[No. 60401-5-I. Division One. September 2, 2008.]
Dana M. Lind (of Nielsen, Broman & Koch, PLLC), for appellant.
Daniel T. Satterberg, Prosecuting Attorney, and Heidi Jacobsen-Watts, Deputy, for respondent.
Written by: Ellington, J.
Concurred by: Becker, J.; Schindler, A.C.
¶1 ELLINGTON, J. -- The police may search a vehicle incident to the lawful arrest of a recent occupant when that person is in close temporal and spatial proximity to the vehicle at the time of the arrest. The arrestee may not preclude the search simply by locking the vehicle. In this case, Coryell Adams was arrested four to five feet from his car about one minute after being pulled over by a sheriff's deputy. Because the car remained in Adams' immediate control at the time of the arrest, the search of the vehicle was proper. We therefore affirm the court's decision to admit evidence discovered therein.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Shortly after midnight, King County Sheriff's Deputy Heather Volpe observed a man sitting in his parked car outside a casino on Aurora Avenue. Volpe checked the license plates and learned that an arrest warrant had been issued in Pierce County for the registered owner for driving with a revoked license. The driver matched the registered owner's description. Volpe turned around to initiate contact.
¶3 The driver quickly drove out of the parking lot onto Aurora. Volpe followed. Immediately and without signaling, the driver turned into a Taco Bell and parked. Volpe activated her emergency lights and pulled in about eight feet behind.
¶4 As Volpe got out of the patrol car, Adams stepped out of his vehicle, stood in the open swing of the driver's door and yelled at Volpe, challenging the stop as racial profiling. Volpe repeatedly instructed Adams to get back in his car, but he ignored the command and continued yelling. Volpe stayed in the doorway of her patrol car and called for another unit to assist.
¶5 Adams slammed the car door, locked it, and stepped four to five feet away into the adjacent parking spot, where he stood screaming at Volpe, raising his arms in an agitated manner and ignoring repeated commands to return to his vehicle.
¶6 After a second officer arrived, Adams complied with instructions to turn around. Volpe put him in handcuffs and asked him to identify himself. Adams refused. Volpe frisked Adams and removed his keys and wallet, confirming his identity as the registered owner of the vehicle. Volpe arrested Adams on the warrant and for failing to provide information ¶7 The other deputy took Adams' keys and unlocked his vehicle. Volpe searched the passenger compartment and found cocaine in a bag in the center console. Volpe arranged to impound the vehicle. ¶8 The State charged Adams with possession of cocaine. ¶9 Adams agreed to a stipulated bench trial and was convicted as charged. DISCUSSION [1, 2] ¶10 We will affirm a refusal to suppress evidence if substantial evidence supports the court's findings of fact, and those findings support the court's conclusions of law. [3-5] ¶11 A warrantless search is unreasonable per se and can be justified only if it falls within one of the "'jealously and carefully drawn'" exceptions to the warrant requirement. ¶12 The rationale for vehicle searches incident to arrest "rests in part on traditional justifications that a suspect might easily grab a weapon or destroy evidence." [6] ¶13 While the ability to search "does not depend on an arrestee being in the vehicle when police arrive," there must be "a close physical and temporal proximity between the arrest and the search." ¶14 How close the arrestee must be to the vehicle has been the subject of several cases. Division Two of this court addressed the question in State v. Porter ¶15 In Rathbun, the defendant saw police approaching and ran 40 to 60 feet away from the truck he was working on, hopping over a fence along the way. ¶16 Division Three of this court considered this question in State v. Quinlivan, ¶17 In two other cases where the defendant locked his car before he was arrested, whether the police needed a warrant turned on whether the defendant had locked the door before or after he was seized. ¶18 In State v. Perea, ¶19 In State v. O'Neill, ¶20 Division Three upheld this search and distinguished Perea on its facts, finding that unlike Perea, O'Neill was inside his vehicle when he was seized (when he submitted to the officer's authority by pulling over, providing information, and stepping from the vehicle at the officer's request). ¶21 Adams contends his case is like Perea and demands the same result. [7] ¶22 We question the usefulness of Perea for two reasons. First, the analysis focuses on the arrestee's proximity to the vehicle at the time of seizure, rather than at the time of arrest. But officer safety and evidence preservation concerns incident to arrest provide the rationale for the search. It is the circumstances at the time of arrest, not seizure, that are relevant. Further, the Perea court's analysis as to when Perea was seized derives from California v. Hodari D., [8, 9] ¶23 Adams acknowledges Perea's infirmity but nonetheless relies upon it to argue that warrantless searches of locked cars are inconsistent with Stroud's limitation on searching locked containers within a vehicle incident to arrest. ¶24 The rationale for the Stroud court's exclusion of locked containers was twofold. First, an individual shows an increased expectation of privacy by locking a container. Second, the danger that the individual could access a weapon or destroy evidence inside a locked container within a vehicle is minimized: "The individual would have to spend time unlocking the container, during which time the officers have an opportunity to prevent the individual's access to the contents of the container." ¶25 Adams contends locking the car doors minimizes the danger that the arrestee will gain access to a weapon or destructible evidence inside the car. We disagree. Whether using a mechanical key or a remote device, it takes only a second to unlock a car door (and, in many cases, one motion opens all doors at the same time). An arrestee could very swiftly gain access to any exposed weapon or evidence inside. This is not so when a locked container puts these items further out of reach. Further, the presence of a locked container inside a vehicle shows an increased expectation of privacy independent of the presence of police, whereas the act of locking a car when confronted by police has many connotations, of which privacy is only one. ¶26 We hold, therefore, that a vehicle locked in the presence of investigating officers is not equivalent to a locked container inside the vehicle. ¶27 Thus the only question here is whether Adams had "immediate control" or ready access to the passenger compartment of the car after he stepped away. We agree with the trial court that Adams was in close temporal and spatial proximity to his car when he was arrested. He was never more than four or five feet from his car, and was at all times closer to it than was the deputy. ¶28 Additionally, unlike the defendants in Porter, Rathbun, and Quinlivan, Adams did not move away from the car. He stood nearby, haranguing the deputy. He was agitated and belligerent, and refused to comply with repeated commands to return to his vehicle or turn around to be handcuffed and frisked. The officer feared for her safety and called for backup. This invokes the officer safety rationale, further distinguishing this case from any upon which Adams relies. ¶29 Adams was a recent occupant in immediate control of his car at the time of the arrest. The search was justified. ¶30 Affirmed. SCHINDLER, C.J., and BECKER, J., concur.