[No. 35461-6-II. Division Two. January 15, 2008.]
[1] Judgment Summary Judgment Review Role of Appellate Court. An appellate court reviews a summary judgment de novo, performing the same inquiry as the trial court under CR 56 and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. [2] Courts Rules of Court Construction Question of Law or Fact Review. The interpretation of a court rule is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. [3] Statutes Construction Question of Law or Fact Review Standard of Review. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. [4] Statutes Construction Unambiguous Language Plain Meaning Statutory Language. The meaning of plain and unambiguous statutory language is derived from the wording of the statute itself. [5] Statutes Construction Unambiguous Language Judicial Interpretation. A statute that is clear on its face is not subject to judicial interpretation. [6] Statutes Construction Ambiguity What Constitutes Conceivable Interpretations. A statute is not ambiguous unless it is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations, but the possibility of different meanings alone does not render a statute vague. [7] Statutes Construction Ambiguity Determination Necessity. A court must first find that a statute is ambiguous before it may interpret the statute. A finding of ambiguity is a threshhold requirement because the judiciary should not subject a clear statute to interpretation. [8] Agriculture Employment Farm Labor Contractors Statutory Provisions "Agricultural Employer" "Forestation or Reforestation" Cultivation or Commercial Planting Necessity. Under the farm labor contractors act (chapter 19.30 RCW), which applies to "agricultural employers" and which defines "agricultural employer" as "any person engaged in agricultural activity, including the growing, producing, or harvesting of farm or nursery products, or engaged in the forestation or reforestation of land," an activity that does not involve cultivation or commercial planting does not constitute "forestation or reforestation." [9] Statutes Construction Unambiguous Language Plain Meaning Legislative Intent. A court must read an unambigu-ous statute for its plain meaning, even if the court believes the legislature intended something else but did not adequately express it. [10] Statutes Construction Legislative Intent Prior Acts and Constructions. The legislature is presumed to have considered its prior enactments when enacting new legislation. [11] Statutes Construction Amendment Legislative Intent Knowledge of Existing Statutes. The legislature is presumed to be aware of its own statutory definitions when it amends a statute. [12] Statutes Construction Unambiguous Language Judicial Alteration. A court may not alter the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute in the guise of construing it. [13] Statutes Construction Amendment Judicial Amendment Additional Language. A court must not read language into an unambiguous statute in the guise of construing the statute. [14] Courts Public Policy Responsibility of Legislature. Public policy arguments must be directed to the legislature, not the courts. [15] Agriculture Employment Farm Labor Contractors Statutory Provisions "Agricultural Employer" Brush Picking. Under the farm labor contractors act (chapter 19.30 RCW), brush picking, or the picking or gathering of naturally occurring products in forests, is not an "agricultural activity" and the employment of a brush picker does not make the employer an "agricultural employer" subject to the requirements of the act. Nature of Action: Several forest greenery packinghouses sought a declaration that brush picking does not constitute an "agricultural activity" and that their employment of brush pickers does not subject them to requirements of the farm labor contractors act. Superior Court: The Superior Court for Mason County, No. 06-2-00218-4, James B. Sawyer II, J., on September 11, 2006, entered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. Court of Appeals: Holding that brush picking does not constitute an "agricultural activity" and that the plaintiffs' employment of brush pickers does not subject them to the requirements of the farm labor contractors act, the court affirms the judgment. Robert M. McKenna-, Attorney General, and Diana S. Cartwright-, Assistant, for appellant. Philip A. Talmadge- (of Talmadge Law Group, PLLC), for respondents. Ά1 HUNT, J. The Department of Labor and Industries (L&I) appeals the trial court's summary judgment order declaring that Washington's farm labor contractor act FACTS I. BACKGROUND Ά2 The specialized forest products industry engages in the gathering and picking of naturally occurring products in forests, such as evergreen foliage, salal, moss, and cascara bark, which the industry uses for floral displays and other decorative purposes. RCW 76.48.020(18). Owners of packinghouses, called "sheds," lease land from property owners such as the United States Forest Service or large timber companies. The packinghouses then (1) sell permits Ά3 In 2003, L&I sent several packinghouses (Companies) II. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Ά4 The Companies filed an action for declaratory judgment. They asked the Mason County Superior Court to declare that they were not "agricultural employers" within the meaning of the Act and, thus, it did not apply to them. Moving for summary judgment, the Companies argued that brush picking is not an "agricultural activity," nor does it qualify as "forestation or reforestation" under the Act. L&I responded that the Act broadly defines "agricultural employer" and that including the brush picking industry would best effectuate the Act's purpose. Ά5 The trial court ruled that the statute was unambiguous and that the phrase "and other related activities" referred back to the Act's specific terms "forestation or reforestation." Ruling that the statute did not include "other related forestry practices," the trial court concluded that brush picking was simply too different from forestation and reforestation for inclusion in the Act. The trial court granted the Companies' motion for summary judgment. Ά6 L&I appeals. ANALYSIS Ά7 L&I argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the Act does not apply to the forest-greenery packing industry and Companies. L&I asserts that the statutory language is intentionally broad and that including brush pickers would conform to the Act's purpose. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW II. PLAIN MEANING OF THE ACT Ά9 The Act requires "agricultural employers" to provide certain protections for contract agricultural workers, such as obtaining insurance for the workers' transportation. The Act defines an "agricultural employer" as: any person engaged in agricultural activity, including the growing, producing, or harvesting of farm or nursery products, or engaged in the forestation or reforestation of lands, which includes but is not limited to the planting, transplanting, tubing, precommercial thinning, and thinning of trees and seedlings, the clearing, piling, and disposal of brush and slash, the harvest of Christmas trees, and other related activities. RCW 19.30.010(4). Ά10 L&I concedes that brush picking is not an "agricultural activity." Nonetheless, it argues that we should read the "forestation" language of the Act broadly and inclusively to effectuate the Act's purpose, namely, the protection of vulnerable workers. The Companies counter that the plain meaning of the Act's statutory language evinces the legislature's intent that the Act apply only to actions involving cultivation, not to the gathering of naturally occurring greens for the brush picking industry. We agree with the Companies that the plain language of the Act controls and, therefore, statutory interpretation, as L&I requested, is unnecessary. A. Standard of Review B. Unambiguous Statute The doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that where general terms follow specific words, a court should give "meaning and effect only to the extent that the general terms suggest similar items to those designated by the specific terms." Silverstreak, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., Here, the language in the Act lists the generalized terms of "forestation or reforestation," followed by a list of specific activities. RCW 19.30.030(4). Thus, a party such as L&I, which asserts that the legislature intended to include an activity in the Act, must show that the specific alleged activity has a sufficient relationship to the specific terms included. We fail to see how L&I could sustain this burden were we to engage in statutory interpretation. Ά14 Furthermore, the issue here is whether "brush picking" is an "other activity" related to "forestation or reforestation." Webster's Dictionary defines "forestry" as "[t]he art and science of cultivating, maintaining, and developing forests." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 23, 439 (2d ed. 1999). Webster's definition of "forestry" is consistent with (1) the Act's definition of "forestation or reforestation" as an agricultural activity involving cultivation or commercial planting and (2) the Act's listed activities following "forestation or reforestation," all of which involve cultivation or planting of some kind. Moreover, the packinghouses do not control when the brush pickers work; nor do the packinghouses transport these workers. The Companies designate the location of harvest only to the extent that the brush pickers must gather from their respective leased lands. Accordingly, the trial court found the Companies' degree of control over the brush pickers insufficient to constitute an employer-employee relationship. Ά15 In spite of L&I's strong urging, we cannot hold that the Act applies to brush picking on the ground that, in promulgating the Act, the legislature did not adequately express its intent to reach the specialized forest products industry. Ά16 Accordingly, we hold that "brush picking" is not an "other related activity" within the meaning of the Act. The legislature's alleged "failure" to extend the Act's coverage to forest products industry workers does not support L&I's argument. III. ATTORNEY FEES Ά17 The Companies request attorney fees on appeal. They argue that L&I's prelitigation conduct and its appeal were in bad faith. L&I counters that we should not consider this request because (1) the Companies failed to raise the issue of attorney fees in the superior court and (2) the Companies improperly base their allegation of bad faith on events that took place before trial. Finding no basis on which to grant attorney fees, we deny the Companies' request. Ά18 We affirm. BRIDGEWATER and PENOYAR, JJ., concur.