THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. DOROTEO MARTINEZ BARAJAS, Appellant.
[1] Statutes - Construction - Question of Law or Fact - Review. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.
[2] Statutes - Construction - Legislative Intent - In General. A court's goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent in drafting the statute.
[3] Statutes - Construction - Legislative Intent - Statutory Language - Unambiguous Language. The legislative intent of a plain and unambiguous statute is determined solely from the language of the statute.
[4] Controlled Substances - Punishment - Enhancement - Statutory Provisions - Effect on Sentencing Decision. RCW 69.50.435, which authorizes increased punishment for drug offenses committed in or near public places or facilities as specified by the statute, doubles the maximum penalties that may be imposed on convicted drug offenders; it does not, however, require a court to increase an offender's sentence.
[5] Criminal Law - Weapon - Enhanced Punishment - Firearm - Controlled Substances Crime - Maximum Sentence. When a convicted drug offender is subject to both RCW 69.50.435 (which doubles the maximum sentence that may be imposed for a drug offense committed in or near a public place or facility as specified by the statute) and RCW 9.94A.310(3) (which mandates enhanced sentences for offenses committed while armed with a firearm), the maximum sentence on which to determine the length of the firearm enhancement is the statutory maximum for the offense as doubled by RCW 69.50.435.
Nature of Action: Prosecution for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The crime was allegedly committed within 1,000 feet of a school bus route stop and while armed with a deadly weapon.
Superior Court: The Superior Court for Yakima County, No. 96-1-00635-7, Stephen M. Brown, J., on July 26, 1996, entered a judgment of guilty and a sentence that included an additional five years' imprisonment for use of a firearm in committing the offense. For purposes of determining the length of the firearm enhancement, the trial court calculated the maximum sentence that could
388 STATE v. BARAJAS Oct. 1997
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be imposed on the defendant by doubling the statutory maximum sentence for the offense under a statute authorizing increased punishments for drug offenses committed within 1,000 feet of school bus route stops.
Court of Appeals: Holding that the maximum sentence authorized by the school zone statute was the proper basis for determining the length of the firearm enhancement, the court affirms the sentence.
Suzanne L. Elliott, for appellant.
Jeffrey C. Sullivan, Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven R. Keller and Lauri M. Boyd, Deputies, for respondent.
SWEENEY, C.J. - Possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in a school zone is punishable "by imprisonment of up to twice the imprisonment otherwise authorized by this chapter [RCW 69.50] . . . ." RCW 69.50.435(a). RCW 9.94A.310(3) requires an enhanced sentence for felonies committed while armed. But the length of the enhancement depends on the maximum sentence for the underlying felony. If the maximum sentence for the underlying felony is 20 years, the firearm enhancement is 5 years. RCW 9.94A.310(3)(a). If the maximum sentence is 10 years, the firearm enhancement is 3 years. RCW 9.94A.310(3)(b).
Doroteo Barajas was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver within 1,000 feet of a school bus stop, while armed with a deadly weapon. The maximum penalty for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver is 10 years. Because Mr. Barajas' offense was within a school zone, the sentencing
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court concluded he had committed a felony carrying a maximum sentence of 20 years. It therefore imposed the five-year firearm sentence enhancement, rather than the three-year enhancement.
The question presented is whether the increased penalty for sale or possession within a school zone (RCW 69.50.435) is only an enhancement to the 10-year maximum sentence (as Mr. Barajas maintains). Or whether instead the school zone enhancement results in a new maximum sentence--here 20 years (as the State maintains). We conclude that the school zone enhancement results in a new maximum sentence. We therefore affirm the trial court's imposition of the five-year firearm penalty enhancement.
DISCUSSION
[1-3] Interpretation of this statute is a question of law which we review de novo. State v. Bright, 129 Wn.2d 257, 265, 916 P.2d 922 (1996). Our goal is to identify and then give effect to the Legislature's intent in drafting the statute. State v. Elgin, 118 Wn.2d 551, 555, 825 P.2d 314 (1992). If the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we need go no further. State v. Wilbur, 110 Wn.2d 16, 19, 749 P.2d 1295 (1988).
[4, 5] RCW 69.50.435(a) provides that drug offenses committed within a school zone "may be punished . . . by imprisonment of up to twice the imprisonment otherwise authorized by this chapter . . . ." The statute by its terms increases the otherwise maximum penalty. Unlike the enhancement statutes (RCW 9.94A.310(3), (4), (5), and (6)), it does not require imposition of an increased sentence.
Our Supreme Court noted in State v. Silva-Baltazar,«1» "[t]he Legislature added RCW 69.50.435 to the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (UCSA) in 1989. The UCSA delineates offenses and establishes maximum penalties, but does not set out determinate sentencing ranges, which are provided for in the Sentencing Reform Act. . . ." The
«1» 125 Wn.2d 472, 476, 886 P.2d 138 (1994).
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dictionary definition of maximum also supports our conclusion. Maximum is "the greatest quantity or amount possible assignable, . . . an upper limit allowed or allowable by law or regulation." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 1188 (2d ed. 1987). That is precisely what the Legislature authorized here.
Given our reading of the statute, the sentencing court properly imposed a mandatory five-year firearm sentence enhancement. RCW 9.94A.310(3)(a).
Affirmed.
SCHULTHEIS, J., and BASTINE, J. Pro Tem., concur.
Review denied at 134 Wn.2d 1026 (1998).