[Nos. 67515-0-I; 67704-7-I. Division One. October 15, 2012.]
September 6, 2012, Oral Argument Affirmed.
Darrell L. Cochran, Loren A. Cochran, and Kevin M. Hastings (of Pfau Cochran Vertetis Amala PLLC), for appellants.
Robert M. McKenna, Attorney General, and Mark C. Jobson, Assistant, for respondent Department of Natural Resources.
Louis D. Peterson, Michael R. Scott, and Alexander M. Wu (of Hillis Clark Martin & Peterson PS), for respondent Weyerhaeuser Company.
Kelly P. Corr, Joshua J. Preece, and Seann C. Colgan (of Corr Cronin Michelson Baumgardner & Preece LLP), for respondent Green Diamond Resource Company.
Author: Anne Ellington, J.
We concur: J. Robert Leach, C.J., Linda Lau, J. ¶1 ELLINGTON, J. -- Under RCW 4.12.010(1), actions alleging injury to property must be commenced in the county where that property is located. The plaintiffs here filed their actions in the wrong county, and the trial court dismissed the lawsuits for want of jurisdiction. Because Washington Supreme Court precedent interprets RCW 4.12.010 as jurisdictional, the trial court was required to dismiss, and we affirm. BACKGROUND ¶2 In December 2007, heavy rains caused the Chehalis River to overflow its banks, resulting in widespread flooding in Lewis County. The properties of William Ralph and William Forth were among those affected. In 2010, Forth sued the Department of Natural Resources, Weyerhaeuser Company, and Green Diamond Resource Company (collectively DNR) in King County Superior Court, alleging negligence, trespass, tortious interference with contractual relations and business expectancy, conversion, inverse condemnation, unlawful agency action, and violations of the Shoreline Management Act of 1971 ¶3 DNR moved to dismiss both actions, arguing that King County Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under RCW 4.12.010, which requires that cases involving injury to real property be brought in the county where the affected property is located. Ralph and Forth responded that RCW 4.12.010 concerns only venue, not jurisdiction. In the alternative, they claimed that their causes of action were transitory, not local, so that RCW 4.12.010 did not apply. The trial court dismissed both cases without prejudice for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Ralph and Forth (collectively Ralph) filed separate appeals, which this court consolidated. DISCUSSION ¶4 We first address Ralph's claim that RCW 4.12.010 does not apply here. RCW 4.12.010 reads in pertinent part: Actions for the following causes shall be commenced in the county in which the subject of the action, or some part thereof, is situated: (1) For the recovery of, for the possession of, for the partition of, for the foreclosure of a mortgage on, or for the determination of all questions affecting the title, or for any injuries to real property. ¶5 Despite the statute's clear mandate, Ralph argues that his causes of action are "transitory," rather than "local," and are therefore properly brought in any county where jurisdiction over the defendants can be achieved. [1, 2] ¶6 "The nature of a claim for relief is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint and as adduced thereunder, and by the relief requested." ¶7 In McLeod, our Supreme Court determined that an action for the conversion of trees was transitory because it was "one for the value of his trees as personalty merely, without any claim for injury to the land." [3, 4] ¶8 The salient difference between these cases and this one is that Ralph alleges injury to his land. Actions for injury to property have long been regarded as local. [5] ¶9 Next, Ralph claims that even if RCW 4.12.010 applies, its requirements relate to venue, not jurisdiction. He contends that interpreting the statute otherwise contravenes article IV, section 6 of the Washington State Constitution. [6-9] ¶10 Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law and our review is de novo. [10, 11] ¶11 Our Supreme Court has determined that RCW 4.12.010 is a jurisdictional statute. In Cugini v. Apex Mercury Mining Co., the court held that actions involving title or injury to real property are jurisdictional in character and may be commenced only in the county in which the real property is located. ¶12 Ralph claims that Snyder is no longer good law under more recent Washington Supreme Court cases: Young v. Clark, ¶13 We recognize that it is difficult to reconcile Young, Shoop, and Dougherty with Snyder. Indeed, our Supreme Court acknowledged the conflict in Five Corners Family Farmers v. State: If RCW 4.12.010 applied, that would raise the troublesome issue of whether that statue is one of jurisdiction, or one of venue. Unless we were to overrule Snyder, if RCW 4.12.010 required that this case be filed in Franklin County, the proper remedy would have been dismissal, not transfer. The parties have not briefed this issue, and we decline to address it. [12] ¶14 While the Supreme Court may overrule Snyder (and Cugini), this court cannot. We are not free to ignore the plain language of those decisions, and neither was the trial court. ¶15 Affirmed. LEACH, C.J., and LAU, J., concur.