[No. 62894-1-I. Division One. May 10, 2010.]
March 3, 2010, Oral Argument Christopher H. Howard, Mary Jo Newhouse, and Averil B. Rothrock (of Schwabe Williamson & Wyatt, PC), for appellant. Stephen S Hornbuckle (of The Hornbuckle Firm), for respondents. ¶1 COX, J. -- Avalon Care Center--Federal Way, LLC, appeals an order denying in part its motion to compel arbitration of all claims asserted in this survival and wrongful death action. The wrongful death claims are based on statutory causes of action for the benefit of the heirs of Henry Woodall. These heirs did not agree to arbitrate their wrongful death claims. Moreover, there is no basis to require them to arbitrate these claims. We affirm. ¶2 On October 6, 2006, Henry Woodall was admitted to a facility run by Avalon that provides skilled nursing care. At the time of his admission, Henry ¶3 Henry died on July 28, 2007. Clifford Woodall and Sharon Woodall King are the children of Henry and his sole heirs (collectively heirs). Clifford is the personal representative of Henry's estate. ¶4 Clifford, individually and as the representative of the estate, and Sharon King, individually, brought this action against Avalon under the wrongful death and survival statutes. They seek damages, attorney fees, and other relief. ¶5 Avalon moved to compel arbitration and to stay these court proceedings pending the outcome of the arbitration of all claims. The trial court ultimately granted Avalon's motion to compel arbitration in part and denied it in part. The court concluded that the survival claims should be resolved through the contractually agreed arbitration process. But the court also concluded that the arbitration agreement did not apply to the wrongful death claims of the heirs. The trial court expressed its reluctance to split the proceedings to resolve the survival and wrongful death claims, stating that litigation "in two separate forums is inefficient, unfair and exposes [all parties] to the inherent danger of conflicting outcomes based on the same set of intertwined facts." Nevertheless, the court concluded that case and statutory authorities required this result. ¶6 Avalon appeals. ARBITRABILITY OF WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS ¶7 Avalon argues that the arbitration agreement between Henry and Avalon binds the heirs to arbitrate their wrongful death claims against Avalon. We disagree. [1, 2] ¶8 Whether a person is bound by an agreement to arbitrate is a legal question that is to be determined by the courts. [3] ¶9 There are limited exceptions to the general rule that one who does not sign an arbitration agreement cannot be compelled to arbitrate. [4, 5] ¶10 Arbitrability is a question of law that we review de novo. ¶11 Here, the arbitration agreement that Henry and Avalon signed states: RESIDENT AND FACILITY ARBITRATION AGREEMENT (Not a Condition of Admission - Please Read Carefully) . . . . . . . We agree to submit to binding arbitration for all disputes and claims for damages of any kind for injuries and losses arising from the medical care rendered or which should have been rendered after the date of this Agreement. All alleged claims for monetary damages against the facility, its owners, lessees, management organization, or their employees, officers, directors, agents, must be arbitrated including, without limitation, claims for personal injury from alleged negligence, gross negligence, malpractice, or any alleged claims based on any departure from accepted medical or health care or safety standards, emotional distress or punitive damages. The agreement further provides: We expressly intend that this Agreement shall bind all persons whose alleged claims for injuries or losses arise out of care rendered by the Facility or which should have been rendered by Facility after the date of this Agreement, including any spouse, children, or heirs of the Resident or Executor of the Resident's estate. ¶12 It is undisputed that Henry and Avalon were the only persons who signed the arbitration agreement. The heirs did not. Thus, the legal question is whether the heirs are required to arbitrate their wrongful death claims against Avalon where they were not parties to the agreement to arbitrate. ¶13 We begin our analysis by considering our supreme court's recent observation in Satomi Owners Association v. Satomi, LLC ¶14 The court went on to identify "certain limited exceptions" to the general rule that a person who is not a party to an arbitration agreement may not be bound by such agreement. ¶15 Avalon does not rely on either the Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co. ¶16 Avalon relies on Clay v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. [6-9] ¶17 That federal case, based on California law, determined that the plaintiffs were bound to an arbitration provision they did not sign because they asserted claims on behalf of the decedent's estate, among other reasons. ¶18 We note also that Clay identifies a split of authority in California Court of Appeals cases over the question of binding persons who are not parties to an arbitration agreement to arbitrate claims: Plaintiffs correctly identify a split in the California Courts of Appeals regarding the applicability of binding arbitration provisions to non-signatory adult heirs. Two lines of cases may apply. The first follows Rhodes v. California Hospital Medical Center, 76 Cal. App. 3d 606, 143 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1978); the second follows Herbert v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 169 Cal. App. 3d 718, 215 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1985). Though Plaintiffs identify the split, they fail to provide any reason the Court should follow one line of cases over the other in this matter. ¶19 Because there is a split of authority within the California Court of Appeals on the question before us, Clay is not helpful in deciding this case. Moreover, the California Supreme Court has not, as of this writing, resolved this conflict within the lower appellate court. ¶20 Avalon does not identify any contract or agency principles that would bind the heirs to arbitrate based on the agreement between Avalon and Henry. Likewise, we are unaware of any such principles that would apply to this case. ¶21 Avalon also relies on Estate of Eckstein v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc. ¶22 But, as Woodall points out, other out-of-state authority can be read to support the conclusion that wrongful death claims are not subject to a decedent's arbitration agreement. In Lawrence v. Beverly Manor, ¶23 Similarly, in Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co., ¶24 Avalon also cites Townsend, a decision from this court. ¶25 Based on the above analysis, we conclude that Avalon has failed to establish that the heirs are bound to arbitrate their wrongful death claims against Avalon under any of the limited exceptions to the general rule that the Satomi court identified. Moreover, the conflicting authorities in other jurisdictions are not dispositive in deciding the arbitrability question under Washington law. ¶26 Avalon relies on another argument to urge that the heirs are bound to arbitrate under an agreement they did not sign. That argument is based on its characterization of the wrongful death claims as "derivative." ¶27 Examination of the nature of the claims asserted in this action is helpful in addressing this argument. Survival actions and wrongful death actions, though often brought together, are conceptually distinct. ¶28 In contrast, Washington's general survival statute, RCW 4.20.046(1), does not create a separate claim for the decedent's survivors, but merely preserves the causes of action a person could have maintained had he or she not died. ¶29 The trial court correctly applied these principles to this case. The court granted Avalon's motion to compel arbitration to the extent of the survival claims. These claims are an asset of Henry's estate. They originated as Henry's "existing causes of action" which survived his death and "continue[d] 'as an asset of his estate.' " ¶30 In addition, the court correctly denied the motion to the extent of the wrongful death claims asserted by the heirs against Avalon. These claims are exclusively for the benefit of the heirs. ¶31 The personal representative of Henry's estate is authorized to commence this action as the nominal party for the survival action. ¶32 Avalon claims that the heirs must arbitrate their claims because wrongful death claims are "derivative." The answer to this is simple. In Johnson v. Ottomeier, ¶33 Avalon relies heavily on Ginochio v. Hesston Corp. ¶34 Avalon cites three areas of law unrelated to the question of arbitrability of claims that is before us to support its position: that wrongful death claimants are bound by enforceable liability releases, that this court "treats uniquely wrongful death claims," and that the Industrial Insurance Act, Title 51 RCW, bars private claims by heirs and beneficiaries. None of these areas are helpful here. ¶35 Neither case Avalon cites on the issue of liability releases addresses the principles discussed in Satomi. ¶36 The case Avalon cites to show that Washington treats wrongful death claims "uniquely" was decided on a statutory basis not relevant here. ¶37 Finally, the bar on beneficiaries' claims under the Industrial Insurance Act is also entirely statutory.