[No. 78331-4. En Banc.]
Argued January 25, 2007. Decided December 20, 2007.
[1] Statutes Construction Review Standard of Review. Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. [2] Statutes Construction Legislative Intent In General. A court's primary goal in interpreting a statute is to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent and purpose in creating the statute. [3] Statutes Construction Unambiguous Language Plain Meaning In General. When a statute's meaning is plain on its face, a court will give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of the legislature's intent. [4] Building Regulations Land Use Regulations Growth Management Administrative Review Growth Management Hearings Board Local Compliance With Act In General. Under the Growth Management Act (chapter 36.70A RCW), a claim that a comprehensive plan or development regulation does not comply with the act must be made by way of a petition to a growth management hearings board filed within 60 days after the plan or regulation is published by the legislative body of the county or city that adopted it. [5] Building Regulations Land Use Regulations Growth Management Hearings Boards Jurisdiction Site-Specific Land Use Decision. The growth management hearings boards created under the Growth Management Act (chapter 36.70A RCW) do not have jurisdiction to hear challenges to site-specific land use decisions because site-specific land use decisions do not qualify as comprehensive plans or development regulations within the meaning of the act. [6] Building Regulations Land Use Regulations Application Review Procedure. A site-specific land use decision should be challenged by means of a petition in superior court under the Land Use Petition Act (chapter 36.70C RCW). [7] Building Regulations Land Use Regulations Judicial Review Land Use Petition Act Review by Growth Management Hearings Board Effect. The Land Use Petition Act (chapter 36.70C RCW) grants the superior court exclusive jurisdiction to review a local jurisdiction's land use decisions, with the exception of decisions subject to review by bodies such as the growth management hearings boards. [8] Building Regulations Land Use Regulations Judicial Review Land Use Petition Act "Land Use Decision" Site-Specific Rezone. A site-specific rezone constitutes a "project permit" within the meaning of RCW 36.70B.020(4) and qualifies as "land use decision" for purposes of RCW 36.70C.020(1)(a) of the Land Use Petition Act. [9] Zoning Rezoning Site-Specific Rezone Judicial Review Statutory Provisions Applicability. A site-specific rezone is not subject to review by a growth management hearings board. [10] Building Regulations Land Use Regulations Growth Management Statutory Provisions Scope Site-Specific Rezones. The Growth Management Act (chapter 36.70A) does not specifically apply to site-specific rezones. [11] Building Regulations Land Use Regulations Growth Management Statutory Provisions Liberal Construction Necessity. The Growth Management Act (chapter 36.70A RCW) has no provision requiring that it be liberally construed. [12] Counties Land Use Controls Growth Management Act Site-Specific Land Use Activities Role of Act, Comprehensive Plans, and Development Regulations. The Growth Management Act (chapter 36.70A RCW) does not directly regulate site-specific land use activities. The act's 13 planning goals including the goal of reducing sprawl, apply by their terms only to comprehensive plans and development regulations. The act indirectly regulates local land use decisions through local comprehensive plans and development regulations, both of which must comply with the act. The comprehensive plans serve as "guides" or "blueprints" to be used in making local land use decisions; thus, a proposed land use decision must only generally conform, rather than strictly conform, to the comprehensive plan. A comprehensive plan does not directly regulate site-specific land use activities. It is the local development regulations, including zoning regulations, that directly constrain individual land use decisions. Under applicable laws, such regulations must be consistent with the comprehensive plan and be sufficient in scope to carry out planning goals. [13] Counties Land Use Controls Growth Management Act Compliance Land Use Permits In General. The Growth Management Act (chapter 36.70A RCW) requires a proposed land use project to be consistent with applicable development regulations or, in the absence of applicable regulations, with the adopted comprehensive plan, but the act does not explicitly require that a project permit be consistent with the act. [14] Statutes Construction Amendment Judicial Amendment In General. A court must interpret a statute as enacted by the legislature and may not rewrite the statute in the guise of construing it. [15] Zoning Rezoning Site-Specific Rezone Judicial Review Scope Compliance With Growth Management Act. Absent statutory authority, a site-specific rezone cannot be challenged for compliance with the Growth Management Act (chapter 36.70A RCW). [16] Zoning Rezoning Site-Specific Rezone Comprehensive Plan Conformity Zoning Code Requirement. A site-specific rezone application must comply with both the local zoning code and the local comprehensive plan if the zoning code explicitly requires that all proposed uses comply with the comprehensive plan. [17] Counties Land Use Controls Comprehensive Plan Judicial Review Collateral Review. A local comprehensive land use plan that is not timely challenged before a growth management hearings board may not be implicitly and collaterally challenged in a later petition filed in the superior court under the Land Use Petition Act (chapter 36.70C RCW) challenging the validity of a site-specific rezone. [18] Building Regulations Land Use Regulations Judicial Review Land Use Petition Act Site-Specific Land Use Decision Scope of Review. A party that files a petition in the superior court under the Land Use Petition Act (chapter 36.70C RCW) seeking review a site-specific land use decision may challenge the decision only for violations of the local comprehensive land use plan and/or development regulations, not for violations of the Growth Management Act (chapter 36.70A RCW). [19] Administrative Law Judicial Review Appellate Review Issues Not Addressed by Trial Court. An appellate court reviewing an administrative action previously reviewed by a superior court stands in the same position as the superior court and may rule on any issues relating to the administrative action that were presented to the superior court, even if the superior court did not address them. [20] Administrative Law Judicial Review Appellate Review Standard of Review In General. An appellate court reviews an administrative decision under the substantial evidence standard and reviews conclusions of law de novo. Substantial evidence is a sufficient quantum of evidence in the record to persuade a reasonable person that the declared premise is true. [21] Building Regulations Land Use Regulations Judicial Review Land Use Petition Act Appellate Review Inferences From Facts. An appellate court reviewing administrative findings of fact under the substantial evidence standard of RCW 36.70C.130(1)(c) of the Land Use Petition Act views the inferences that may be drawn from the record in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed in the highest forum exercising factfinding authority. [22] Zoning Rezoning Presumption In General. A rezone is not presumed to be valid. [23] Zoning Rezoning Validity Test. A rezone may be granted if (1) the proponent of the rezone demonstrates that (a) conditions have changed since the original zoning and (b) the rezone bears a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare and (2) the requirements of local ordinances, if any, have been satisfied. [24] Counties Land Use Controls Growth Management Act Hearings Board Decision Jurisdiction Invalidation of Development Regulations Pre-Act Regulations. A growth management hearings board does not have jurisdiction to review a county's development regulations enacted prior to the effective date of the Growth Management Act (chapter 36.70A RCW) or to invalidate any such regulations that do not comply with the act. [25] Counties Land Use Controls Growth Management Act Hearings Board Decision Invalidation of Plan and Regulations Effect on Vested Rights.A growth management hearings board's determination that a comprehensive land use plan provision or development regulation is invalid is prospective in effect and does not extinguish rights that vested prior to the board's decision. [26] Zoning Rezoning Comprehensive Plan Conformity Substantial Reduction in Rural Lot Size. A proposed rezone that would substantially reduce minimum lot sizes in a rural area does not violate the local comprehensive plan if the plan expressly recognizes the zoning classification as a rural zone. [27] Zoning Rezoning Validity Benefit to Public Health, Safety, Morals, or Welfare Elimination of "High Intensity" Uses.A proposed rezone that would eliminate the possibility of more intense conditional uses that do not conform to the surrounding area bears a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. [28] Zoning Rezoning Validity Similar Adjacent Uses Reasonable Development of Property. A proposed rezone that would reduce minimum lot sizes may be appropriate on the grounds that adjacent properties allow similar uses and the smaller lot sizes would allow for reasonable development of the subject property. BECKER, J. PRO TEM., concurs by separate opinion; CHAMBERS, J., did not participate in the disposition of this case. Nature of Action: A property owner sought judicial review of a county's decision to rezone 252 acres of neighboring land from forest and range (allowing one dwelling per 20 acres) to rural (allowing one dwelling per 3 acres). Superior Court: The Superior Court for Yakima County, No. 04-2-02188-9, Susan L. Hahn, J., on December 1, 2004, entered a judgment reversing the county's decision. Court of Appeals: At 130 Wn. App. 573 (2005), the court reversed the judgment and reinstated the county's decision, holding that the superior court had jurisdiction under the Land Use Petition Act to determine whether the rezone is consistent with the county's comprehensive land use plan; that the superior court did not have jurisdiction to consider whether the rezone complied with the Growth Management Act; that the county's decision is supported by substantial evidence; and that the county did not clearly misapply the law by determining that the site-specific rezone complied with the county's comprehensive plan. Supreme Court: Holding that the superior court erred by concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction under the Land Use Petition Act to decide whether a site-specific rezone complies with the Growth Management Act, that the remaining issues raised by the petitioner under the Land Use Petition Act were properly before the court, and that the county's decision to allow the site-specific rezone application is supported by substantial evidence and is not an erroneous interpretation of the law or a clearly erroneous application of the law to the facts, the court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals. James C. Carmody- (of Velikanje Halverson), for petitioner. Michael J. Murphy- (of Groff Murphy Trachtenberg & Everard, PLLC); Gregory L. Zempel-, Prosecuting Attorney, and Neil A. Caulkins- and James E. Hurson-, Deputies; and William J. Crittenden-, for respondents. Timothy M. Harris- and Andrew C. Cook- (of Building Industry Association of Washington), amicus curiae. EN BANC Ά1 FAIRHURST, J. Petitioner, Cecile B. Woods, seeks review of a Court of Appeals ruling that the superior court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), chapter 36.70C RCW, to review a claim that a site-specific rezone application does not comply with the Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW. Woods claims the appellate court decision conflicts with our decision in Wenatchee Sportsmen Ass'n v. Chelan County, 141 Wn.2d 169, 4 P.3d 123 (2000). She also argues the Court of Appeals improperly decided other LUPA issues she raised at the superior court because she did not raise them on appeal and the superior court did not decide them. Ά2 Respondents, Evergreen Meadows, LLC; Stuart Ridge, LLC; Steele Vista, LLC; and Cle Elum's Sapphire Skies, LLC (hereinafter collectively referred to as CESS); and Kittitas County argue that the Court of Appeals correctly held that the superior court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether a site-specific rezone complies with the GMA. CESS further argues that the Court of Appeals properly addressed and decided Woods' remaining LUPA issues and they do not warrant further review by this court. Ά3 We affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that the superior court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under LUPA to decide whether a site-specific land use decision complies with the GMA. The superior court may decide only whether a site-specific land use decision complies with a comprehensive plan and/or development regulation. Because we stand in the superior court's position on review of an administrative decision, Woods' remaining LUPA issues are properly before us. We conclude that the Kittitas County Board of County Commissioners' (BOCC) decision to approve CESS's site-specific rezone application was supported by substantial evidence and was not an erroneous interpretation of the law or a clearly erroneous application of the law to the facts. I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Ά4 CESS owns 251.63 acres of land in Kittitas County. CESS's property was originally zoned forest and range (F&R). The F&R zone, which was adopted in 1974, creates areas in which natural resource management is the highest priority and where uses incompatible with resource management are discouraged. KITTITAS COUNTY CODE (KCC) 17.56.010. Land zoned F&R generally permits minimum lot sizes of 20 acres. Former KCC 17.56.040(A) (1992). Ά5 In January 2004, CESS applied to the county for a site-specific rezone from F&R to "Rural-3" (R-3). The purpose and intent of the R-3 zone, which was adopted in 1992, is to "provide areas where residential development may occur on a low density basis." KCC 17.30.010. A primary goal in siting R-3 zones "will be to minimize adverse effects on adjacent natural resource lands." Id. Land zoned R-3 generally permits minimum lot sizes of three acres served by individual wells and septic tanks. Former KCC 17.30.040(A) (1992). Former KCC 17.30.020 (1996) lists permitted uses in the R-3 zone, including single-family homes, lodges, agriculture, forestry, home occupations that do not produce noise, and mining. Like the F&R zone, the R-3 zone includes a variety of conditional uses, but the conditional uses allowed in the R-3 zone are generally less intensive than those allowed in the F&R zone. Former KCC 17.30.030 (1992) lists the conditional uses allowed in the R-3 zone, including campgrounds, guest ranches, group homes, golf courses, mining, gas and oil exploration, home occupations that produce noise, and miniwarehouses. Ά6 Both the F&R and R-3 zones permit minimum lot sizes of one-half acre for lots within platted cluster subdivisions served by public water and sewer systems. Former KCC 17.56.040(B); former KCC 17.30.040(B). "[C]luster" subdivisions are "three or more buildable lots in which all lots are contiguous." Former KCC 17.65.020(A) (1996), repealed by Ord. 2005-35 (2005). The permitted uses in a cluster subdivision "shall be those of the underlying zone and limited to single-family detached residential uses." Former KCC 17.65.030 (1996), repealed by Ord. 2005-35 (2005). The maximum allowable percentage of cluster acreage is 30 percent for F&R zones and 40 percent for R-3 zones. Former KCC 17.65.040 (1996), repealed by Ord. 2005-35 (2005). Ά7 The Kittitas County Planning Commission (KCPC) held a public meeting to discuss the site-specific rezone on April 26, 2004. The day of the public meeting, Mike Alberg, chairperson of the KCPC, received a letter from 1000 Friends of Washington, which was distributed to commission members, urging denial of the rezone because it claimed the GMA requires a minimum density of five acres in rural areas and the R-3 zone allows a density of only three acres. The letter cited rulings of the Court of Appeals and the three Growth Management Hearings Boards (GMHBs) as the basis for 1000 Friends' claim that the GMA requires a five acre minimum density in rural areas. Ά8 After deliberation, KCPC approved the application by a vote of five-to-one. The BOCC approved the site-specific rezone by Ordinance 2004-15 on June 1, 2004. Ά9 In June 2004, Woods filed a LUPA petition, RCW 36.70C.070, in superior court, challenging the BOCC decision. Her petition claimed the decision (1) erroneously interpreted the law because it used incomplete findings and site-specific rezone standards and failed to include determinations regarding changed circumstances and consistency with the GMA, (2) was not supported by substantial evidence in the record, and (3) was a clearly erroneous application of the law to the facts because the environmental review was incomplete Ά10 The superior court granted Woods' petition and reversed the rezone. CP at 13-14. In its letter ruling, the trial court determined it had subject matter jurisdiction over the site-specific rezone. The court recognized, "[a]lthough the GMHB has jurisdiction to determine whether Kittitas County's RR-3 [sic] zoning ordinance violates the GMA, it does not have jurisdiction to review whether the BOCC's decision to rezone the subject property as RR-3 [sic] violates the GMA as applied by allowing urban growth (RR-3) [sic] in a rural area." CP at 11 (emphasis added). The trial court found: Whether this RR-3 [sic] rezone is lawful depends on where the subject property is located within the county. In other words, the RR-3 [sic] ordinance may be consistent with the GMA when applied to some properties and inconsistent when applied to others. Since the property in this case is located outside of a designated UGA [urban growth area], a rezone that allows for development which is urban in nature violates the GMA. The fact that the property may never be fully built out is irrelevant to whether the application of RR-3 [sic] to this property has the potential to turn a rural area into an area of urban growth density. Id. The trial court did not explain the reasoning for its conclusion that the R-3 zone is urban in nature. Lastly, because of the trial court's decision that "BOCC erred by granting a rezone which allows for urban growth density in a rural area," it was unnecessary to reach Woods' remaining LUPA issues. Id. at 12. CESS and the county appealed the superior court's decision to Division Three of the Court of Appeals. Woods v. Kittitas County, 130 Wn. App. 573, 123 P.3d 883 (2005). Ά11 The Court of Appeals held that the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether the rezone decision was consistent with the county's comprehensive plan but not whether the rezone complied with the GMA. Id. at 576-77, Ά 2. It concluded Wenatchee Sportsmen held only that a party may challenge a site-specific rezone in superior court under LUPA based on incompatibility with the comprehensive plan, not noncompliance with the GMA. Id. at 583, Ά 17. The appellate court declined to consider the rezone's compliance with the GMA and reviewed only the properly remaining LUPA issues. Id. at 583, Ά 18. It concluded that BOCC's decision was supported by sufficient evidence and BOCC did not clearly misapply the law when it determined that the site-specific rezone complied with the county's comprehensive plan. Id. at 588-89, Ά28. Ά12 Woods petitioned this court for review of the Court of Appeals reversal of the superior court decision, which we granted. Woods v. Kittitas County, 158 Wn.2d 1001, 143 P.3d 829 (2006). II. ISSUES A. Does the superior court have subject matter jurisdiction under LUPA to decide whether site-specific land use decisions comply with the GMA? B. Should this court reach Woods' remaining LUPA issues and, if so, did BOCC properly approve CESS's rezone application? III. ANALYSIS A. The superior court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether a site-specific rezone complies with the GMA Ά14 Woods claims that in Wenatchee Sportsmen this court expressly recognized that the GMA and LUPA created two separate avenues for a petitioner to seek review of whether a land use decision complies with the GMA, and we held that the superior court has jurisdiction to determine whether site-specific land use decisions comply with the GMA. CESS disputes Woods' interpretation of our holding in Wenatchee Sportsmen. It argues the superior court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide any questions regarding compliance with the GMA, even where a party challenges a site-specific land use decision in a LUPA petition. CESS also argues that Woods' real target was not the rezone but the R-3 zone in general. Ά15 To determine whether the superior court has subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether site-specific land use decisions comply with the GMA, we first examine the framework of the GMA and LUPA. Ά16 The legislature enacted the GMA in 1990 to address concerns related to "uncoordinated and unplanned growth" in the State and "a lack of common goals expressing the public's interest in the conservation and the wise use of our lands." RCW 36.70A.010. The GMA requires counties to develop a " 'comprehensive plan,' " which sets out the "generalized coordinated land use policy statement" of the county's governing body. Former RCW 36.70A.030(4) (1997). In essence, "[t]he comprehensive plan is the central nervous system of the GMA. It receives and processes all relevant information and sends policy signals to shape public and private behavior." Richard L. Settle, Washington's Growth Management Revolution Goes to Court, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 5, 26 (1999). Ά17 The comprehensive plan must designate a UGA "within which urban growth shall be encouraged and outside of which growth can occur only if it is not urban in nature." Ά18 Along with a comprehensive plan, the GMA requires counties to adopt development regulations that are "consistent with and implement the comprehensive plan." RCW 36.70A.040(3)(d), (4)(d). " 'Development regulations' " include, but are not limited to, zoning ordinances. Former RCW 36.70A.030(7) (1997). These regulations must be adopted within six months from the time of the comprehensive plan's adoption. WAC 365-195-810(1). Ά21 LUPA grants the superior court exclusive jurisdiction to review a local jurisdiction's land use decisions, with the exception of decisions subject to review by bodies such as the GMHBs. RCW 36.70C.030(1)(a)(ii). The legislature's purpose in enacting LUPA was to "establish[ ] uniform, expedited appeal procedures and uniform criteria for reviewing [land use] decisions [by local jurisdictions], [A] final determination by a local jurisdiction's body or officer with the highest level of authority to make the determination, including those with authority to hear appeals, on: (a) An application for a project permit or other governmental approval required by law before real property may be improved, developed, modified, sold, transferred, or used, but excluding applications for permits or approvals to use, vacate, or transfer streets, parks, and similar types of public property; excluding applications for legislative approvals such as area-wide rezones and annexations; and excluding applications for business licenses. RCW 36.70C.020(1). A site-specific rezone is a project permit, RCW 36.70B.020(4), and, thus, a land use decision. Ά22 Having established the statutory framework, we next examine our holding in Wenatchee Sportsmen to determine whether it supports Woods' claim that we explicitly recognized that the GMA and LUPA established two different avenues for review of a local jurisdiction's compliance with the GMA. Wenatchee Sportsmen involved Chelan County's approval of a developer's request to rezone its property and a subsequent subdivision plat application. 141 Wn.2d at 174. Wenatchee Sportsmen filed a LUPA petition in superior court challenging the county's approval of the subdivision but not the earlier rezone. Id. The superior court concluded the subdivision constituted urban growth outside the county's interim UGA (IUGA) Ά23 We addressed only the narrow question of whether the petitioner's challenge to the subdivision constituted a collateral challenge to the earlier site-specific rezone of the property. Id. at 175-77. In the course of our analysis, we observed that had the property owner timely challenged the earlier rezone, the superior court "could have considered whether the minimum density allowed by the [zoning ordinance] was compatible with the [county's] IUGA." Id. at 181-82. We also noted that having not timely challenged the rezone itself, "[t]he only issue that can be raised concerning the rezone is whether the plat application conforms to the zoning requirements." Id. at 182 (emphasis added). These two statements indicate that we viewed the superior court's jurisdiction as limited to determining whether the rezone complied with the applicable zoning requirements or the county's IUGA, but not the GMA. Ά24 However, Wenatchee Sportsmen also suggests that a superior court may have subject matter jurisdiction over whether a site-specific rezone complies with the GMA. We noted that "[i]f a GMHB does not have jurisdiction to consider a petition, it must be filed in superior court under LUPA." Id. at 178. More specifically, "[c]hallenges to a decision concerning a site-specific rezone should be brought by means of a LUPA petition in superior court." Id. at 179 n.1. A GMHB does not have jurisdiction to hear a petition alleging that a site-specific rezone violates the GMA. See id. at 178. Thus, one could argue that a superior court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether the site-specific rezone complies with the GMA. The flaw in this reasoning is that the GMA does not explicitly apply to site-specific rezones and the GMA has no provision that it is to be liberally construed. Skagit Surveyors & Eng'rs, LLC v. Friends of Skagit County, 135 Wn.2d 542, 565, 958 P.2d 962 (1998). B. The GMA does not explicitly apply to site-specific rezones Ά26 Thus, the GMA indirectly regulates local land use decisions through comprehensive plans and development regulations, both of which must comply with the GMA. See former RCW 36.70A.130(1)(a), (b) (2002). Comprehensive plans serve as " 'guide[s]' " or " 'blueprint[s]' " to be used in making land use decisions. Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 133 Wn.2d 861, 873, 947 P.2d 1208 (1997). Thus, a proposed land use decision must only generally conform, rather than strictly conform, to the comprehensive plan. Id. A comprehensive plan does not directly regulate site-specific land use decisions. Id.; Viking Props., 155 Wn.2d at 126, Ά 31. Instead, local development regulations, including zoning regulations, directly constrain individual land use decisions. Viking Props., 155 Wn.2d at 126, Ά 31. Such regulations must be consistent with the comprehensive plan and be sufficient in scope to carry out the goals set forth in the comprehensive plan. RCW 36.70A.040(3)(d), (4)(d); WAC 365-195-800(1). C. Woods implicitly challenges the compliance of the comprehensive plan and development regulations with the GMA Ά30 This reasoning is consistent with a Division One of the Court of Appeals case that determined that a superior court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether a project permit complied with the GMA. Somers v. Snohomish County, 105 Wn. App. 937, 21 P.3d 1165 (2001). Ά31 In Somers, a hearing examiner approved a developer's application for a new subdivision in Snohomish County and neighboring landowners filed a LUPA petition challenging the hearing examiner's decision, claiming the development constituted "urban growth" in violation of the GMA. 105 Wn. App. at 939. The hearing examiner found that, although the proposed development was outside the county's IUGA and the ordinance establishing the IUGA did not adequately define "urban growth," the development was valid because it complied with the county's zoning ordinance. Id. at 940. After determining it had subject matter jurisdiction to decide the matter, the superior court reversed the hearing examiner, holding that the subdivision constituted urban growth outside the IUGA in violation of the GMA. Id. at 941. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that although the Somerses claimed to challenge approval of the subdivision, their real claim was that the zoning ordinance violated the GMA by allowing urban growth outside the county's IUGA, a claim the superior court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to decide. Id. at 943-44. CESS argues that, as in Somers, the superior court in this case did not have subject matter jurisdiction to decide that the R-3 zone allows urban growth outside the county's UGA in violation of the GMA. We agree. Ά32 Wenatchee Sportsmen and Somers demonstrate the hierarchical, rather than parallel, relationship between the GMA and LUPA. Comprehensive plans and development regulations provide the general structure for a local jurisdiction's site-specific decisions. The comprehensive plan and development regulations are presumed to comply with the GMA. The comprehensive plan and development regulations may be challenged for violations of the GMA before a GMHB within 60 days of publication. Subsequent site-specific land use decisions by a local jurisdiction must be generally consistent with the comprehensive plan and development regulations. An adjacent property owner must challenge a local jurisdiction's site-specific decisions by filing a LUPA petition in superior court. But a challenge to a site-specific land use decision can be only for violations of the comprehensive plan and/or development regulations, not violations of the GMA. We affirm the Court of Appeals. D. Woods' remaining LUPA issues are properly before us and BOCC properly approved CESS's site-specific rezone application (a) The body or officer that made the land use decision engaged in unlawful procedure or failed to follow a prescribed process, unless the error was harmless; (b) The land use decision is an erroneous interpretation of the law, after allowing for such deference as is due the construction of a law by a local jurisdiction with expertise; (c) The land use decision is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court; (d) The land use decision is a clearly erroneous application of the law to the facts; (e) The land use decision is outside the authority or jurisdiction of the body or officer making the decision; or (f) The land use decision violates the constitutional rights of the party seeking relief. RCW 36.70C.130(1). "Issues raised under subsection (c) challenge the sufficiency of the evidence." Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 146 Wn.2d 685, 694, 49 P.3d 860 (2002). In a challenge for sufficiency of the evidence, " '[w]e view inferences in a light most favorable to the party that prevailed in the highest forum exercising factfinding authority.' " Id. (quoting Schofield v. Spokane County, 96 Wn. App. 581, 588, 980 P.2d 277 (1999)). Therefore, we view the record and inferences in the light most favorable to CESS because they prevailed before BOCC. 1. The proposed amendment is compatible with the comprehensive plan; and 2. The proposed amendment bears a substantial relation to the public health, safety or welfare; and 3. The proposed amendment has merit and value for Kittitas County or a sub-area of the county; and 4. The proposed amendment is appropriate because of changed circumstances or because of a need for additional property in the proposed zone or because the proposed zone is appropriate for reasonable development of the subject property; and 5. The subject property is suitable for development in general conformance with zoning standards for the proposed zone; and 6. The proposed amendment will not be materially detrimental to the use of properties in the immediate vicinity of the subject property; and 7. The proposed changes in use of the subject property shall not adversely impact irrigation water deliveries to other properties. Id. (emphasis added). Ά37 In approving CESS's rezone application, BOCC found the requested zone change met all the criteria in former KCC 17.98.020(E), that is: (1) the rezone was "consistent with the rural land use designation" of the county's comprehensive plan and the rural designation "has consistently been interpreted to be consistent with the Rural-3 zoning designation," (2) the rezone had a "substantial relationship to the public health, safety or welfare," Ά38 Aside from Woods' GMA challenge, discussed supra at pages 607-12, Woods' LUPA petition and supporting briefs challenged only findings related to criteria (1), (2), (4), and (5). (1) The rezone is consistent with the rural land use designation in the county's comprehensive plan and the rural land use designation is consistent with the R-3 zone Ά39 Regarding inconsistency of the rezone with the county's comprehensive plan, Woods raised two main arguments in her briefs to the superior court. Ά40 CESS responded that the plan allows for the continued use of preexisting rural densities. It further contends that, although the plan acknowledges a generalization that a five acre density is associated with rural character, the topography of the county allows for a variety of lot sizes. CESS acknowledges its property is located in an area designated as rural but asserts it merely sought to rezone its property from one rural zone to another. Ά42 Woods' premise seems to be that if a local jurisdiction does not adopt its development regulations after or in unison with its comprehensive plan, the development regulations do not implement the comprehensive plan. She implies there has been no prior opportunity to challenge whether the R-3 zone complies with the GMA. We sympathize with Woods' frustration over adjacent property owners' inability to challenge a local jurisdiction's actions, but the GMA does not provide her with the relief she seeks. We have held that the GMA does not authorize the GMHBs to review a county's preexisting development regulations for compliance with the GMA and invalidate any that do not comply. Skagit Surveyors, 135 Wn.2d at 567. Therefore, adjacent property owners have few alternatives to challenge a local jurisdiction's incorporation of a preexisting development regulation into its comprehensive plan under the GMA once the plan is adopted. Id. Ά44 Because we conclude the county validly adopted the R-3 zone into its comprehensive plan, the only issue before us is whether the county's comprehensive plan permits the R-3 zone to be used in rural areas. Woods argues it does not. The aforementioned range of rural densities and uses has created and contributed to a successful landscape which contributes to an attractive rural lifestyle. The exception to this landscape can be seen in areas where individuals have had to acquire larger lots than desired in order to obtain a building site. This has created the effect of "rural sprawl." This current mix of rural uses and densities has not increased the cost to taxpayers for road and utility improvements, police and fire protection, or the education of school populations beyond the means of the local people to finance such infrastructure. The mix of rural uses and densities have [sic] allowed rural growth to be accommodated in a variety of areas where it is appropriate. This has been compatible with both resource activities and urbanization. Id. Ά46 Although, as Woods notes and CESS acknowledges, the county's plan indicates that five acre minimum lot sizes are generally viewed as preserving the rural nature of the area, the plan also expresses concern that a focus on lot size alone could lead to rural sprawl. Id. at 176. It states: There exists a generalization that 5 acre minimum lot sizes might preserve "rural character.". . . However, over the past fifteen to twenty years Kittitas County has experienced "rural sprawl" through the adoption of 20 acre minimum lot sizes, which has caused the conversion of farm land into weed patches. Small lot zoning with conservation easements for agriculture, timber, or open space may be preferable to the wasteful "sprawl" developments of large lot zoning and could be more conducive to retaining rural character . . . . In Kittitas County there are rural settlements of all sizes and descriptions, some resembling small towns and others simple "crossroads cluster." While attaining higher densities, these areas remain rural in character. Id. Ά47 Woods conspicuously does not point to any language that restricts the use of the R-3 zone to urban areas. The most she can demonstrate is that the plan acknowledges a common perception that five acres is generally viewed as rural. Other language in the plan, though, plainly demonstrates that the county explicitly rejected the bright-line rule that a five acre density is required for rural land and arrived at a reasonable decision based on the county's specific needs. Ά48 Because the county's comprehensive plan expressly recognizes the R-3 zone as a rural zone, BOCC's approval of a rezone of rural land from F&R to R-3 did not violate the county's comprehensive plan and was not an erroneous interpretation of the law or a clearly erroneous application of the law to the facts. (2) The rezone had a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, or welfare Ά50 The record indicates that the Department of Ecology (DOE) was concerned about the potential that there would be inadequate water for development on CESS's property, but potential inadequacy is a far cry from conclusive evidence. The record also shows the county took note of DOE's concerns and established mitigation measures to ensure that if and when a project development application was submitted, DOE's concerns would be addressed before any development occurred. Ά51 Moreover, BOCC based its decision that the rezone had a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, or welfare on the fact that F&R zone permits more intense conditional uses than those permitted in the R-3 zone. It found that while such uses might be appropriate in areas where lots are predominately 20 acres in size, much of the area surrounding CESS's property is already zoned R-3 or it is zoned F&R but contains many 3 acre lots. Ά52 We conclude that there is substantial evidence in the record to support BOCC's decision that the rezone to R-3 would have a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, or welfare, and BOCC's decision was not an erroneous interpretation of the law or a clearly erroneous application of the law to the facts. (4) The proposed rezone was appropriate for reasonable development of the subject property given three acre zoning in the surrounding area Ά54 CESS's rezone application stated that the purpose of the rezone was to permit future residential development characteristic of the surrounding area and provide a transition zone between the F&R zone and the outlying commercial forest zone. It also stated that the property is former timberland that has since been subdivided into parcels ranging from 8 to 84 acres and is no longer appropriate for commercial forestry. Woods failed to explain why a rezone of the property to R-3 is inappropriate for reasonable development of property so described. She stated that there is already capacity for 7,483 dwelling units on existing R-3 zoned districts and there is no need for 70 additional residential lots. However, she did not explain why current capacity elsewhere in the county would preclude creation of additional capacity on, or render the rezone inappropriate for, reasonable development of a particular property. Moreover, in reaching its decision, BOCC reasoned that because adjacent properties also allowed a three acre density, it was not inappropriate to approve the same density for CESS's property. Ά55 We conclude there is substantial evidence in the record to support BOCC's decision that because the surrounding area is already a mix of F&R and R-3, a rezone is appropriate for reasonable development, and BOCC's decision was not an erroneous interpretation of the law or a clearly erroneous application of the law to the facts. (5) The rezone was suitable for development in conformance with R-3 zoning standards Ά56 Finally, Woods claimed the record established conclusively that, because there is inadequate water to support increased density and the topography of the area precluded adequate traffic capacity, the rezone was not suitable for development. Although the Kittitas County Department of Public Works and DOE expressed concerns regarding the impact of the rezone on traffic and water availability, BOCC reasoned that a determination that the property was not suitable for development is pertinent only where an application is submitted to develop the property. The county had established mitigation measures to ensure that if and when a project development application was submitted, those issues would be taken into account. Ά57 We conclude there is substantial evidence in the record to support BOCC's decision that the property is suitable for development. BOCC's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not an erroneous interpretation of the law or a clearly erroneous application of the law to the facts. IV. CONCLUSION Ά58 We affirm the Court of Appeals. We hold that the superior court erred in concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction under LUPA to decide whether a site-specific rezone complies with the GMA. The superior court has jurisdiction only to determine whether a site-specific rezone complies with the county's comprehensive plan and/or development regulations. We further conclude Woods' remaining LUPA issues are properly before us and hold that BOCC's decision to approve CESS's site-specific rezone application was supported by substantial evidence and was not an erroneous interpretation of the law or a clearly erroneous application of the law to the facts. ALEXANDER, C.J., and C. JOHNSON, MADSEN, SANDERS, BRIDGE, OWENS, and J.M. JOHNSON, JJ., concur. Ά59 BECKER, J. Ά60 Under the GMA, counties must adopt a comprehensive plan and development regulations. The development regulations must be consistent with and implement the county's comprehensive plan. RCW 36.70A.040(3). The comprehensive plan must contain certain elements, including measures to protect the rural character of rural areas. RCW 36.70A.070(5)(c). The county must designate an urban growth area, outside of which growth can occur only if it is not urban in nature. RCW 36.70A.110. When a county's comprehensive plan and development regulations comply with the GMA, then project permit decisions that are consistent with the plan and regulations will also comply with the GMA. Ά61 Here, the Kittitas County Commissioners decided it was consistent with their comprehensive plan to reclassify some 250 acres from the "Forest and Range" zone (where the minimum lot size is 20 acres) to the "R-3" zone (where the minimum lot size is 3 acres). The acreage in question, previously part of a timber company's holdings that were broken into smaller tracts after being harvested, is located south of Cle Elum. Cecile Woods, a neighboring landowner, brought a land use petition asserting that the rezone was unlawful because it allowed for urban density in a rural area, contrary to the GMA. Ά62 Woods had good reason to think that the superior court was authorized by statute to decide whether the site-specific rezone complied with the GMA. According to Wenatchee Sportsmen, a party "must initially appeal a land use decision of the kind involved here" to either a Growth Management Hearings Board or else to superior court under the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), chapter 36.70C RCW. Wenatchee Sportsmen, 141 Wn.2d at 178. The growth boards only have jurisdiction to review comprehensive plans and development regulations for compliance with the GMA. They do not have jurisdiction to review site-specific rezones. Wenatchee Sportsmen, 141 Wn.2d at 178-79. Therefore, an argument that a particular site-specific rezone violates the GMA has to be "raised in a timely LUPA challenge to the rezone." Wenatchee Sportsmen, 141 Wn.2d at 181. Ά63 The rural land in question in Wenatchee Sportsmen was rezoned in 1996 to "RR-1," which permitted density of one dwelling per acre. The Sportsmen did not challenge the 1996 rezone. In 1998, the county approved a subdivision on this land with one-acre lots. The Sportsmen brought a LUPA challenge in superior court claiming that the subdivision impermissibly authorized urban growth outside the urban growth area boundary. On that basis, the superior court reversed the subdivision. But this court agreed with the developer that the Sportsmen were barred because they had not challenged the original rezone to the RR-1 designation. Because the original rezone was a project permit decision, they could not have challenged it by a petition to the growth board, but they could have done so in a timely LUPA petition brought within 21 days of the decision. At that time a court reviewing the rezone decision could have considered whether the minimum density allowed by the RR-1 district was compatible with the IUGA. Wenatchee Sportsmen, 141 Wn.2d at 181-82. Ά64 Cecile Woods did exactly what Wenatchee Sportsmen directed her to do: she challenged the site-specific rezone decision in a LUPA petition within the 21-day time limit. She did not wait until the rezone led to an actual plat approval. The trial court read Wenatchee Sportsmen and concluded, reasonably, that Woods had come to the correct forum to allege that the rezone was incompatible with the urban growth boundary. Ά65 The majority characterizes Wenatchee Sportsmen as having decided "only the narrow question" of whether the 1998 land use petition was a collateral challenge to the 1996 rezone decision. Majority at 13. I do not think the rest of the opinion can be so easily pushed aside. The underlying premise was that there must be some forum for reviewing county decision-making for lack of compliance with the GMAeither the growth board, or if not, then the superior court. If the county decision is a development regulation such as a zoning ordinance, then the appropriate forum will be the growth board. But according to Wenatchee Sportsmen, when the county decision is a site-specific rezone, the superior court is the appropriate forum because the growth board does not have jurisdiction. Ά66 One application of Wenatchee Sportsmen is found in Somers v. Snohomish County, 105 Wn. App. 937, 21 P.3d 1165 (2001). Like in Wenatchee Sportsmen, the issue in Somers was the lawfulness of a subdivision located outside an urban growth area. The county approved the subdivision because it was in compliance with a residential zone (R-20,000) that was already applicable to the property at the time the application vested in 1994. Somers should have petitioned the growth board for a ruling that the R-20,000 zone in a rural area is an improper development regulation under the GMA. Instead, just like in Wenatchee Sportsmen, Somers waited until the zoning led to a subdivision, then filed a LUPA petition challenging the subdivision approval. This he was not permitted to do. His LUPA petition was a collateral attack upon a zoning ordinance that could have been earlier subjected to review by the growth board. "Although the Somers' LUPA petition does not expressly challenge the underlying zoning as contrary to the GMA, it does so implicitly." Somers, 105 Wn. App. at 945. Ά67 Respondents argue that Woods likewise implicitly challenges the underlying zoning. They say her LUPA petition is a disguised attack on the R-3 zone that she should have raised earlier with the growth board. But factually, this case is not like Somers. The underlying zoning applicable to the property was Forest and Range with a minimum lot size of 20 acres. Woods was satisfied with that zoning and had no reason to challenge it as violating the GMA. Ά68 And she also had no reason to petition the growth board to do away with the R-3 zone. The R-3 zone in Kittitas County is merely the ordinance defining the uses and densities permitted in land zoned R-3. Woods has no objection if the county applies the R-3 zone to land in unincorporated areas within the urban growth areas. What Woods contests is the county's decision to apply the R-3 zone to the subject site, outside the urban growth area. Ά69 The comprehensive plan designated all lands outside the urban growth areas as "Rural." The plan's description of the Rural Lands does not identify R-3 zoning or any other zoning classification as desirable for new development in the Rural Lands. It simply recognizes R-3, along with Forest and Range and several other classifications, as among the zones represented by existing land use patterns in the Rural Lands. There is no statement in the comprehensive plan that the county planned on allowing more R-3 development to occur in the future, much less any criteria defining where it might occur. Only when the owners proposed a rezone did it become apparent that the R-3 zone had, as the trial court put it, "the potential to turn a rural area into an area of urban growth densities." Ά70 As this case demonstrates, the ad hoc nature of a site-specific rezone can make it something of a loose cannon. If Kittitas County had adopted an area-wide zoning ordinance attaching the R-3 zone to a broader area of logged-off lands in northern Kittitas County, that would have presented a situation like in Somers. Woods would have been put on notice that R-3 subdivisions would be approved on her neighboring lands, and she could have tried to prevent that from happening by asking the growth board to determine that the ordinance violated the GMA. It is anomalous that a decision to attach the R-3 zone to a single parcel of 250 acres would not also be subject to review for GMA compliance; obviously, a series of such rezones, parcel by parcel, will eventually add up and have the same effect as an area-wide zoning ordinance. In this light, it is a fair reading of Wenatchee Sportsmen that when a rezone allows urban densities that the county did not specifically plan for and neighbors had no reason to anticipate, its compliance with the GMA is an issue that can be raised in a LUPA petition. Because Somers does not involve a site-specific rezone, it does not necessarily point to a different conclusion. Ά71 Nevertheless, I believe the majority correctly analyzes the statute. It has become increasingly clear that there simply is no statutory provision allowing the GMA to be applied directly to a specific site at the project permit level. Every time a superior court has reversed a county project permit decision on the basis of noncompliance with the GMA, our appellate courts have reinstated the county decision. See, e.g., Ass'n of Rural Residents v. Kitsap County, 141 Wn.2d 185, 4 P.3d 115 (2000); Caswell v. Pierce County, 99 Wn. App. 194, 992 P.2d 534 (2000); Somers, 105 Wn. App. at 937. An allegation that a county decision violates the GMA by allowing urban growth in a rural area cannot be decided in a LUPA petitioneven if, like a site-specific rezone, the decision is incapable of being appealed to the growth board. To the extent that Wenatchee Sportsmen states that the GMA issue can be raised in a LUPA petition, it is incorrect. And to the extent that such a statement in Wenatchee Sportsmen is an actual holding (as opposed to mere dicta), the court should overrule that aspect of the case as being not only incorrect but harmful. Ά72 The harm lies in the prospect of inconsistent interpretation and application of the GMA. The harm of inconsistency may not exist here because the ruling Woods sought from the superior court, that the GMA requires a five-acre minimum lot size for rural development, can easily be recognized as consistent with decisions by all three growth boards. But in another case, nothing would prevent a LUPA petitioner from arguing, and a trial court from deciding, that to protect the rural character of a particular area, the minimum lot size had to be at least 10 acres. And the two different lines of authority, one arising from the regional growth board and one from the local court, would bring chaos to a county's administration of its obligations under the GMA. Ά73 The eastern Washington board recently responded to a petition alleging that the Kittitas County comprehensive plan as amended in 2006 was in violation of the GMA for failing to eliminate densities greater than one dwelling unit per five acres in the rural area. Kittitas County Conservation v. Kittitas County, No. 07-1-0004c, Final Dec. and Order 6, E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hr'gs Bd. (Aug. 20, 2007). Relying on extensive research and study conducted by all three boards, the board found that the density allowed by the R-3 zone was an urban density. Kittitas County Conservation, No. 07-1-0004c, Final Dec. and Order at 17. The board also found that Kittitas County had "failed to adopt specific, directive policies in the CP [Comprehensive Plan] for determining when and where rezone applications should be approved." Kittitas County Conservation, No. 07-1-0004c, Final Dec. and Order at 83. As a result, the plan has been remanded to the county with directions to solve these and other problems in a way that complies with the GMA. Kittitas County Conservation, No. 07-1-0004c, Final Dec. and Order at 85. Ά74 Unfortunately for Woods, the board's decision is prospective in application and will not reverse the site-specific rezone to neighboring forest land that prompted the filing of her LUPA petition. But the board's decision does demonstrate that the jurisdiction of the growth boards provides an opportunity to plug what would otherwise be a big loophole undermining the intent of the GMA. While there is no forum that can overturn a site-specific rezone as being in violation of the GMA, a county with weak standards governing rezones is subject to enforcement action by the growth board for failing in its obligation to take measures protecting the rural character of its rural lands. RCW 36.70A.070(5)(c). This mechanism is not self-executing and it is not a fail-safe antidote to sprawl. But it does create an avenue for review that in the long run is likely to produce more consistent and predictable GMA case law than the alternative of review under LUPA.