[No. 78156-7. En Banc.]
Argued November 28, 2006. Decided July 19, 2007.
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of SCOTT W. SKYLSTAD, Petitioner.
[1] Statutes - Construction - Question of Law or Fact - Review - Standard of Review. Statutory construction is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.
[2] Statutes - Construction - Unambiguous Language - Plain Meaning - In General. An unambiguous statute is applied according to its plain language; only ambiguous statutes will be construed.
[3] Statutes - Construction - Considered as a Whole - In General. A statute must be read as a whole, giving effect to all of the language used.
[4] Statutes - Construction - Rational Interpretation - Avoiding Absurdity. A statute should not be construed in a manner that would result in unlikely, absurd, or strained consequences.
[5] Personal Restraint - Petition - Timeliness - Statutory Limits - "Judgment" - Finality - What Constitutes - In General.For purposes of RCW 10.73.090, under which a judgment and sentence in a criminal case may not be collaterally attacked more than one year after the judgment becomes final, a judgment is "final" if (1) it eliminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the judgment or sentence and leaves nothing for the inferior court to do in case of an affirmance except to execute the judgment; (2) no further judicial action is required by the court that rendered the judgment to determine the matter litigated; or (3) it is the last action by the court that settles the rights of the parties and disposes of all issues in controversy, except for the award of costs (and, sometimes, attorney fees) and enforcement of the judgment. Thus, a judgment becomes "final" when all litigation on the merits of the judgment or sentence ends.
[6] Personal Restraint - Petition - Timeliness - Statutory Limits - "Judgment" - Finality - What Constitutes - Conviction Affirmed on Appeal - Appeal of Sentence Pending. For purposes of RCW 10.73.090, under which a judgment and sentence in a criminal case may not be collaterally attacked more than one year after the judgment becomes final, a judgment is not "final" if the sentence remains under appeal after an affirmance of the conviction has been mandated by an appellate court. A criminal judgment cannot be final until both the conviction and sentence are final. Finality means that all direct appeals have been exhausted or the time for appeal has expired. When an appeal of a sentence remains pending, the judgment is not final and the one-year time period of RCW 10.73.090 is not yet triggered.
FAIRHURST, MADSEN, BRIDGE, and OWENS, JJ., dissent by separate opinion.
Nature of Action: Petition for relief from personal restraint. The petition was filed during the second of two direct appeals, more than one year after the petitioner was convicted, but while his sentence was pending review.
Court of Appeals: The court dismissed the petition on December 15, 2005, holding that the petition was time-barred.
Supreme Court: Holding that the petition is not time-barred because the petitioner's sentence was not final when the petition was filed, the court reverses the decision of the Court of Appeals and remands the case to the Court of Appeals to determine the merits of the petition.
Jeffrey E. Ellis- (of Ellis Holmes & Witchley, PLLC), for petitioner.
Steven J. Tucker-, Prosecuting Attorney, and Kevin M. Korsmo-, Deputy, for respondent.
Pamela B. Loginsky- on behalf of Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, amicus curiae.
En Banc
¶1 SANDERS, J. -- We are asked to determine whether a judgment is final if a defendant's sentence is still under appeal. RCW 10.73.090 prevents collateral attacks on a judgment and sentence to be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final. Scott Skylstad filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) during the second of two direct appeals, more than one year after his conviction but while his sentence was on appeal. Despite this ongoing second appeal, the Court of Appeals held Skylstad's PRP was time-barred.
¶2 We hold Skylstad's judgment was not final because his sentence was still being appealed. A judgment cannot be final until the conviction and the sentence are both final. Therefore, we remand to the Court of Appeals to determine the merits of Skylstad's PRP.
I
FACTS
¶3 The relevant facts are undisputed although confusing. On February 8, 2002, Scott Skylstad was convicted in Spokane County Superior Court of first degree robbery with a firearm enhancement. He appealed the conviction, and the State cross-appealed the sentence. On October 7, 2003, the Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the conviction but reversed the sentence. State v. Skylstad, noted at 118 Wn. App. 1062, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 2298. We denied review on May 4, 2004, State v. Skylstad, 151 Wn.2d 1023, 91 P.3d 95 (2004), and the mandate from the first appeal issued on May 14, 2004.
¶4 The trial court resentenced Skylstad on July 28, 2004, and Skylstad appealed again. On October 11, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed Skylstad's sentence. On November 21, 2005, during the pendency of his second appeal, Skylstad filed a PRP. The Court of Appeals dismissed the PRP on December 15, 2005, finding it was time-barred and claiming the May 14, 2004 mandate issued in the first appeal was the date of final judgment. On September 6, 2006, we denied review of the opinion in the second direct appeal. State v. Skylstad, 157 Wn.2d 1023, 142 P.3d 609 (2006). Then on September 15, 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a final mandate in this case. ¶5 We granted discretionary review to determine whether there could be a final judgment before there was a final sentence. II ANALYSIS A. Can a Judgment Be Final If the Sentence Is Not? (1) No petition or motion for collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a criminal case may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. (2) For the purposes of this section, "collateral attack" means any form of postconviction relief other than a direct appeal. "Collateral attack" includes, but is not limited to, a personal restraint petition, a habeas corpus petition, a motion to vacate judgment, a motion to withdraw guilty plea, a motion for a new trial, and a motion to arrest judgment. (3) For the purposes of this section, a judgment becomes final on the last of the following dates: (a) The date it is filed with the clerk of the trial court; (b) The date that an appellate court issues its mandate disposing of a timely direct appeal from the conviction; or (c) The date that the United States Supreme Court denies a timely petition for certiorari to review a decision affirming the conviction on direct appeal. The filing of a motion to reconsider denial of certiorari does not prevent a judgment from becoming final. (Emphasis added.) We apply unambiguous statutes according to their plain language; only ambiguous statutes will be construed. State v. Wilson, 125 Wn.2d 212, 217, 883 P.2d 320 (1994). When we read a statute, we must read it as a whole and give effect to all language used. State v. Young, 125 Wn.2d 688, 696, 888 P.2d 142 (1995). And no construction should be accepted that has "unlikely, absurd, or strained consequences." State v. Elgin, 118 Wn.2d 551, 555, 825 P.2d 314 (1992). 1. RCW 10.73.090 plainly says a judgment is final when review is terminated on both the conviction and the sentence ¶8 This comports with the plain meaning of "final." Webster's Third New International Dictionary gives many definitions of "final," but the one most apposite to a final legal judgment is: "being a judgment . . . that eliminates the litigation between parties on the merits and leaves nothing for the inferior court to do in case of an affirmance except to execute the judgment." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 851 (2002). ¶9 This is also how both this court and United States Supreme Court have defined final judgment. We have said, "[i]n a criminal proceeding, a final judgment 'ends the litigation, leaving nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.' " State v. Taylor, 150 Wn.2d 599, 601-02, 80 P.3d 605 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Det. of Petersen, 138 Wn.2d 70, 88, 980 P.2d 1204 (1999)); see also State v. Siglea, 196 Wash. 283, 285, 82 P.2d 583 (1938) ("As a prerequisite to an appeal in a criminal case, there must be a final judgment terminating the prosecution of the accused and disposing of all matters submitted to the court for its consideration and determination."). Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has said a final judgment " 'ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.' " Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S. Ct. 2454, 57 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1978) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S. Ct. 631, 89 L. Ed. 911 (1945)). ¶11 Under federal statutes similar to RCW 10.73.090, a judgment is not final until both the conviction and the sentence have been affirmed. But this argument misreads [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act], which states that the limitations period applicable to "a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court" shall run from, as relevant here, "the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." [28 U.S.C.] § 2244(d)(1)(A). "Final judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment." Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212, 58 S. Ct. 164, 82 L. Ed. 204 (1937). Accordingly, Burton's limitations period did not begin until both his conviction and sentence "became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review"—which occurred well after Burton filed his 1998 petition. Id. at 798-99 (first emphasis added). 2. The State's reading of RCW 10.73.090 produces inconsistent and absurd results ¶12 Considering the clarity with which both the United States Supreme Court and this court have held a criminal judgment cannot be final until both the conviction and the sentence are final, there should be little doubt as to how we would resolve this case. But the State focuses on language in RCW 10.73.090 stating a judgment is final when "an appellate court issues its mandate disposing of a timely direct appeal from the conviction." RCW 10.73.090(3)(b) (emphasis added). Therefore, the State claims May 14, 2004— the date the conviction was final—was when the judgment was final, while Skylstad argues conviction, judgment, and sentence should be read interchangeably. Pet'r's Suppl. Br. at 9. ¶13 While conviction, judgment, and sentence certainly are not interchangeable, the State focuses solely on one word—conviction—rather than reading the sentence and the statute as a whole. See State v. Young, 125 Wn.2d 688, 696, 888 P.2d 142 (1995) (" 'Each provision must be viewed in relation to other provisions and harmonized if at all possible to insure proper construction of every provision.' " (quoting Addleman v. Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 107 Wn.2d 503, 509, 730 P.2d 1327 (1986))). A "mandate disposing of a timely direct appeal from the conviction," RCW 10.73.090(3)(b), means the mandate that terminates review of both conviction and sentence—only then can the appeal be entirely disposed of. ¶14 First, the statute's purpose is to set a time limit for when a defendant can bring a "collateral attack on a judgment and sentence." RCW 10.73.090(1). When the Court of Appeals issued its mandate on May 14, 2004, Skylstad had no sentence. The State's reading would require Skylstad to have collaterally attacked his sentence within one year, even though he had no sentence to attack. This incongruity would prevent a defendant from ever being able to collaterally attack his sentence if his second appeal takes longer than a year. ¶15 Second, after Skylstad's sentence was reversed, there was also no judgment for Skylstad to collaterally attack. When a court reverses a sentence, it effectively vacates the judgment because the "[f]inal judgment in a criminal case means sentence." Berman, 302 U.S. at 212. Without the sentence, there can be no judgment. Id. The State's reading would mean Skylstad had to bring a collateral attack against the judgment even though there was no valid judgment. And it strains reason to suggest there can be a final judgment where there is no valid judgment. ¶16 And finally, the legislature broadly defines collateral attack as "any form of postconviction relief other than a direct appeal." RCW 10.73.090(2). This includes "a personal restraint petition, a habeas corpus petition, a motion to vacate judgment, a motion to withdraw guilty plea, a motion for a new trial, and a motion to arrest judgment." Id. A defendant should not be forced to seek such relief while his direct appeal is still pending. Depending on its result, Skylstad's second appeal could have mooted issues in his PRP and vice versa. See Bode v. Clark Equip. Co., 807 F.2d 879, 881 (10th Cir. 1986) (stating a judgment is not final if it can be mooted by subsequent events). ¶17 RCW 10.73.090(3)(b) says a judgment is final when the appellate court mandate disposes of a timely direct appeal from the conviction. Skylstad's direct appeal from his conviction cannot be disposed of until both his conviction and sentence are affirmed and an appellate court issues a mandate terminating review of both issues. Therefore, because his second appeal was still pending, no final judgment was entered and the one-year limitation had not yet begun. Skylstad's PRP is not time-barred. B. Should Skylstad's PRP Be Remanded to Superior Court? ¶18 Skylstad raises two new issues he claims cannot be determined solely on the record. Pet'r's Suppl. Br. at 17. Therefore, he requests we transfer his PRP to superior court for a determination on the merits under RAP 16.11. III CONCLUSION ¶19 We hold the mandate issued on May 24, 2004 was not a final judgment because it did not dispose of Skylstad's second appeal. A final judgment means both the conviction and sentence are final. Therefore, Skylstad's PRP is not untimely, and we remand to the Court of Appeals to determine the merits of Skylstad's PRP. ALEXANDER, C.J., and C. JOHNSON, CHAMBERS, and J.M. JOHNSON, JJ., concur. ¶20 FAIRHURST, J. (dissenting) -- The majority erroneously concludes a judgment is final under RCW 10.73.090(3)(b) when the appellate court issues its mandate disposing of a timely direct appeal from both the conviction and the sentence. I would hold a judgment is final under RCW 10.73.090(3)(b) when the appellate court issues its mandate disposing of a timely direct appeal from the conviction and affirm the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Scott W. Skylstad's personal restraint petition was time-barred. I respectfully dissent. ¶21 The court's primary goal in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. Am. Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Steen, 151 Wn.2d 512, 518, 91 P.3d 864 (2004) (citing State v. Watson, 146 Wn.2d 947, 954, 51 P.3d 66 (2002)). We generally begin our analysis with the text of the statute. Id. " '[A] statute is ambiguous if it can be reasonably interpreted in more than one way.' " Yousoufian v. Office of King County Executive, 152 Wn.2d 421, 433, 98 P.3d 463 (2004) (quoting Vashon Island Comm. for Self-Gov't v. Wash. State Boundary Review Bd., 127 Wn.2d 759, 771, 903 P.2d 953 (1995)). "When a statute is ambiguous, 'this court will resort to principles of statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law to assist in interpreting it.' " Id. at 434 (quoting Watson, 146 Wn.2d at 955). However, a statute's failure to define a term or terms does not necessarily render it ambiguous. Ravenscroft v. Wash. Water Power Co., 136 Wn.2d 911, 920, 969 P.2d 75 (1998). "Rather, an undefined term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning unless a contrary legislative intent is indicated." Id. at 920-21 (citing Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 813, 828 P.2d 549 (1992)). "Courts often look to standard dictionaries to determine the ordinary meaning of words." Id. at 922. ¶22 RCW 10.73.090(1) states, "[n]o petition or motion for collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a criminal case may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final." RCW 10.73.090(3) states, "a judgment becomes final" when (a) "it is filed with the clerk of the trial court," (b) "an appellate court issues its mandate disposing of a timely direct appeal from the conviction," or (c) "the United States Supreme Court denies a timely petition for certiorari to review a decision affirming the conviction on direct appeal." Because Skylstad filed a direct appeal of his conviction, only subsection (b) of RCW 10.73.090(3) is applicable here. ¶23 RCW 10.73.090 does not define the words "judgment," "sentence," or "conviction." Thus, we must analyze their plain and ordinary meaning to determine if the statute is ambiguous. ¶24 Black's Law Dictionary defines "judgment" as "[a] court's final determination of the rights and obligations of the parties in a case." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 858 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). It defines "sentence" as "[t]he judgment that a court formally pronounces after finding a criminal defendant guilty; the punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer." Id. at 1393 (emphasis added). It defines "conviction" as "[t]he act or process of judicially finding someone guilty of a crime; the state of having been proved guilty." Id. at 358 (emphasis added). ¶25 It is clear that the words "judgment," "sentence," and "conviction" are not interchangeable, as the majority concedes. Majority at 10. Rather, the "judgment" is the court's formal decision or order in a case, the "sentence" is the punishment imposed on a defendant for the crime committed, and the "conviction" is the act of judicially finding a defendant guilty of committing the crime. Once we have determined the meaning of the words used in the statute, we must determine whether the statute is ambiguous and whether it requires application of the statutory interpretation canons. ¶26 RCW 10.73.090(1) clearly allows a defendant to file a petition or motion for a collateral attack on a "judgment" and "sentence" no more than one year after the "judgment" is final. RCW 10.73.090(3)(b) clearly defines the finality of a "judgment" as the date that the appellate court issues its mandate disposing of a defendant's timely direct appeal from his or her "conviction." The majority insists that in order to give meaning to the fact that RCW 10.73.090(1) allows a defendant to file a petition or motion for a collateral attack on a sentence, RCW 10.73.090(3)(b) must mean the date the appellate court issues the "mandate that terminates review of both conviction and sentence." Majority at 10-11. But there is nothing in the statute that would suggest such a requirement. ¶27 Indeed, RCW 10.73.090(3)(b) could not be more clear in stating that the appellate court's mandate disposing of the defendant's timely direct appeal from his or her "conviction" renders the judgment "final." "The court may not add language to a clear statute, even if it believes the Legislature intended something else but failed to express it adequately." State v. Chester, 133 Wn.2d 15, 21, 940 P.2d 1374 (1997). While it is true that RCW 10.73.090(1) allows a defendant to file a petition or motion for a collateral attack on the "judgment" and "sentence," that fact alone does not require the finality of the "judgment" to be based on both the "conviction" and the "sentence" if the statute does not require it. ¶28 The court should not read into a statute words that are not there. If the legislature had wanted to base finality of a judgment on both the conviction and the sentence, as the majority finds, it would have said so. The legislature's purpose in enacting RCW 10.73.090 was to restrict the time for a defendant to raise a collateral attack on his or her judgment and sentence. It defined that time as when the judgment becomes final and specifically outlined what final meant in RCW 10.73.090(3). ¶29 I would affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that Skylstad's collateral attack was time-barred because his judgment was final when the appellate court issued its mandate disposing of his timely direct appeal from his conviction. I respectfully dissent. MADSEN, BRIDGE, and OWENS, JJ., concur with FAIRHURST, J.