111 Wn.2d 499, GEVAART v. METCO CONSTRUCTION

CITE:          111 Wn.2d 499, 760 P.2d 348

               GEVAART v. METCO CONSTRUCTION

CAUSE NUMBER: 54341-1

FILE DATE:     September 1, 1988

CASE TITLE: Debbie Gevaart, Petitioner, v. Metco Construction,
               Inc., et al, Respondents.

[1] Limitation of Actions - Accrual of Cause - Discovery Rule - Knowledge of Legal Cause of Action. A cause of action accrues under the discovery rule when the injured person knows or should in the exercise of due diligence know all the facts necessary to establish the elements of the claim. Accrual of the cause is not dependent on the plaintiff's discovery of the existence of a right to a legal remedy.

NAMES OF CONCURRING OR DISSENTING JUDGES: Brachtenbach, J., concurs in the result only; Smith, J., did not participate in the disposition of this case.

NATURE OF ACTION: After falling backward off a sloping step, the plaintiff sought damages for negligence from the designer and builder of the stairway.

Superior Court: The Superior Court for Snohomish County, No. 84-2-03580-1, Daniel T. Kershner, J., granted a summary judgment in favor of the defendants on July 18, 1985.

Court of Appeals: The court AFFIRMED the judgment in an unpublished opinion noted at 48 Wn. App. 1034.

Supreme Court: Holding that the action was not timely, the court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment.

COUNSEL:      SCHROETER, GOLDMARK & BENDER and JAMES D. HAILEY, for petitioner.

RICHARD B. JOHNSON, for respondents.

AUTHOR OF MAJORITY OPINION: Dolliver, J.-

MAJORITY OPINION: Plaintiff Debbie Gevaart brought a negligence action against defendant Metco Construction, Inc., claiming negligent design and construction of a stairway.

On October 25, 1981, plaintiff ascended the stairs to her residence in the Executive Manor Condominiums. Upon reaching the top step, which sloped downward, she lost her balance and fell backward.

Sometime after November 1981, Gevaart learned, from a discussion with her family and friends, that the slope of the step may have been improperly constructed.

In April 1982, Gevaart retained an attorney who investigated the accident scene, employing experts in architectural design and engineering psychology. In August 1984, the engineering psychologist submitted a report stating Gevaart's injuries were the direct result of the poorly designed and constructed stairway. On October 29, 1984, more than 3 years after the accident, a complaint for personal injuries was filed by Gevaart.

[1] The trial court, finding no genuine issues of material fact, granted the defendant Metco's motion for summary judgment because the action was barred by the 3-year statute of limitations. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted review. After examining the record and hearing oral argument, we affirm the Court of Appeals. The decision of that court, although unpublished, fully resolves the issues raised by Gevaart. (CF. NORTH COAST AIR SERVS. v. GRUMMAN CORP., 111 Wn.2d 315, 319, 759 P.2d 405 (1988) holding "claimant in a product liability case must have discovered, or in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered, a factual causal relationship of the product to the harm." This is not in issue here.) We concur in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, publish the essential parts of that opinion, and adopt them as our own:

"     Gevaart contends a genuine issue of material fact
      exists as to when she knew or should have known the essential
      elements of negligence. She claims that even though she
      knew the step was sloped and the step caused her fall
      and injuries, she did not know the slope of the step existed
      because the builder-designer breached a duty toward her.

Therefore she contends that, as she did not discover Metco's
      and Hale's breach until a considerable time had passed
      after she fell, the limitation statute did not begin to
      run until that later date and her claim should not be
      barred. We do not agree.

The general rule in a personal injury action is that
      a cause of action "accrues" at the time the act or omission
      occurs. However, in certain torts, injured parties do
      not, or cannot, know they have been injured. In those
      cases, the cause of action accrues at the time the plaintiff
      knew or should have known all of the essential elements
      of the cause of action, I.E., duty, breach, causation
      and damages. This rule which postpones the accrual of
      the cause of action is known as the "discovery rule."
      SEE SAHLIE v. JOHNS-MANVILLE SALES CORP., 99 Wn.2d 550,
      552, 663 P.2d 473 (1983); OHLER v. TACOMA GEN. HOSP.,
      92 Wn.2d 507, 598 P.2d 1358 (1979).

The general rule in claims against builders and architects
      for negligent design and construction is that the negligence
      action accrues and the limitation statute begins to run
      when the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered,
      his/her damage or injury resulting from the negligence.
      THEURER v. CONDON, 34 Wn.2d 448, 454-55, 209 P.2d 311
      (1949); SEE ALSO TWIN FALLS CLINIC & HOSP. BLDG. CORP.
      v. HAMILL, 103 Idaho 19, 644 P.2d 341 (1982); BOARD OF
      DIRECTORS OF ASS'N OF APARTMENT OWNERS OF REGENCY TOWER
      CONDOMINIUM PROJECT v. REGENCY TOWER VENTURE, 2 Hawaii
      App. 506, 635 P.2d 244 (1981); SISTERS OF MERCY v. GAUDREAU,
      INC., 47 Md. App. 372, 423 A.2d 585 (1980). 1

In this case, the alleged negligent acts are the
      design and construction of the stairway. Even though
      the design and construction resulted in the defective
      stair, Gevaart did not have a cause of action in 1978.

The hazard created by the alleged negligent acts was continuous.

On October 25, 1981, all essential elements of her
      cause of action had occurred. In addition to Metco and
      Hale having breached their duty to Gevaart to design and
      construct the stairway pursuant to code, the resulting
      sloped step allegedly caused Gevaart to fall and she was
      injured.

Gevaart argues she assumed the slope which caused
      her fall was for drainage and that as of October 29, 1981,
      she had no knowledge of a possible professional negligence
      action against Hale or Metco. However, the discovery
      rule does not require knowledge of the existence of a
      legal cause of action. REICHELT v. JOHNS-MANVILLE CORP.,
      107 Wn.2d 761, 733 P.2d 530 (1987); SAHLIE v. JOHNS-MANVILLE
      SALES CORP., SUPRA. To so require would effectively do
      away with the limitation of actions until an injured person
      saw his/her attorney. SEE BUXTON v. PERRY, 32 Wn. App.
      211, 222, 646 P.2d 779 (1982). This is not the law.

Gevaart's affidavit establishes that on October 25,
      1981, she knew the step sloped. By the exercise of due
      diligence she could have determined that the step did
      not conform to the building code and further, the true
      reason why the slope existed. Because she did not exercise
      diligence in a timely manner her cause of action filed
      October 29, 1984, was barred by the 3-year statute of
      limitations.

          1 The discovery rule is limited by RCW 4.16.310 which
      fixes a precise time beyond which no remedy will be available.
      RODRIGUEZ v. NIEMEYER, 23 Wn. App. 398, 401, 595 P.2d
      952 (1979). This 6-year limitation created by RCW 4.16.310
      begins to run upon substantial completion of construction.

An action may accrue within the 6 years and then be extended
      by the relevant limitation statute as to that injury.

Here, the August 1978 completion date and the 1981 injury
      are well within the 6-year limitation. However, once
      an action accrues it may also be subject to the 3-year
      limitation statute, RCW 4.16.080, when it extends the
      time for filing beyond the 6-year period. Thus the cause
      of action brought against Metco and Hale had to be brought
      within 3 years after it occurred, as the 6-year statute
      of repose ran out in August of 1984.

GEVAART v. METCO CONSTR., INC., noted at 48 Wn. App. 1034 (1987).

The Court of Appeals is affirmed.

CONCURRING JUDGES: Pearson, C.J., and Utter, Dore, Andersen, Callow, and Durham, JJ., concur.

Brachtenbach, J., concurs in the result.

POST-OPINION INFORMATION: