[No. 36715-7-II. Division Two. November 18, 2008.]
Eric S. Nelson, City Attorney, for petitioner.
Eric J. Nielsen and David B. Koch (of Nielsen, Broman & Koch, PLLC), for respondent.
Authored by Elaine Houghton.
Concurring: J. Robin Hunt, David H. Armstrong.
¶1 HOUGHTON, J. -- The superior court reversed and remanded a municipal court finding that Francis Regan violated a condition of his probation. The city of Aberdeen (City) appeals, arguing that the superior court erred because it applied the wrong burden of proof. The City contends that revoking probation based on a violation of a "no criminal violations of the law" condition does not require a finding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt but instead requires evidence sufficient to reasonably satisfy the municipal court that Regan violated a probationary condition. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 55. We agree and reverse and remand.
FACTS
¶2 On January 13, 2005, the Aberdeen Municipal Court found Regan guilty of fourth degree assault, sentenced him to 365 days of jail with 360 days suspended, and placed him on probation for 24 months. As one of the conditions of his probation, Regan agreed to commit "no criminal violations of the law." CP at 55.
¶3 On April 28, 2006, the City charged Regan with fourth degree assault and criminal trespass. As a result of these new charges, the City petitioned the municipal court for a probation revocation hearing, which the court continued until after trial. At trial, a jury acquitted him of both criminal trespass and fourth degree assault.
¶4 At the probation revocation hearing, the municipal court revoked five days of Regan's suspended sentence. The judge, who had also presided at the criminal trial, ruled that although the jury found Regan not guilty using a beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the evidence supported "at least a criminal trespass violation." CP at 36. Regan appealed to the superior court.
¶5 The superior court agreed with the City "that an acquittal in a criminal proceeding does not preclude revocation of a suspended sentence." CP at 55. But the superior court reversed the municipal court, reasoning that Regan's probation conditions prohibited "'criminal violations of the law'" and, therefore, any violation must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. CP at 55.
¶6 We granted the City's motion for discretionary review.
ANALYSIS
[1] ¶7 The City contends that revocation of probation based on a violation of a "no criminal violations of the law" condition does not require a finding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [2, 3] ¶8 Courts allow probation not as a right, but as a rehabilitative measure "'granted to the deserving and withheld from the undeserving' within the sound discretion of the trial judge." State v. Kuhn, 81 Wn.2d 648, 650, 503 P.2d 1061 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Shannon, 60 Wn.2d 883, 888, 367 P.2d 646 (1962)). On review, we apply a de novo standard, sitting in the same position as the trial court with respect to this question of law. State v. Womac, 160 Wn.2d 643, 649, 160 P.3d 40 (2007). [4, 5] ¶9 Both parties rely on In re Habeas Corpus of Standlee, a habeas corpus case where the court reaffirmed the validity of the trial court's parole revocation even after the defendant's acquittal of underlying felony charges. 83 Wn.2d 405, 406-07, 518 P.2d 721 (1974). As the Standlee court explained, even when probation revocation hearings and criminal trials are premised on the same alleged violation, the two carry distinct burdens of proof, thereby precluding application of collateral estoppel and res judicata. ¶10 Here, the superior court determined that the probationary condition of "no criminal violations of the law" requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt because the condition contains the word "criminal." CP at 55. But Standlee dictates the opposite conclusion. ¶11 Our Supreme Court has spoken on this issue: Probation revocation hearings for criminal offenses are not subject to proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 83 Wn.2d at 408-09. Instead, such hearings require evidence sufficient to reasonably satisfy the court that the defendant violated a condition of probation. For these reasons, we reverse and remand. ARMSTRONG and HUNT, JJ., concur.