[Nos. 67712-8-I; 68739-5-I. Division One. August 26, 2013.]
Affirmed.
Scott E. Stafne and Andrew J. Krawczyk (of Stafne Law Firm), for appellants.
Mark K. Roe, Prosecuting Attorney, and Brian J. Dorsey and Hillary E. Graber, Deputies, for respondent Snohomish County.
Kenneth H. Davidson, for respondents Gallo and Dankers.AUTHOR: Spearman, A.C.J. WE CONCUR: Lau, J., Dwyer, J.Spearman
FACTS DISCUSSION A proposed division of land, as defined in RCW 58.17.020, shall be considered under the subdivision or short subdivision ordinance, and zoning or other land use control ordinances, in effect on the land at the time a fully completed application for preliminary plat approval of the subdivision, or short plat approval of the short subdivision, has been submitted to the appropriate county, city, or town official. The Mangats contend the statute is ambiguous because "the party who benefits from the rights in [the statute] is not defined. . . ." Br. of Appellants at 18. Based on this alleged ambiguity, the Mangats argue that we must resort to statutory interpretation to resolve the issue. The Mangats then argue that in applying the rules of statutory interpretation, it is apparent that the legislature's intent was to provide only to permit applicants the right to process the application, to the exclusion of other parties who may have an interest in the land. [1, 2] Every final plat or short plat of a subdivision or short subdivision filed for record must contain a . . . statement that the subdivision or short subdivision has been made with the free consent and in accordance with the desires of the owner or owners. . . . Said certificate or instrument of dedication shall be signed and acknowledged before a notary public by all parties having any ownership interest in the lands subdivided and recorded as part of the final plat. RCW 58.17.165 (emphasis added).» [3] [4] The exercise of zoning powers by county planning commissions and boards of county commissioners involves more than the granting of purely personal licenses or privileges. . . . . . . . These powers do not contemplate the restriction or authorization of land use on the basis of ownership by particular persons. Id. at 189-90. We reject the Mangats' arguments on this issue. [5, 6] 6. The filing of the subdivision application by plaintiffs with Snohomish County was merely a request to develop the subject property. While the filing of an application vests certain developmental rights as they relate to the subject property, there can be no ownership interest in the application itself independent of the real property to which it pertains. Any vested rights created by the filing of such an application belong to the landowner who has the legal right to develop the property. . . . . 8. When they defaulted under the contract, the plaintiffs lost the right to purchase the property and were required to turn over to the Dankers[es] and Gallo the maps, drawings, reports and other work product related to the subdivision of the land. There is nothing left for them to own. Clerk's Papers at 560-63 (ruling denying motion for preliminary injunction). In short, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on this issue. [7] DWYER and LAU, JJ., concur.