislative action according to the schedules provided in RCW
36.70A.130. As part of this review process, counties and cities are required to
2 The Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys and Washington State
Association of Municipal Attorneys each filed amicus curiae briefs in support of the County?s
position.
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Cause No. 84894-7
establish procedures for the public to annually suggest updates, proposed
amendments, and revisions to the jurisdiction?s comprehensive plan. RCW
36.70A.470(2). To comply, Snohomish County adopted the procedure codified in
chapter 30.74 of the SCC. The participation program is known as ?docketing.? To
ensure the cumulative effect of all the docket proposals is ascertained, the Council
must consider all proposed amendments in a single public hearing. RCW
36.70A.130(2)(b). Following the hearing, the Council determines which proposals,
if any, will be added to the final docket for comprehensive plan amendments.
Amendments are adopted by resolution or ordinance. RCW 36.70A.130(1)(b). This
case involves the Council?s decision not to adopt Stafne?s proposed amendment.
The legislature established in the GMA an administrative appeal process to
resolve GMA noncompliance allegations, including that a local government?s
comprehensive plan is noncompliant. Under the GMA, such allegations must be
filed with the growth board first. RCW 36.70A.250-.345. Unless otherwise
specified in the GMA, the Washington Administrative Procedure Act (APA) chapter
34.05 RCW, governs the practice and procedure of the board. RCW 36.70A.270(7).
Under the GMA, the board considers petitions alleging, among other things, that a
local government?s plans, regulations, or amendments do not comply with the act.
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Cause No. 84894-7
RCW 36.70A.280(1)(a). The board has interpreted its statutory authority, at a
minimum, as extending to review of comprehensive plans and amendments adopted
by state or local governments. However, the board has held that it ?lacks
jurisdiction? to review decisions not to adopt proposed amendments. See SR 9/US 2
LLC v. Snohomish County, No. 08-3-0004, at 4 (Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt.
Hr?gs Bd. Apr. 9, 2009); Chimacum Heights LLC v. Jefferson County, No. 09-2-
0007, at 3 (W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hr?gs Bd. May 20, 2009); Cole v. Pierce
County, No. 96-3-0009c ,at 9-10 (Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hr?gs Bd. July
31, 1996).
On the other hand, under LUPA, the superior court is granted exclusive
jurisdiction to review government actions meeting the definition of a ?land use
decision? under RCW 36.70C.020(2)(a).3 The definition includes decisions on
applications for a ?project permit.? In turn, a project permit is defined by RCW
36.70B.020(4), which we have recognized applies to LUPA. Woods v. Kittitas
3 RCW 36.70C.020(2) defines a ??[l]and use decision?? as ?a final determination by a local
jurisdiction?s body or officer with the highest level of authority to make the determination,
including those with authority to hear appeals, on:
?(a) An application for a project permit or other governmental approval required by law
before real property may be improved, developed, modified, sold, transferred, or used, but
excluding applications for permits or approvals to use, vacate, or transfer streets, parks, and
similar types of public property; excluding applications for legislative approvals such as area-wide
rezones and annexations; and excluding applications for business licenses.?
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Cause No. 84894-7
County, 162 Wn.2d 597, 610, 174 P.3d 25 (2007). Significant to the argument in
this case, the definition for a ?project permit? expressly excludes the adoption or
amendment of a comprehensive plan. Further, among the types of applications
excluded from a ?land use decision? under RCW 36.70C.020(2)(a) are applications
for legislative approvals. Amending a comprehensive plan is a legislative act. RCW
36.70A.130(1). Thus, when a citizen submits a docket proposal for a comprehensive
plan amendment, he or she is seeking legislative approval, not a land use decision as
defined under LUPA.
In Coffey, Division Three recognized the distinction between decisions falling
under the GMA and LUPA. There, Walla Walla?s city council passed an ordinance
adopting a comprehensive plan amendment pertaining to land 50 acres in size.
Property owners of neighboring land challenged the amendment by filing a land use
petition in superior court. The superior court dismissed the petition because the
petitioners had not established that the city council acted in an arbitrary or
capricious manner in adopting the ordinance. On appeal, Division Three affirmed
the dismissal, but on different grounds. The court explained that comprehensive plan
amendments were excluded from decisions reviewable under LUPA and that under
RCW 36.70A.280 and .290, anyone seeking to challenge an amendment to a
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Cause No. 84894-7
comprehensive plan was required to appeal that decision to the growth board, the
agency with jurisdiction over such legislative decisions. Thus, the court concluded
that the petitioners should have appealed to the growth board and held because of
this the superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider a comprehensive plan
amendment under LUPA. Coffey, 145 Wn. App. at 442.
Yet contrary to the GMA, LUPA, and Coffey, the Court of Appeals in this
case permitted Stafne to bypass the growth board and held that Stafne?s avenue for
relief was in superior court under LUPA. By reaching this conclusion, the court
confused the concept of a legislative amendment changing the designation of land in
a comprehensive plan with a quasi-judicial decision rezoning specific property.4
Though some rezone decisions fall under LUPA, Stafne did not seek a rezone of his
property. He sought a legislative amendment to the County?s comprehensive plan,
including to the plan?s future land use map. Because comprehensive plan
amendments are not considered ?land use decisions,? LUPA cannot provide a direct
means for judicial review of such amendments. In other words, even if the chances
for successful review before the growth board are slim, that cannot change a
nonland use decision into a land use decision under LUPA. The proper procedure
4 In its decision, the Court of Appeals refers to Stafne?s request as a rezone. Stafne, 156
Wn. App. at 685, 686.
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Cause No. 84894-7
for challenging a local government?s decision not to adopt a proposed
comprehensive plan amendment is to appeal first to the growth board and next to the
superior court under the APA. Therefore, we agree with the County and hold that a
party challenging a decision related to a comprehensive plan must seek review
before the growth board first and cannot seek relief in superior court under LUPA.
We also agree with the County that the Court of Appeals misunderstood the
growth board?s jurisdiction and incorrectly applied the futility exception, allowing
Stafne to bypass administrative review before the growth board. Generally, parties
are required to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial review.
We have recognized limited exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine in circumstances
of fairness or practicality, for example, where appeal would be futile. This futility
exception is based on the principle that courts will not require vain and useless acts.
Still, a strong bias exists toward requiring parties to follow the statutorily prescribed
administrative path before resorting to the courts and the futility exception is
narrowly applied. Orion Corp. v. State, 103 Wn.2d 441, 456-57, 693 P.2d 1369
(1985).
In this case, the Court of Appeals erred in its procedural and substantive
application of the futility exception. Procedurally, at best, the futility exception
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Cause No. 84894-7
permits a party to skip the ?vain? or ?useless? step in the review process. In no
circumstance would the exception permit appeal under some other distinct,
inapplicable statutory review scheme. According to the Court of Appeals, the futile
step in this case was appealing to the growth board. But, if the futility exception
applied, skipping review before the board simply would have allowed Stafne to
appeal directly to the superior court under the procedures provided for in the GMA
and APA, and not LUPA as the Court of Appeals concluded.
More important is the Court of Appeals? substantive error. Because the
futility exception is narrowly applied and parties are rarely excused from
administrative review, it is helpful to illustrate when we have found exhaustion
futile. For example, we found it appropriate to apply the futility exception in Orion,
the case the Court of Appeals relied upon. In that case, Orion owned the majority of
land in Padilla Bay, an area designated as a shoreline of statewide significance, and
its land included an estuarine sanctuary dedicated to long term maintenance of the
ecosystem. Orion?s development plans were incompatible with the area?s
designation, and the State and Skagit County had a clear policy that prevented
development of the area. Although Orion could have, as a step in the ?administrative
process,? applied for a development permit, we noted that it was evident from the
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Cause No. 84894-7
existing policy that the permit would not have been granted. Moreover, as Orion
maintained, it would have taken at least two years and cost over $200,000 to pursue
that administrative remedy. Given these circumstances, we held that exhausting
administrative remedies would have been futile and that Orion was permitted to
seek review directly in superior court. Orion Corp., 103 Wn.2d at 443, 459-61.
On the other hand, we have previously explained the importance of following
the GMA administrative appeal process in situations like Stafne?s. In Torrance, as
occurred here, the property owner sought redesignation of his property by
submitting a docket proposal during the county council?s annual consideration of
comprehensive plan amendments. The council decided not to change the property?s
designation. The owner appealed to the growth board, which found that the
council?s decision not to change the property?s designation was a legal exercise of
legislative discretion. Instead of appealing the growth board?s decision under the
APA, the owner sought a constitutional writ of certiorari in superior court. The
superior court granted the writ, which we reversed, stressing the importance of
following the statutorily prescribed review procedures and holding that the decision
to forgo an available appeal was fatal to the owner?s case. Torrance 136 Wn.2d at
785-87, 792. This exhaustion principle applies equally here.
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Cause No. 84894-7
In this case, the Court of Appeals read the growth board?s decisions as
consistently holding it ?lacks jurisdiction? over actions like Stafne?s, that is, where
the party alleges that the failure to adopt a proposed comprehensive plan
amendment means the plan is noncompliant with the GMA. This, as the court
determined, meant that appeal to the board was futile. But while the board has
consistently rejected claims such as Stafne?s, as the circumstances in Orion
demonstrate, more is needed before a party can be excused from exhausting
administrative remedies. Futility does not exist merely because the agency?s
decision would be unfavorable or, as in this case, may have resulted in a final order
denying relief.
Under the GMA, the only statutory requirement for a party to appeal the
growth board?s decision to the superior court is that the board?s decision be final.
RCW 36.70A.300(5). A final decision by the growth board provides helpful analysis
and reasoning to the superior court, as a court of review. Such a decision is also
important given the deferential standard of review under the GMA and expertise of
the board. As we now explain, this is precisely what the board?s decisions in cases
like Stafne?s offer, which the Court of Appeals overlooked.
A closer reading of the board?s decisions shows it has not simply held it lacks
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Cause No. 84894-7
jurisdiction over claims like Stafne?s.5 Significantly, the board?s decisions cannot be
read as establishing that the petitioner should have sought review elsewhere. Rather,
in each decision, the board reviews the facts and issues specific to the case and
makes a threshold determination on the petitioner?s claims. In those decisions, the
board has generally explained its reason for denying relief as follows:
While RCW 36.70A.130 authorizes a local government to amend
comprehensive plans annually, it does not require amendments.
Moreover, it does not dictate that a specific proposed amendment be
adopted. . . .[When] the County takes an action pursuant to the
authority of RCW 36.70A.130 or fails to meet a duty imposed by some
other provision of the GMA, [the petitioner] may have an action that
could properly be brought before the Board.
Cole, No. 96-3-0009c, at10 (footnote omitted). The board subsequently evaluates
the petitioner?s claims, explains that the petitioner failed to identify a statutory
provision mandating that the county or city council amend the plan as the petitioners
claim, and enters a final order. Cole, No. 96-3-0009c, at10; see, e.g., SR 9/US 2
LLC, No. 08-3-0004, at 5 (?[a]bsent a duty to amend its Plan . . . such decisions are
within the jurisdiction?s discretion. . . . and there is no evidence that the County
5 That the growth board lacks ?jurisdiction? over decisions not to adopt proposed
amendments is not entirely accurate. Under the GMA, the board?s jurisdiction is over petitions
alleging GMA noncompliance stemming from either action or inaction of a local government.
Thus, the question is not whether the board has jurisdiction to review claims such as Stafne?s?it
does; the question instead is whether the growth board has authority to grant relief to parties, like
Stafne, where there has been no showing that the amendment is required by the GMA or other
law.
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Cause No. 84894-7
ha[d] a duty to amend its plan to address the Petitioner?s proposal? (emphasis
added)).
We agree with the board?s determinations in cases like Cole and SR 9/US 2
LLC. County and city councils have legislative discretion in deciding to amend or
not amend their comprehensive plans.6 Absent a duty to adopt a comprehensive plan
amendment pursuant to the GMA or other law, neither the board nor a court can
grant relief (that is, order a legislative discretionary act). In other words, any remedy
is not through the judicial branch. Instead, the remedy is to file a proposal at the
County?s next annual docketing cycle or mandatory review or through the political
or election process.
Importantly, the board?s consistent determinations explaining why it cannot
grant relief to parties like Stafne provide the superior court with a GMA-framework
for review. This makes it imperative that courts require parties to exhaust
administrative remedies before exercising judicial review. Moreover, a growth
board?s order denying relief to a party, based on the party?s failure to identify a
provision in the GMA requiring a local government to amend its plan, is final and
appealable to the superior court thereafter. A final order is all that the GMA requires
6 Though amendments are considered annually, RCW 36.70A.130(2)(a) does not require
jurisdictions to actually amend their plans annually.
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Cause No. 84894-7
for appealing a board?s decision to the superior court. Given these reasons, we hold
that the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that Stafne was permitted to
bypass GMA review before the growth board.
We turn now to Stafne?s claims. Stafne first contends that the superior court
has jurisdiction through its constitutional writ authority. The superior court has
inherent power under article IV, section 6 of the Washington State Constitution to
review administrative decisions for illegal or manifestly arbitrary acts. A
constitutional writ of certiorari is discretionary with the court. This discretion can be
exercised when no other adequate remedy at law is available and when the decision
below is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. Saldin Sec., Inc. v. Snohomish
County, 134 Wn.2d 288, 292, 949 P.2d 370 (1998). As we mentioned, in Torrance
we squarely addressed this issue of when a superior court has constitutional writ
authority to review a county?s decision not to adopt an amendment redesignating
land in a comprehensive plan. There, we held that a constitutional writ was
unavailable where a right to appeal exists and the failure to appeal is not excused.
Torrance, 136 Wn.2d at 788, 793. That same reasoning applies here.
Stafne did not appeal the Council?s decision to the growth board, failing to
utilize an available statutory right of appeal and leaving no administrative decision
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Cause No. 84894-7
to review. As in Torrance, Stafne?s failure to exhaust administrative remedies
means the superior court cannot grant a constitutional writ.
Finally, Stafne asserts the Court of Appeals erred by holding that the trial
court properly denied his summary judgment motion seeking declaratory relief.
Declaratory relief will not be ordered where the petitioner has an adequate legal
remedy. Reeder v. King County, 57 Wn.2d 563, 564, 358 P.2d 810 (1961). Stafne
sought a judgment declaring the legal consequences of his boundary line adjustment,
which incorporated the land he acquired from DNR into the parcel he already
owned. A boundary line adjustment is a final land use decision that Stafne could
have timely sought relief under LUPA. RCW 36.70C.020(2)(a). He did not.
Moreover, the legal effect of a boundary line adjustment is to establish new
boundary lines for parcels of real property; the adjustment does not legally effect
how that land will be designated in a comprehensive plan or zoned. We agree with
the Court of Appeals? holding that declaratory relief is unavailable to Stafne.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that parties seeking to appeal a
jurisdiction?s decision not to adopt a proposed comprehensive plan amendment must
seek review before the growth board pursuant to the GMA, which prescribes the
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Cause No. 84894-7
review process. We also hold that review under LUPA does not apply and that
failure to appeal to the growth board bars Stafne?s claims.
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Cause No. 84894-7
AUTHOR:
Justice Charles W. Johnson
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice Barbara A. Madsen Justice James M. Johnson
Justice Debra L. Stephens
Justice Tom Chambers Justice Charles K. Wiggins
Justice Susan Owens Gerry L. Alexander, Justice Pro Tem.
Justice Mary E. Fairhurst
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