[No. 59534-2-I. Division One. July 21, 2008.]
[1] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- Public Records -- Statutory Provisions -- Public Policy. The Public Records Act (chapter 42.56 RCW) is a strongly worded mandate for the broad disclosure of public records. [2] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- Judicial Review -- Appellate Review -- De Novo Review. Under RCW 42.56.550(3), agency action taken or challenged under the Public Records Act (chapter 42.56 RCW) is reviewed by an appellate court de novo. [3] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- In Camera Review -- Discretion of Court -- In General. Under RCW 42.56.550(3), a court may examine records in camera to determine whether their disclosure would be proper. [4] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- Statutory Provisions -- Construction -- Disclosure and Exemptions. The disclosure requirements of the Public Records Act (chapter 42.56 RCW) are liberally construed and its exemptions are narrowly construed. [5] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- Statutory Provisions -- Construction -- Policy. Under RCW 42.56.550(3), a court interpreting the Public Records Act (chapter 42.56 RCW) must take into account "that free and open examination of public records is in the public interest, even though such examination may cause inconvenience or embarrassment to public officials or others." [6] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- Public Records -- Threshold Issue. In analyzing a dispute over a public records request under the Public Records Act (chapter 42.56 RCW), a threshold issue is whether the requested documents are public records. [7] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- Public Records -- What Constitutes -- E-mail -- Created and Transmitted by Private Citizen -- Subject of Public Comment at Public Meeting. The electronic version of an e-mail created and transmitted by a private citizen to a public official that the official makes the subject of public comment at a public meeting constitutes a "writing" within the meaning of RCW 42.56.010(3) and is a "public record" within the meaning of RCW 42.56.010(2) for purposes of the Public Records Act (chapter 42.56 RCW). [8] Statutes -- Construction -- Meaning of Words -- Absence of Statutory Definition -- Resort to Dictionary -- In General. The meaning of a statutory term that is undefined by the statute may be found in a dictionary. [9] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- Public Records -- Statutory Provisions -- "Own" -- What Constitutes. For purposes of the RCW 42.56.010(2) definition of "public record," which includes "any writing containing information relating to the conduct of government or the performance of any governmental or proprietary function prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics," to "own" means to have or possess as property. [10] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- Public Records -- "Writing" -- Metadata Associated With E-mail.The metadata associated with an e-mail, or some portion of it, can constitute a "writing" within the meaning of RCW 42.56.010(3) of the Public Records Act (chapter 42.56 RCW). [11] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- Public Records -- What Constitutes -- E-Mail -- Associated Metadata.Metadata associated with an e-mail received by a public official on an e-mail account used by the official, at least in part, for governmental business can constitute a "public record" within the meaning of RCW 42.56.010(2) for purposes of the Public Records Act (chapter 42.56 RCW). One example of such metadata is e-mail addresses of persons who may have knowledge of a matter relating to the conduct of government or to the performance of a governmental function. [12] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- Response by Agency -- Agency Rules -- Fullest Assistance. Under RCW 42.56.100, agency rules must provide for the fullest assistance to persons inquiring about public records. [13] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- Public Records -- Destruction -- Avoidance. Under RCW 42.56.100, an agency must refrain from destroying public records that are subject to a pending public record request. [14] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- Public Records -- Request -- Specificity. The disclosure requirements of the Public Records Act (chapter 42.56 RCW) are not triggered unless a request is made for an identifiable public record. A public record is "identifiable" only if the party requesting the record provides a reasonable description enabling an employee of the responding public agency to locate the requested record. [15] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- E-mail -- Response by Agency -- Deletion of Header Identifying Sender -- Validity. When a person requests to "see that e-mail" that a public official referenced at a public hearing, the responding agency's provision of an altered version of the e-mail that lacks the header identifying the sender of the e-mail does not satisfy the disclosure requirements of the Public Records Act (chapter 42.56 RCW). Protection of the sender from potential public exposure is not a valid reason for redacting the header information. [16] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- Response by Agency -- Timeliness -- Sufficiency. A public disclosure request is satisfied if a timely and complete response to the request is made within five business days of the request as required by RCW 42.56.520, even if an incomplete response was earlier made. [17] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- E-mail -- Request for "Copy of E-mail" -- Response by Agency -- Electronic Version -- Necessity. When a party requests to see a "copy" of a public record e-mail but makes no mention of either the electronic version of the e-mail or its associated metadata, the responding agency is not required to provide an electronic copy of the e-mail in order to satisfy the disclosure requirements of the Public Records Act (chapter 42.56 RCW). [18] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- Statutory Provisions -- Preemption -- First Amendment -- Shifting Burdens. A party raising a First Amendment defense to a claimed failure to fulfill a public disclosure request in violation of the Public Records Act (chapter 42.56 RCW) must make an initial showing that there is some probability that the information sought to be disclosed will infringe on the person's First Amendment rights. If the showing is made, the burden shifts to the party making the disclosure request to show the relevance and materiality of the requested information and that reasonable efforts to obtain the information another way have been unsuccessful. [19] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- Judicial Review -- Standard of Review -- De Novo Review -- Deference to Agency -- Necessity. Under the de novo standard of RCW 42.56.550(3) for judicial review of agency actions taken or challenged under Public Records Act (chapter 42.56 RCW), the courts owe no deference to agencies as to whether a duty to disclose exists. [20] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- Statutory Provisions -- Conflict With Another Law -- Resolution. The Public Records Act (chapter 42.56 RCW) prevails when there is a conflict between the act and another law. [21] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- E-mail -- Request for Metadata -- Response by Agency -- Copy of E-mail Sent to Different Recipient -- Sufficiency. When a party requests the metadata of a public record e-mail sent to an agency official, the responding agency's provision of the metadata from a copy of the e-mail that the sender transmitted to a recipient other than the agency official does not satisfy the disclosure requirements of the Public Records Act (chapter 42.56 RCW). [22] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- Response by Agency -- Failure To Properly Respond -- Penalty -- In General. Where appropriate, a trial court should determine the appropriate monetary penalty for a public agency's failure to properly respond to a disclosure request under the Public Records Act (chapter 42.56 RCW). [23] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- Privileged Information -- Attorney-Client Privilege -- Determination -- By Court -- Validity. Where a public agency responding to a disclosure request under the Public Records Act (chapter 42.56 RCW) claims that the requested record is protected by the attorney-client privilege, the trial court has the discretion to review the evidence and the record and to determine whether the agency has met its burden of proving that the record is privileged. [24] Courts -- Stare Decisis -- Foreign Law -- Unpublished Opinions. Under GR 14.1(b), the citation to an unpublished opinion from another jurisdiction is prohibited and sanctionable if the court rules of the other jurisdiction do not allow such citation. [25] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- Judicial Review -- Show Cause Hearing -- Rulings -- Litigation Management Decisions -- Purpose. A trial court's rulings in a show cause hearing under the Public Records Act (chapter 42.56 RCW) are trial "management decisions" that are designed to avoid making cases under the act so expensive that citizens could not use the act for its intended purpose. [26] Dismissal and Nonsuit -- Review -- Standard of Review. A trial court's dismissal of an action is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. [27] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- Judicial Review -- Dismissal of Action -- Summary Procedure -- Validity. In an action to enforce a public disclosure request under the Public Records Act (chapter 42.56 RCW), the trial court may employ the show-cause procedure set forth in RCW 42.56.550 and dismiss the action based solely on the written record, without a hearing or trial on the merits. There is no right under the act to a hearing with oral argument or a trial. [28] Appeal -- Review -- Issues Unsupported by Authority, Argument, or Analysis. An appellate court may decline to consider a claim or contention that is unsupported by citation to authority or sufficient argument. [29] Appeal -- Disposition of Cause -- Assignment Rendered Moot. An appellate court may decline to consider a claim or issue rendered moot by its disposition of other issues in the case. [30] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- Attorney Fees -- On Appeal -- Partial Success. A party that partially prevails on appeal in an action to enforce a disclosure request under the Public Records Act (chapter 42.56 RCW) is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal under RCW 42.56.550(4). [31] Open Government -- Public Disclosure -- Denial -- Penalty -- Prevailing Party -- Partially Prevailing Party. A party that partially prevails on appeal in an action to enforce a disclosure request under the Public Records Act (chapter 42.56 RCW) should be awarded between $5 and $100 for each day records were unlawfully withheld under RCW 42.56.440(4). Nature of Action: A citizen sought to enforce several requests for the disclosure of an e-mail, and the metadata therefrom, that a deputy mayor had received on her personal e-mail account and that she referenced at a city council meeting. Superior Court: The Superior Court for King County, No. 06-2-36983-1, Bruce W. Hilyer, J., on January 9, 2007, entered a judgment denying the plaintiffs' motions, dismissing the action, and awarding costs to the city and the deputy mayor. Court of Appeals: Holding that the e-mail is a public record; that the metadata from the e-mail is a public record; that the city satisfied the plaintiff's public disclosure request with respect to the e-mail; that the city failed to satisfy the plaintiff's public disclosure request with respect to the metadata; that the trial court must determine on remand whether the deputy mayor's personal computer contains the requested metadata; that the trial court must determine on remand whether the deputy mayor's deletion of the metadata violated the Public Records Acts and, if so, determine the appropriate penalty; that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that certain requested records are protected by the attorney-client privilege; that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the complaint without a hearing with oral argument or trial on the merits; that the trial court's order granting costs to the city and the deputy mayor may be stricken in accordance with their request therefor; and that the plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal and a statutory penalty assessment as the partially prevailing party, the court affirms the judgment in part, vacates it in part, and remands the case for further proceedings. Michael G. Brannan (of Law Office of Michael G. Brannan) and Michele L. Earl-Hubbard (of Allied Law Group, LLC), for appellants. Ramsey E. Ramerman (of Foster Pepper, PLLC) and Ian R. Sievers, City Attorney, and Flannary P. Collins, Assistant, for respondents. Written by: Judge Cox. Concurred by: Judge Appelwick, Judge Lau. [As amended by order of the Court of Appeals September 25, 2008.] ¶1 COX, J. -- This is an action under the Public Records Act (PRA) of the state of Washington. ¶2 In November 2006, Beth and Doug O'Neill commenced this action, claiming that the city of Shoreline (City) and its deputy mayor violated the PRA in responding to Ms. O'Neill's multiple requests for public records. They also contend that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the case after the show cause hearing, which was held solely on declarations and briefs. They further claim this procedure violated due process. Finally, they contend that the trial court erroneously awarded costs to the City and its deputy mayor, Maggie Fimia. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. ¶3 The material facts are not substantially in dispute. At a public meeting of the Shoreline City Council on September 18, 2006, Deputy Mayor Maggie Fimia stated that she had received an e-mail that related to a pending zoning matter. According to her, the e-mail stated serious allegations of improper influence by members of the city council over that zoning matter. She said the message came to her from "a Ms. Hettrick and a Ms. O'Neill." ¶4 Ms. O'Neill was present at the public meeting and claims that Deputy Mayor Fimia's remarks "came as a complete shock to [her]." ¶5 Central to the dispute on appeal are actions the deputy mayor took after Ms. O'Neill's request. The deputy mayor deleted the top four lines of the header on the e-mail when she forwarded it from her personal computer to herself. Sometime thereafter, it appears she deleted the e-mail from her personal computer. Whether the editing of the e-mail and the failure to provide the entire e-mail with all metadata violates the PRA are at issue. ¶6 Further communication between Ms. O'Neill and the City (including Deputy Mayor Fimia) occurred the following day and thereafter. O'Neill made six more oral or written requests for records following the oral request at the public meeting on September 18. No one argues that any of the City's responses were untimely. We discuss the details of the requests and the responses later in this opinion. ¶7 Dissatisfied with the City's responses to the requests, the O'Neills commenced this action pursuant to the PRA, simultaneously moving for an order to appear and show cause directed to the City and Deputy Mayor Fimia. At the same time, they also moved for an order requiring the City and its agents, including the deputy mayor, to lodge public records for in camera review and to prepare a detailed record of documents withheld and exemptions claimed. All parties submitted declarations and briefing on the requests for relief. ¶8 The trial court reviewed the briefing, the declarations, and one record submitted for in camera review as exempt from disclosure. ¶9 They appeal. PUBLIC RECORDS ACT ¶10 O'Neill argues that the City violated the PRA by, among other things, altering and destroying public records following her request. [1] ¶11 The PRA was enacted in 1972 by initiative as part of the public disclosure act, formerly chapter 42.17 RCW. Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for public inspection and copying all public records, unless the record falls within the specific exemptions of . . . this chapter, or other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records. The supreme court has recognized that the PRA "'is a strongly worded mandate for broad disclosure of public records.'" [2-5] ¶12 Judicial review of challenged agency actions under the PRA is de novo, and a court may examine the records in camera to determine whether disclosure is proper. that free and open examination of public records is in the public interest, even though such examination may cause inconvenience or embarrassment to public officials or others. Public Records [6] ¶13 A threshold issue under the PRA is whether the requested documents are public records. ¶14 The PRA specifies that a "public record" is any writing containing information relating to the conduct of government or the performance of any governmental or proprietary function prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics. A "writing" is defined as handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing, and every other means of recording any form of communication or representation, including, but not limited to, letters, words, pictures, sounds, or symbols, or combination thereof, and all papers, maps, magnetic or paper tapes, photographic films and prints, motion picture, film and video recordings, magnetic or punched cards, discs, drums, diskettes, sound recordings, and other documents including existing data compilations from which information may be obtained or translated. [7] ¶15 It is undisputed that the City is a "local agency" under the PRA. ¶16 Deputy Mayor Fimia argues that the electronic version of the e-mail is not a public record because it was not "used" by the City. She argues that it was created and transmitted by a private citizen, not the City. Her argument fails to acknowledge that Deputy Mayor Fimia used the e-mail when she made it the subject of public comment at the city council meeting. And she cites no authority for the proposition that a private citizen's creation and transmission of an e-mail is relevant to the question whether the e-mail is a public record. We conclude that the electronic version of the e-mail is a public record. [8-11] ¶17 We next turn to the question of whether the metadata associated with the foregoing e-mail is also a public record. As we previously indicated, the definitions section of the PRA provides the answer. A "public record" is any writing containing information relating to the conduct of government or the performance of any governmental or proprietary function prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics. A "writing" is: [h]andwriting . . . and every other means of recording any form of communication or representation, including, but not limited to . . . magnetic or punched cards, discs, drums, diskettes, . . . and other documents including existing data compilations from which information may be obtained or translated. ¶18 The metadata associated with the e-mail, or some portion of it, falls within the broad definition of a "writing." It is sufficiently similar to the examples of the types of documents in the definition to qualify as a "writing." Accordingly, the information falls within that broad definition in the statute, as we must liberally interpret the PRA. ¶19 Moreover, on this record, the metadata contains information that "relates to" the conduct of government or the performance of a governmental function. For example, it shows the e-mail addresses of persons who may have knowledge of alleged government improprieties in dealing with a zoning matter. This falls squarely within the statute's definition of "public record," as we must liberally construe the PRA. On remand, the trial court should determine which of the other portions of the metadata in the e-mail fall within the scope of the PRA. ¶20 Finally, no one argues that anyone other than the deputy mayor, an agent of the City, "owns" the metadata from the e-mail she received on her personal e-mail account that she uses, in part, for the City's business. ¶21 We conclude that, on this record, the metadata associated with the e-mail Deputy Mayor Fimia discussed at the meeting, or some portion of it, is also a public record. We do not rule on the more general question whether e-mail or metadata that is transmitted to personal e-mail accounts, without more, is subject to the PRA. Here, the materials at issue fall within the statutory definitions subjecting those materials to disclosure under the PRA. Moreover, the metadata was specifically requested in this case. ¶22 The City does not dispute in its brief that the metadata associated with the e-mail is a public record. Moreover, we find nothing in the record indicating that the City ever took the position, either before or during this litigation, that the metadata at issue here is not a public record. While the City appears to have taken a different position at oral argument before this court, we conclude that its position at oral argument does not address, in a persuasive way, the analysis we set forth above. Requests for Public Records and Responses ¶23 As in most public records cases, the other basic issues here are whether all public records that O'Neill requested were provided and whether the City bore its burden to show that any requested records are exempt. Here, O'Neill specifically argues that the City altered and deleted an e-mail after her request for that e-mail and failed to protect public records from damage or destruction. [12-14] ¶24 The PRA requires agency rules to "provide for the fullest assistance to inquirers." ¶25 We first examine O'Neill's claim that the City failed to provide the e-mail in response to her oral request of September 18, 2006, at the city council meeting on that date. Doing so requires a close reading of the record. ¶26 This matter originated when Deputy Mayor Maggie Fimia received on September 18, 2006, an e-mail from Lisa Thwing. That message forwarded an e-mail that was from Diane Hettrick. The header in the e-mail to the deputy mayor from Thwing reads: From: "Lisa Thwing" &t;tootrd@comcast.net&t; Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2006 07:55:38 -0700 To: "Lisa Thwing" &t;tootrd@comcast.net&t; Subject: Current city council meeting being broadcast this week From: Diane Hettrick &t;mailto:dhettrick@earthlink.net&t; Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 11:40 PM Subject: Current city council meeting being broadcast this week The body of the message begins as follows: From my friend Judy: Hi Folks, My dear friend, Beth O'Neill has asked me to pass along information about our dysfunctional Shoreline City Council. The e-mail goes on to state that city council members are "playing favorites" in zoning decisions in favor of their political supporters. ¶27 That night, a Monday, the Shoreline City Council held a public meeting. ¶28 During the public comment portion of this meeting that followed, Ms. O'Neill denied knowledge of the message that the deputy mayor described and orally requested to "see that e-mail." Deputy Mayor Fimia responded that she did not have the document with her but would be happy to share it with O'Neill. ¶29 Following the public meeting, the deputy mayor reviewed the e-mail from Thwing and forwarded that e-mail from her personal e-mail account to herself. Before forwarding this e-mail, the deputy mayor deleted the first four lines of the header, which includes the "to" and "from" lines listing Thwing as the sender and recipient. She did this "in order to protect Ms. Thwing from potential public exposure." ¶30 That same day, a Tuesday, O'Neill called the City of Shoreline and left a voicemail message "again requesting a copy of the e-mail." ¶31 In response, Carolyn Wurdeman sent an e-mail to Deputy Mayor Fimia requesting "information about who the e-mail [was] sent to." The deputy mayor responded that "there was no 'To' line in the e-mail." ¶32 On Wednesday, September 20, O'Neill went to the city clerk's office to pick up the requested record. There, she submitted her first written request, PD 06-135, for the "E-mail mentioned by Deputy Mayor Fimia at the 9-18 Council meeting." In response, the clerk's office gave O'Neill a hard copy of the e-mail from Hettrick, without the forwarding header from Thwing. ¶33 Dissatisfied with the record she received, O'Neill immediately submitted another written request, PD 06-134. She requested: [A]ll information relating to this e-mail: how it was received by Maggie Fimia, from whom it was received, and the forwarding chain of the e-mail. ¶34 On Monday, September 25, Deputy Mayor Fimia located the original September 18 e-mail from Thwing on her computer and forwarded the complete e-mail, including the forwarding information from Thwing, to the city attorney. ¶35 The deputy mayor deleted the original e-mail from her computer sometime after forwarding the message to the city attorney. The record is unclear on when this deletion occurred. ¶36 That same day, Monday, September 25, O'Neill submitted a third written request, PD 06-138. It expanded on the prior requests by seeking [a]ny and all correspondence (including memos) relating to this [e-mail] and a COMPLETE transmission / forwarding chain AND ALL metadata pertaining to this document. ¶37 That evening, there was another city council meeting. At the meeting, Deputy Mayor Fimia publicly corrected the error she made in the September 18 meeting by explaining that Hettrick had sent the original e-mail quoting her friend "Judy," but that O'Neill had not sent the e-mail. ¶38 On Wednesday, September 27, O'Neill submitted a fourth written records request, PD 06-139. Specifically, she sought a copy of the e-mail Deputy Mayor Fimia mentioned during the September 25 council meeting, including all "metadata, memos, and any other correspondence relating to this document." ¶39 The City responded to O'Neill's third and fourth written requests on September 29. It provided numerous records and also indicated that further records would likely be available by October 5. ¶40 The City's letter stated that it was declining to disclose one document that was covered by the attorney-client privilege. That document was later accidentally released to O'Neill. ¶41 The records provided included, among other documents, metadata from a copy of the e-mail that Deputy Mayor Fimia had apparently sent to herself on September 26. ¶42 The letter also informed O'Neill that the City would search Deputy Mayor Fimia's computer for any additional responsive records. We describe later in this opinion the City's efforts in this respect. ¶43 In the meantime, Deputy Mayor Fimia was unable to locate the original e-mail on her computer, so she asked Thwing to resend it to her. On September 30, Thwing complied with that request. ¶44 The City provided a second installment of records to O'Neill on October 3. The second installment included a paper copy of the original e-mail that Thwing resent to Deputy Mayor Fimia on September 30 and metadata from that e-mail. It also included metadata from the September 18 e-mail Thwing had sent to Janet Way, a city council member. The City declined to release one additional document based on attorney-client privilege. ¶45 On October 16, O'Neill submitted her fifth and final written records request, PD 06-154. Her request essentially reiterated her past requests and also requested any and all documents of any kind relating to the incident or the City's treatment of the incident. ¶46 The City responded on either October 23 or 24. Included in its response were several e-mail messages. On October 25, the City supplemented its response to O'Neill's fourth written request. ¶47 O'Neill first argues that the City did not comply with her oral request of September 18 at the public meeting because the deputy mayor intentionally altered the e-mail by deleting the forwarding header after the request. O'Neill also claims the deputy mayor's later deletion of the entire e-mail violated the PRA. [15] ¶48 The record shows that O'Neill made an oral request at the September 18, 2006 public meeting to "see that e-mail" to which the deputy mayor referred at that meeting. A fair reading of that request is that O'Neill sought to see the entire e-mail, not an altered version of it. It is undisputed that the deputy mayor altered the e-mail after the oral request and before forwarding it by removing the header information showing who sent it to her. Nothing in the PRA supports alteration of the record "in order to protect Ms. Thwing from potential public exposure," the deputy mayor's stated rationale for altering the document. ¶49 O'Neill argues that Deputy Mayor Fimia's "alteration" of the original e-mail could support a criminal charge under chapter 40.16 RCW. That statute renders the destruction of a public record a class C felony. [16] ¶50 O'Neill does not dispute that on September 25, 2006, she received a hard copy of the original e-mail, which contained the header and body of the September 18 e-mail. Within five business days of receiving a public record request, an agency . . . must respond by either (1) providing the record; (2) acknowledging that the agency . . . has received the request and providing a reasonable estimate of the time the agency . . . will require to respond to the request; or (3) denying the public record request.» ¶51 O'Neill argues that her September 18 request fairly identified that she sought the electronic version of the e-mail. A careful reading of the record shows that she did not make that request on that date. [17] ¶52 The City is not required to be a mind reader when responding to public records requests. ¶53 Deputy Mayor Fimia argues that requiring her to identify Thwing as the sender of the e-mail violates her First Amendment right to freedom of association. We disagree. [18] ¶54 Washington's First Amendment jurisprudence requires an initial showing that there is "some probability that the requested disclosure will infringe upon [the person's] First Amendment rights." ¶55 Next, we must determine whether the City complied with O'Neill's request for the e-mail's metadata, which she first requested on September 25. ¶56 Deputy Mayor Fimia describes the deletion of e-mail as accidental. She also testified that she was not familiar with the term metadata until O'Neill requested that information. This latter statement could be read to suggest that the deputy mayor did not intentionally delete any metadata before O'Neill specifically requested that information. The City defends on the basis that the deletion of e-mail and associated metadata was consistent with its records retention policy. ¶57 The records retention guidelines promulgated by the secretary of state provide that certain e-mails are public records. Those that are public records may be deleted as long as they are printed along with the following information: name of sender, name of recipient, and date and time of transmission and/or receipt. [19, 20] ¶58 However, the PRA directs courts to review agency actions de novo, giving them no deference in determining whether a record is subject to disclosure under the PRA. [21] ¶59 Here, the City admits that it did not provide the exact metadata from the original e-mail. Rather, the City argues that O'Neill received metadata "associated with" the e-mail. ¶60 Without having the metadata associated with the September 18 e-mail to the deputy mayor before us, we cannot tell the extent to which it differs from the metadata from the e-mail that went to Way, which was provided to O'Neill. In any event, the metadata from the e-mail to Way is not the specific record O'Neill requested. At the very least, the information contained in the headers of the respective e-mails would likely be different. This header information includes, among other things, the name, e-mail address, and Internet protocol address of the e-mail's recipient. ¶61 Our conclusion on this point addresses O'Neill's challenge to the trial court's ruling that "'[n]o additional responsive records are available or contained on the computer hard drive of [Deputy Mayor Fimia] and duplication of the hard drive for further in camera inspection is not warranted.'" ¶62 Joel Taylor, a computer and network specialist for the City, stated only that he searched Deputy Mayor Fimia's e-mail program for the missing e-mail. ¶63 Tho Dao, the City's manager of information services, stated that the City did not search Deputy Mayor Fimia's hard drive: The City only has software capable of copying the hard drives of personal computers ("PC"), not macintosh computers ("MAC"). The Deputy Mayor has a MAC. I estimate the cost to purchase the software capable of copying a MAC hard drive at somewhere between $ 500 - $ 1,000. ¶64 On this record, we cannot tell whether the hard drive of the deputy mayor's computer contains metadata associated with the September 18 e-mail that would be responsive to the request. The trial court shall determine the answer to that question on remand. ¶65 We also note that the deputy mayor forwarded to the city attorney the September 18 e-mail to which she referred at the September 18 meeting. This record does not tell us whether that forwarded e-mail had with it the same metadata that O'Neill sought or whether the City could provide the metadata from the forwarded e-mail to her in response to her request. Whether the metadata is the same or different is a question this court cannot answer. We leave it for decision by the trial court on remand. ¶66 The trial court should also consider on remand whether the e-mail Thwing resent to the deputy mayor contains the requested metadata. Again, we cannot tell on this record whether it does. [22] ¶67 If the metadata exists from any of these sources, it is subject to O'Neill's pending record request, and the City is required under the PRA to provide it to her. If it does not exist, the trial court must determine, consistent with this opinion, whether the City's deletion of the metadata violated the PRA. [23] ¶68 O'Neill also challenges the trial court's conclusion regarding the record the City withheld as attorney-client privileged. [24] ¶69 Finally, O'Neill cites an unpublished case from another jurisdiction regarding electronic information to support her argument concerning the computer's hard drive. We note that our court rules prohibit the citation of unpublished cases under the circumstances here because the rules of the other jurisdiction do not allow such citation. Dismissal at Show Cause Hearing ¶70 O'Neill argues that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing her complaint without a hearing or trial on the merits. Specifically, she asserts that the decision to dismiss was contrary to the requirements of the PRA and violated due process. [25-27] ¶71 RCW 42.56.550 sets forth the procedure to be followed when a litigant wishes to challenge an agency's actions surrounding a public records request. The statute provides for the superior court in the relevant county to conduct a show cause hearing at which the agency may be required to justify its response to a request for public records.