TRACEE L. RAIDER, Appellant, v. GREYHOUND LINES, INC., Respondent.
[1] Judgment - Summary Judgment - Review - In General. An appellate court reviews a summary judgment by engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court and applying the standard of CR 56(c) considering the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom most favorably toward the nonmoving party. Questions of law are reviewed de novo.
[2] Judgment - Summary Judgment - Issues of Fact - Determination as a Matter of Law - In General. A question of fact may be decided as a matter of law in a summary Judgment proceeding if reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion from the evidence.
[3] Negligence - Owner or Occupier of Land - Invitee - Business Visitor - Duty Owed - Hiring Security Personnel. A business that invites persons onto its premises has no per se duty to employ security personnel to protect invitees from being harmed by criminal acts of third persons.
[4] Negligence - Owner or Occupier of Land - Invitee - Business Visitor - Duty Owed - Criminal Acts of Third Persons. A business does not owe a duty to invitees to protect them from the criminal acts of third persons if such acts are neither imminent nor reasonably foreseeable.
[5] Negligence - Duty - Scope - Foreseeability - Test. The foreseeability standard for negligence liability is not satisfied unless the resulting harm is reasonably perceived as being within the general field of danger covered by the specific duty owed.
[6] Negligence - Duty - Scope - Foreseeability - Question of Law or Fact - Criminal Acts. A court may determine that a
Feb. 1999 RAIDER v. GREYHOUND LINES, INC. 817
94 Wn. App. 816
criminal act is unforeseeable as a matter of law if the occurrence is so highly extraordinary or improbable as to be wholly beyond the range of expectability.
Nature of Action: A patron of a bus terminal sought damages from the owner of the bus line for injuries sustained in an apparent racially motivated shooting. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached an obligation to provide security to her.
Superior Court: The Superior Court for Spokane County, No. 94-2-06692-1, Michael E. Donohue, J., on February 14, 1998, entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
Court of Appeals: Holding that the defendant had no duty to provide security to the plaintiff, the court affirms the judgment.
Gary R. Penar, for appellant.
Curtis L. Shoemaker of Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, for respondent.
BROWN, J. - Tracee L. Raider (now Hayes) was injured in an apparent racially motivated shooting while an invitee in the Greyhound Lines, Inc., bus terminal in Spokane. Ms. Hayes sued Greyhound claiming breach of an "obligation to provide security" to her. Summary judgment was granted to Greyhound. Ms. Hayes appealed. We affirm.
FACTS
Ms. Hayes, a Caucasian, entered the Greyhound bus
818 RAIDER v. GREYHOUND LINES, INC. Feb. 1999
94 Wn. App. 816
terminal in Spokane to play video games in September 1992. Ms. Hayes, by chance, stood in line to get change near Miguel LeGrada, an African American man. A stranger, Chria Lindholm, who had recently disembarked a Greyhound bus, entered the lobby. Mr. Lindholm without warning took out a gun and began firing at Ms. Hayes and Mr. LeGrada. After the first shot, Mr. Lindholm called her a "nigger-loving bitch" and then shot her again repeatedly.
The affidavits described the station as an area of high criminal activity, including prostitution, drugs, and a shooting two years earlier. Greyhound employed on-site security personnel but none were then on duty. Greyhound did not employ security checks or electronic security equipment on the premises.
Ms. Hayes filed suit claiming that Greyhound breached an "obligation to provide security." Greyhound conceded Ms. Hayes was an invitee. The trial court granted Greyhound's motion for summary judgment. Ms. Hayes appealed.
ANALYSIS
The issue is whether the trial court erred when granting summary judgment dismissing Ms. Hayes' claim of breach of an "obligation to provide security" for the criminal acts of a third person on the basis that the harm was not imminent or reasonably foreseeable.
[1, 2] In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court. Nivens v. 7-11 Hoagy's Corner, 133 Wn.2d 192, 197, 943 P.2d 286 (1997). This court reviews issues of law de novo. Id. at 198. A summary judgment may be granted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id. The court considers the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. While fact questions are generally left for a jury, when reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion a court
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may decide the question as a matter of law. Ruffer v. St. Frances Cabrini Hosp.. 56 Wn. App. 625, 628, 784 P.2d 1288, review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1023 (1990).
[3, 4] A business has no per se duty to employ security personnel to protect business invitees. Niven, 133 Wn.2d at 206. Thus, Ms. Hayes's claim depends on whether Greyhound violated its more general duty to protect its business invitees. "[A] business owes a duty to its invitees to protect them from imminent criminal harm and reasonably foreseeable criminal conduct by third persons." Id. at 205.
[5, 6] To be foreseeable, the harm must lie within the general field of danger covered by specific duty owed by the defendant. Schooley v. Pinch's Deli Market, Inc., 134 Wn.2d 468, 478, 951 P.2d 749 (1998); see Wilbert v. Metropolitan Park Dist., 90 Wn. App. 304, 308, 950 P.2d 522 (1998). Although foresecability is normally a jury question, a criminal act may be unforeseeable as a matter of law if the occurrence is " 'so highly extraordinary or improbable as to be wholly beyond the range of expectability.' " Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 131 Wn.2d 39, 50, 929 P.2d 420 (1997); Johnson v. State, 77 Wn. App. 934, 942, 894 P.2d 1366, review denied, 127 Wn.2d 1020 (1995).
Where there is no evidence that the defendant knew of the dangerous propensities of the individual responsible for the crime and there is no history of such crimes on the premises, courts have held the criminal conduct unforeseeable as a matter of law. Wilbert, 90 Wn. App. at 309. On the other hand; where there is a history of similar violence on the premises or the defendant knew that the third party was dangerous, foreseeability becomes a question for the jury. Id. In Wilbert, a guest was shot and killed at a dance held on a rented premises and the victim's family sued the owner of the premises. Division Two held that as a matter of law the shooting was not foreseeable. Id. at 310, The court reasoned that the plaintiffs "offered no evidence that[the owners knew of the violent propensities of the assailant or that there had been similarly violent episodes at the Center in the past." Id. at 309.
820 CRAIG v. WASHINGTON TRUST BANK Feb. 1999
94 Wn. App. 820
The case at hand is analogous. First, there is no evidence that Greyhound knew or had reason to know that Mr. Lindholm was likely to assault Ms. Hayes or that similar racially motivated conduct had occurred. Second, although Ms. Hayes introduced affidavits that showed the bus terminal was a high crime area, there is no indication that Mr. Lindholm's attack bore any relationship or similarity to the past crimes. Rather, the evidence suggests Mr. Lindholm's action was racially motivated: neither Ms. Hayes nor Mr. LeGrada knew Mr. Lindholm and when he attacked Ms. Hayes he called her a "nigger-loving bitch." Thus, reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion, the criminal conduct was not imminent or reasonably foreseeable to come within the duty described in Nevins. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err.
Affirmed.
SCHULTHEIS, C.J., and KATO, J., concur.