[Nos. 54354-7-I; 54450-1-I. Division One. September 17, 2007.]
[1] Dismissal and Nonsuit Failure To State Claim Test. An action may be dismissed under CR 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted if it appears beyond doubt that the claimant can prove no set of facts, consistent with the complaint, that would justify recovery. [2] Dismissal and Nonsuit Failure To State Claim Review Standard of Review. The dismissal of an action under CR 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted is reviewed de novo. [3] Injunction Temporary Injunction Elements. To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, a party must establish (1) a clear legal or equitable right, (2) a well-grounded fear of immediate invasion of that right, and (3) that the acts complained of either have or will result in actual and substantial injury. [4] Injunction Temporary Injunction Review Standard of Review. A trial court's denial of a preliminary injunction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. [5] Prohibition Application Test. A writ of prohibition is a drastic remedy that is properly granted only if (1) it appears that an actor or agency is about to act in excess of its jurisdiction and (2) the petitioner does not have a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [6] Prohibition Review Standard of Review. A trial court's denial of a writ of prohibition is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. [7] Municipal Corporations Executive Orders Validity Preemption State Law Test. The chief executive of a municipal corporation is not preempted by state law from issuing an executive order if (1) state law does not preempt regulation of the subject matter of the order and (2) the order does not directly conflict with a state law. [8] Municipal Corporations Public Employment Benefits Municipalities Local Concern. The field of employee benefits for municipal employees has not been preempted by the State and remains a matter of local concern. The regulation of employee benefits is a matter of local concern in which local governments have wide discretion. Municipalities have a strong interest in retaining qualified employees, making the regulation of employee benefits a traditionally local interest. [9] Municipal Corporations Powers First Class Cities Scope of Authority Regulations. Under Const. art. XI, §§ 10 and 11, cities of the first class have broad powers to make and enforce regulations on any matter of local interest so long as the regulations do not conflict with the general laws of the state. [10] Municipal Corporations Charter Home Rule Purpose. The State provides for home rule charters in order to allow cities to operate economically and efficiently. [11] Municipal Corporations Public Employment Health Insurance Coverage for Dependents "Dependent" What Constitutes Authority To Determine. Under RCW 41.04.180, which authorizes political subdivisions of the State to provide medical benefits to employees and their dependents, eligibility for employee benefits is a matter of local concern over which local jurisdictions may exercise broad discretion. [12] Municipal Corporations Public Employment Health Insurance Coverage for Dependents "Dependent" Local Definition State Regulation of Marriage and Familial Relationships Effect. The legislature's interest in defining and regulating marriage and familial relationships is not implicated by a local executive order that extends employment benefits to same-sex marriage partners of local public employees where the order does not purport to give legal effect to same-sex marriages. [13] Municipal Corporations Public Employment Health Insurance Coverage for Dependents "Dependent" Local Definition Same-Sex Marriage Partners Validity. A local executive order that extends employment benefits to same-sex marriage partners of local public employees does not conflict with state law where the order does not purport to recognize same-sex marriages. The order is not placed in conflict with state law either by its inclusion of "whereas" clauses expressing the aspirational view that marriage equality should be extended to same-sex couples or by its authorization of the local jurisdiction's office of civil rights to receive and investigate complaints regarding violations of the order. Nature of Action: In two consolidated cases, citizens sought declaratory, injunctive, and other relief on claims that a mayor's executive order recognizing same-sex marriages for employment benefit purposes was preempted by state law. Superior Court: The Superior Court for King County, Nos. 04-2-05955-1 and 04-2-05857-1, Bruce W. Hilyer, J., on May 19, 2004, entered a judgment dismissing the actions for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Court of Appeals: Holding that the field of municipal corporation employee benefits is a matter of local concern and that the executive order is not preempted by state law, the court affirms the judgment. Brian Fahling- (of AFA Center for Law & Policy), and Darren C. Walker- (of Law Office of Richard S. Ross), for appellants. Thomas A. Carr-, City Attorney, and Phillip E. Brenneman- and Gary E. Keese-, Assistants, for respondents. Ά1 COX, J. A city's executive orders are presumed to be valid, and grants of municipal power are to be liberally construed. Ά2 Here, Randall Leskovar, Gloria Atchison, and others challenging the executive order of Seattle's Mayor Gregory Nickels, in his official capacity, fail in their burden to prove the order is invalid. State statutes do not preempt the field of employee benefits governed by the laws of the city of Seattle. Moreover, the executive order at issue here does not conflict with state statutes governing marriage. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of these cases by the superior court. Ά3 The material facts are undisputed. In March 2004, Mayor Nickels issued Executive Order 02-04, entitled "City Recognition of Valid Marriage Licenses." The operative portion of the order directed that: [A]ll City Departments recognize the same sex marriages of City employees in the same manner as they currently recognize opposite sex marriages of City employees for purposes of granting employee benefits and other benefits ordinarily received in the course of employment. Ά4 Leskovar, Atchison, and others commenced these actions against the city of Seattle and Mayor Nickels (collectively City). They sought declaratory, injunctive, and other relief on the basis that the executive order was allegedly invalid. Specifically, they contended that the order conflicted with the Defense of Marriage Act, RCW 26.04.010, RCW 26.04.020, and other governing law. Ά5 Following consolidation of the two cases, the City moved to dismiss under Civil Rule 12(b)(6). The trial court granted the motion and denied all requests for relief. Ά6 Leskovar and Atchison (collectively Leskovar) appeal. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM Ά7 Leskovar argues that Mayor Nickels' executive order granting employee benefits to city employees in same-sex marriages redefines marriage and violates RCW 26.04.010 and RCW 26.04.020. We disagree. We hold that the order neither conflicts with these statutes nor otherwise invades a field preempted by a state statute. Ά11 We start with the observation that the state supreme court recently dealt with the same issues now before us in a substantially similar case, Heinsma v. City of Vancouver. Ά12 In Heinsma, the city of Vancouver began offering health care benefits to domestic partners of city employees. Preemption Ά15 In Heinsma, the supreme court recognized that cities have a strong interest in retaining qualified employees, making the regulation of employee benefits a traditionally local interest. Ά16 Nothing has changed by way of constitutional, legislative, or other action since Heinsma to suggest that the field of employee benefits of municipalities has been preempted by the state. To the contrary, this field remains a matter of local concern, particularly in light of the court's recognition that cities have a strong interest in retaining qualified employees. Ά17 Here, the executive order at issue provides in relevant part as follows: NOW, THEREFORE, I, GREGORY J. NICKELS, Seattle Mayor, do order that all City Departments recognize the same sex marriages of City employees in the same manner as they currently recognize opposite sex marriages of City employees for purposes of granting employee benefits and other benefits ordinarily received in the course of employment. Any county, municipality, or other political subdivision of the state acting through its principal supervising official or governing body may, whenever funds shall be available for that purpose provide for all or a part of hospitalization and medical aid for its employees and their dependents through contracts with regularly constituted insurance carriers or with health care service contractors as defined in chapter 48.44 RCW or self-insurers as provided for in chapter 48.62 RCW, for group hospitalization and medical aid policies or plans . . . . Ά19 In short, the state has not preempted the field of employee benefits for workers employed by the city of Seattle. Benefits for city employees are a matter of local concern in which a city may exercise broad discretion. Thus, Leskovar has failed to establish a right to relief based on preemption. Conflict Ά21 In Heinsma, the court also concluded that the city of Vancouver's recognition of domestic partnerships for purposes of employee benefits in no way affects Title Ά22 Here, the executive order extending benefits to city employees in same-sex marriages in the same manner as other city employees determines who is eligible for employee benefits. Nowhere does the order purport to give legal effect to same-sex marriages. Moreover, we see nothing in it that conflicts with Title Ά23 The cases on which Leskovar relies are not helpful in resolving the questions that are before us. Andersen v. King County, Ά24 Leskovar also cites Waggoner v. Ace Hardware Corp. Ά25 National Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Michigan, "To secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and for future generations of children, the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose." Ά26 It is significant that the Michigan court specifically noted that Michigan's marriage amendment is unique from other jurisdictions because it prohibits the recognition of not only same-sex marriages, but also "similar unions." Ά27 In contrast here, Washington's marriage statute prohibits marriage by "persons other than a male and a female." Ά28 There is a final point we should make. We recognize that the executive order contains language to which Leskovar objects and on which much of the arguments are based. For example, the "Whereas" clauses state: WHEREAS, hundreds of protections, privileges, benefits and responsibilities are denied to same sex couples because of their inability to marry; and WHEREAS, marriage equality should be afforded to all consenting, adult couples regardless of their sexual orientation; and WHEREAS, the City of Seattle has recognized domestic partnerships since 1989 and has subsequently granted equal employee benefits to city employees with a domestic partner; . . . . Ά29 The City characterizes this language as aspirational views that do not affect the operative portions of the order that define who is entitled to employee benefits. We agree with that observation. We likewise conclude that the fact that the order authorizes the City's Office of Civil Rights to receive and investigate complaints regarding violations of the order makes no difference to our analysis. Who the City designates to administer the order is a discretionary decision that Leskovar fails to show is in any way unlawful. REQUESTS FOR RELIEF Ά30 Leskovar's requests for injunctive and other relief are, of course, based on their prevailing on the underlying claim that the executive order is invalid. Leskovar fails to make the proper showing. Accordingly, Leskovar is not entitled to injunctive relief or a writ of prohibition under the standards we previously set forth in this opinion. CONCLUSION Ά31 To summarize, we conclude that Leskovar fails to show the state has preempted the field of employee benefits for the city of Seattle. To the contrary, that field remains a matter of local concern in which the City exercises broad discretion. Moreover, there is nothing to show that the executive order before us directly conflicts with our state statutes. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed the actions and denied the requests for relief. Ά32 We affirm the order granting the motion to dismiss. AGID and DWYER, JJ., concur.