[No. 70758-2-I. Division One. February 10, 2014.]
Dmitri L. Iglitzin and Laura E. Ewan (of Schwerin Campbell Barnard Iglitzin & Lavitt); and Bess M. McKinney, for petitioner.
Harry J.F. Korrell III and Rebecca O. Meissner (of Davis Wright Tremaine LLP); Cecilia A. Cordova (of Pacific Alliance Law PLLC); Mary Mirante Bartolo, City Attorney, and Mark S. Johnsen, Assistant; and Wayne D. Tanaka (of Ogden Murphy Wallace), for respondents.AUTHOR: Leach, C.J. Spearman, J., DWYER, J. concurred.Leach
FACTS CRITERIA FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW ANALYSIS [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] Were there some showing of facts upon which the legislature could reasonably have found that this provision was necessary to facilitate the initiative process and guard its integrity, we would, of course, be obliged to defer to the legislative judgment; but since no state of facts which would justify it has been proposed, in order to protect the right of the people which was reserved by them in their constitution, we must hold this portion of RCW 29.79.200 to be in excess of the legislative authority granted. The court noted that the State made no claim the challenged provision was necessary to guard against fraud and mistake. "In view of the multiplicity of petitions which are circulated before each election, it is not surprising that some honest citizens may become so confused by the number of petitions presented to them that they may inadvertently sign two or more for the same measure. This, of course, is carelessness on their part, but if they are legally entitled to sign, we think one signature should be allowed and the others stricken." We find Sudduth controlling. While the State's interest in preserving electoral integrity extends to ferreting out duplicate signatures caused by mistake, striking all--instead of counting the first and striking the duplicates--overburdens voters' First Amendment rights. CONCLUSION SPEARMAN, J., concurs. DWYER, concurs Sufficiency of petitions. Wherever in this title petitions are required to be signed and filed, the following rules shall govern the sufficiency thereof: . . . . (3) The term "signer" means any person who signs his or her own name to the petition. (4) To be sufficient a petition must contain valid signatures of qualified registered voters or property owners, as the case may be, in the number required by the applicable statute or ordinance. Within three working days after the filing of a petition, the officer with whom the petition is filed shall transmit the petition to the county auditor for petitions signed by registered voters, or to the county assessor for petitions signed by property owners for determination of sufficiency. The officer or officers whose duty it is to determine the sufficiency of the petition shall proceed to make such a determination with reasonable promptness and shall file with the officer receiving the petition for filing a certificate stating the date upon which such determination was begun, which date shall be referred to as the terminal date. Additional pages of one or more signatures may be added to the petition by filing the same with the appropriate filing officer prior to such terminal date. Any signer of a filed petition may withdraw his or her signature by a written request for withdrawal filed with the receiving officer prior to such terminal date. Such written request shall so sufficiently describe the petition as to make identification of the person and the petition certain. The name of any person seeking to withdraw shall be signed exactly the same as contained on the petition and, after the filing of such request for withdrawal, prior to the terminal date, the signature of any person seeking such withdrawal shall be deemed withdrawn. RCW 35A.01.040 (emphasis added). Reconsideration denied February 27, 2014.