[No. 59333-1-I. Division One. October 22, 2007.]
[1] Statutes — Construction — Legislative Intent — In General. A court's fundamental objectives when construing a statute are to ascertain and carry out the legislature's intent. [2] Statutes — Construction — Unambiguous Language — Plain Meaning — In General. When a statute's meaning is plain on its face, a court will give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of the legislature's intent. [3] Statutes — Construction — Statutory Language — Considered as a Whole — Context. The plain meaning of a statute is discerned from the language of the statute itself, considered as a whole and in light of related statutes that disclose legislative intent about the provision in question. [4] Statutes — Construction — Meaningful Interpretation. A statute is construed so that no portion of it is rendered meaningless. [5] Statutes — Construction — Rational Interpretation — Avoiding Absurdity. A statute is construed to avoid strained meanings and absurd results. [6] Statutes — Construction — Question of Law or Fact — Review — Standard of Review. The meaning of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. [7] Appeal — Disposition of Cause — Affirmance on Other Grounds — In General. An appellate court may affirm a judgment on any basis supported by the record, even if the trial court did not consider the argument. [8] Statutes — Construction — Amendment — Judicial Amendment — Removal of Language. A court will not read words out of a statute in the guise of construing it. [9] Attorney and Client — Compensation — Attorney's Lien — Adjudication — Statutory Summary Procedure — Applicability — Scope. The summary procedure set forth in RCW 60.40.030 for adjudicating an attorney's claim of lien for compensation owed is limited to lien claims "upon the money or papers" of a client under RCW 60.40.020; the statutory summary procedure is not available when an attorney's lien claim is upon something other than the money or papers of a client. The "order" to which RCW 60.40.030 refers is a show cause order under RCW 60.40.020 when an attorney refuses to deliver over a client's money or papers. [10] Attorney and Client — Compensation — Attorney's Lien — Judgment Lien — Statutory Summary Procedure — Applicability. An attorney's lien claim upon a client's judgment is not subject to adjudication by the summary procedure set forth in RCW 60.40.030. [11] Attorney and Client — Compensation — Attorney's Lien — Judgment Lien — Authority of Court — Scope. A trial court adjudicating an attorney's lien claim against a judgment under RCW 60.40.010(1)(e) has the right to determine all questions affecting the judgment raised by parties properly before the court in some form of proceeding. [12] Liens — Enforcement — Nature of Proceeding. A proceeding to enforce a lien is equitable in nature. [13] Equity — Remedies — Discretion of Court. Trial courts have broad discretion when fashioning equitable remedies. [14] Equity — Remedies — Review — Standard of Review. A trial court's fashioning of an equitable remedy is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. A trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is manifestly unreasonable or is based on untenable grounds. [15] Attorney and Client — Compensation — Attorney's Lien — Judgment Lien — Statutory Procedures — Existence. The attorney lien statute (chapter 60.40 RCW) does not set out a procedure for adjudicating an attorney's lien claim against a judgment under RCW 60.40.010(1)(e); nor does the attorney lien statute require the adjudication proceeding to be separate from the underlying proceeding. [16] Attorney and Client — Compensation — Attorney's Lien — Judgment Lien — Discretion of Court. The manner in which to adjudicate an attorney's lien claim against a judgment under RCW 60.40.010(1)(e) is a matter within the trial court's discretion. [17] Attorney and Client — Compensation — Attorney's Lien — Judgment Lien — Adjudication — Proceeding Ancillary to Underlying Action — Validity. A trial court may adjudicate an attorney's lien claim against a client's judgment under RCW 60.40.010(1)(e) in a proceeding ancillary to the underlying action so long as all parties asserting interests in the judgment are before the court; the parties are provided with sufficient time to conduct discovery and otherwise prepare for the proceeding; and the proceeding comports with due process of law in that the parties are provided with sufficient opportunity to present evidence, raise all relevant defenses and counterclaims, and argue their respective theories of the dispute. [18] Appeal — Assignments of Error — Authority — Absence of Citations to Authority — Inference of No Authority. Where a party has failed to cite to authority in support of an argument or assertion, an appellate court may presume that the party found none. [19] Appeal — Review — Issues Unsupported by Authority and Argument. An appellate court may decline to consider a claim or contention that is unsupported by argument or citation to legal authority. Nature of Action: In an eminent domain proceeding in which the trial court awarded more than $7.6 million to the property owner as just compensation, the property owner's attorneys filed and served a notice of attorney's claim of lien against the property owner in the amount of $324,956.68 for compensation owed for legal services rendered. The trial court entered an order directing that $84,728.23 be disbursed to the attorneys, which represented the unpaid balance for fees and costs that the property owner did not dispute. The remaining $240,228.45 in the court registry was the amount subject to dispute between the attorneys and the property owner. The attorneys then withdrew as counsel for the property owner. Thereafter, the trial court, after consultation with the attorneys and new counsel for the property owner, set an evidentiary hearing on the lien claim. Superior Court: The Superior Court for King County, No. 05-2-05843-9, Charles W. Mertel, J., on December 4, 2006, entered a judgment in favor of the attorneys, ruling that the parties had entered into a binding written fee agreement and that the compensation sought by the attorneys was reasonable. The court directed disbursement to the attorneys of the balance of the $240,228.45 in the court registry. Court of Appeals: Holding that, in the absence of a statutory procedure for adjudicating an attorney's lien that is claimed against a judgment, the trial court properly exercised its discretion to adjudicate the lien claim as a matter ancillary to the eminent domain proceeding, the court affirms the judgment. Matthew F. Davis-, for appellants. Larry J. Smith-, Estera F. Gordon-, Matthew R. Hansen-, (of Graham & Dunn, PC), for respondent. ¶1 COX, J. — Seawest Investment Associates, LLC, claims the trial court was without authority to adjudicate in a proceeding ancillary to this action the validity and amount of the attorney lien filed in this matter by the law firm of Graham & Dunn. We hold that the trial court properly exercised its discretion to ensure that all necessary persons participated in the lien enforcement proceeding and that all were afforded due process. Accordingly, we affirm. ¶2 Seawest hired Graham & Dunn to represent it in this eminent domain proceeding brought by King County as the matter approached trial. Two other law firms had represented Seawest in the proceeding before Graham & Dunn assumed representation. The matter went to trial and consumed some 15 total days. ¶3 On June 9, 2006, the trial court awarded Seawest more than $7.6 million as just compensation for the taking of its property. Although the judgment was for less that Seawest had sought, it exceeded the amount that the County had been willing to pay by more than $3 million dollars. ¶4 Shortly thereafter, a dispute arose between Seawest and Graham & Dunn over the firm's compensation for the legal services it provided. On June 23, 2006, Graham & Dunn filed and served its notice of attorney's claim of lien in the amount of $324,956.68. ¶5 Thereafter, the trial court, after consultation with Graham & Dunn and new counsel for Seawest, set an evidentiary hearing for November 20 and 21, 2006. At that hearing, the court ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the case. It then took testimony from a number of witnesses, admitted exhibits, and reviewed a deposition transcript admitted as part of the evidence. The court held that Seawest and Graham & Dunn had entered into a binding written fee agreement. The court further determined that Graham & Dunn's fees were reasonable. The court entered its order directing disbursement of the balance of the $240,228.45 in the court registry to Graham & Dunn. ¶6 Seawest appeals. LIEN FOR ATTORNEY FEES Statutory Interpretation ¶7 Seawest argues that the attorney lien statute, chapter 60.40 RCW, does not permit the procedure the trial court followed in this case. Specifically, it argues that the statute required the attorney lien be adjudicated in an action separate from this condemnation proceeding. ¶10 Here, Seawest argues that sections of Washington's attorney lien statute, chapter 60.40 RCW, must be read together to discern whether a court must require a separate action by Graham & Dunn to adjudicate its lien for fees. The current version of the statute provides in relevant part: 60.40.010 Lien created—Enforcement—Definition—Exception. (1) An attorney has a lien for his or her compensation, whether specially agreed upon or implied, as hereinafter provided: (a) Upon the papers of the client, which have come into the attorney's possession in the course of his or her professional employment; (b) Upon money in the attorney's hands belonging to the client; . . . . (e) Upon a judgment to the extent of the value of any services performed by the attorney in the action, or if the services were rendered under a special agreement, for the sum due under such agreement, from the time of filing notice of such lien or claim with the clerk of the court in which such judgment is entered, which notice must be filed with the papers in the action in which such judgment was rendered, and an entry made in the execution docket, showing name of claimant, amount claimed and date of filing notice. (2) Attorneys have the same right and power over actions to enforce their liens under subsection (1)(d) of this section and over judgments to enforce their liens under subsection (1)(e) of this section as their clients have for the amount due thereon to them. . . . . 60.40.020 Proceedings to compel delivery of money or papers. When an attorney refuses to deliver over money or papers, to a person from or for whom he has received them in the course of professional employment, whether in an action or not, he may be required by an order of the court in which an action, if any, was prosecuted, or if no action was prosecuted, then by order of any judge of a court of record, to do so within a specified time, or show cause why he should not be punished for a contempt. 60.40.030 Procedure when lien is claimed. If, however, the attorney claim[s] a lien, upon the money or papers, under the provisions of this chapter, the court or judge may: (1) Impose as a condition of making the order, that the client give security in a form and amount to be directed, to satisfy the lien, when determined in an action; (2) summarily to inquire into the facts on which the claim of a lien is founded, and determine the same; or (3) to refer it, and upon the report, determine the same as in other cases. ¶12 We note that the summary procedures specified in RCW 60.40.030 refer to imposing a condition on "the order." We conclude that the order to which this section refers is the only order provided for in the statute—a show cause order under RCW 60.40.020. This adds weight to the argument that unless a client moves for an order under RCW 60.40.020, the summary procedures of RCW 60.40.030 do not apply. ¶13 Graham & Dunn urges this court to reject the above analysis. The law firm argues that the following language in RCW 60.40.030 permits the procedures of that section to be utilized where judgment liens are at issue: "If, however, the attorney claim[s] a lien, upon the money or papers, under the provisions of this chapter, the court or judge may . . . ." ¶14 This argument is unpersuasive. To accept it would require us to read out of the statute both the "however" as well as the "money and papers" language in the statute. That would violate a cardinal rule of statutory construction, and we decline to do so. ¶15 We note that Washington case law sheds little light on the correct interpretation of these statutes where the lien on a judgment is at issue. None of the cited cases addresses the question of whether the statute permits adjudication of an attorney lien on a judgment to be summarily determined under RCW 60.40.030, or whether a separate action is required in such a situation. ¶16 Graham & Dunn argues that United States v. Moulton & Powell ¶17 In that case, the federal court of appeals held that the trial court properly recognized an attorney's lien upon the proceeds of a condemnation proceeding. The court affirmed on multiple grounds, including equitable principles, the principles of trust law, and Remington's Revised Statutes of Washington section 898. Section 898 allowed any person claiming to be entitled to condemnation proceeds paid into the court to apply to the court for an order directing payment. ¶18 We conclude that a fair reading of the attorney lien statute requires us to hold that the legislature intended the summary procedures set forth in RCW 60.40.030 to apply only when RCW 60.40.020 applies. Specifically, the procedures of RCW 60.40.030 are triggered when the claimed lien is asserted against money or papers of the client, but not when the lien is asserted against a judgment. Attorney Lien Enforcement ¶19 Notwithstanding our conclusion in the prior portion of this opinion, there is still an unresolved question: whether the attorney lien statute requires the adjudication of an attorney lien against a judgment in a separate action. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the statute does not require a separate action. ¶22 Like the version of Washington's statute that existed when Angeles Brewing was decided, the current version of the statute does not set out a procedure for adjudicating a lien against a judgment. Although the 2004 amendments mention an action to enforce a lien on a judgment in RCW 60.40.010(2), the statute does not set out a procedure for enforcement. Significantly, the statute does not require that such an action be separate from the underlying proceeding. Thus, it places the question of how to properly adjudicate the lien with the court, requiring it to fashion some "form of proceeding by which the matters might be properly adjudicated." ¶24 At the same hearing, the trial court also determined that the written fee agreement was enforceable and that the fees were reasonable. In Krein, this court considered whether the lack of a full adversarial hearing in adjudicating an attorney's lien was error. ¶25 Seawest urges us to adopt California's rule requiring separate actions to enforce attorney's liens. However, California law is unlike that of this state. In California, an attorney's lien is created only by contract—either expressly in the fee contract or by implication where a retainer agreement provides the attorney is to look to the judgment for payment. "[California] [a]ppellate courts have consistently held that the trial court in the underlying action has no jurisdiction to determine the existence or validity of an attorney lien on the judgment. [Citations.] The trial court does have fundamental jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties. Nevertheless, because the attorney is not a party to the underlying action and has no right to intervene, the trial court acts in excess of its jurisdiction when it purports to determine whether the attorney is entitled to foreclose a lien on the judgment. . . . " ¶26 Washington's different statutory scheme and case law require us to reject the California rule. In Angeles Brewing, our supreme court placed the question of how to properly adjudicate an attorney's lien on a judgment squarely within the discretion of the trial court: There can be no question but that, as between the parties to the action in which the judgment was entered, the court has a right to determine all questions affecting the judgment raised by parties properly before the court, in some form of proceeding by which the matters might be properly adjudicated. ¶28 Significantly, Seawest neither assigns error to nor otherwise challenges the trial court's determination of the reasonableness of the fees. For these reasons, we have no basis to disturb the trial court's decision in this respect. ¶29 We affirm the order granting Graham & Dunn's motion for disbursement of reasonable attorney fees and costs. APPELWICK, C.J., and GROSSE, J., concur.