[No. 25403-8-III. Division Three. May 20, 2008.]
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of JORDAN DAVID KNIPPLING, Petitioner.
[1] Criminal Law — Punishment — Sentence — Reform Act — Construction — Sentencing Scheme as a Whole. The meaning of a provision of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (chapter 9.94A RCW) is determined by reading the provision in the context of the sentencing scheme as a whole.
[2] Criminal Law — Punishment — Sentence — Conditions — Community Placement — Community Custody — Commencement — Statutory Provisions. RCW 9.94A.715(1), not RCW 9.94A.625(3), governs when a term of community custody begins. Under RCW 9.94A.715(1), an offender's term of community custody begins either (1) upon the offender's completion of the term of confinement or (2) at such time as the offender is transferred to community custody in lieu of early release. RCW 9.94A.625(3) addresses the tolling of a term of community custody and applies only after the term of community custody has commenced.
[3] Criminal Law — Punishment — Sentence — Conditions — Community Placement — Community Custody — Credit for Confinement Beyond Term of Confinement. Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (chapter 9.94A RCW), a convicted offender sentenced to a term of confinement and to a term of community custody who is not actually released from confinement until some time after completing the term of confinement is entitled to credit against the term of community custody for the additional period of confinement.
SWEENEY, J., dissents by separate opinion.
Nature of Action: An offender whose exceptional sentence was reduced to a standard range sentence following an appeal but who had been incarcerated for a greater period of time than called for by the standard range sentence by the time he was resentenced sought relief from personal restraint on a claim that he was entitled to a credit against his term of community custody for the period of time he remained incarcerated beyond his standard range sentence.
Court of Appeals: Holding that the offender's term of community custody began at the completion of his term of confinement and that he was entitled to credit against his term of community custody for the period he remained incarcerated beyond the end of his term of confinement, the court grants the petition.
Janet G. Gemberling- and Julia A. Dooris- (of Gemberling & Dooris, PS), for petitioner.
Steven J. Tucker-, Prosecuting Attorney, and Mark E. Lindsey-, Deputy, for respondent.
¶1 STEPHENS, J. FACTS ¶2 In Mr. Knippling's direct appeal of his convictions, this court affirmed the convictions but remanded for resentencing consistent with Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004). State v. Knippling, noted at 126 Wn. App. 1045 (2005), review denied, 156 Wn.2d 1011 (2006). On remand, the superior court sentenced Mr. Knippling to concurrent standard range sentences, the longest being 17 months. Since he had already served 41 months of the original exceptional sentence, he was released immediately to community custody. ANALYSIS ¶3 Mr. Knippling contends that he should be given credit against his 18 to 36 months of community custody for the extra 24 months he was incarcerated beyond his standard range sentence. The State counters that RCW 9.94A.625(3) disallows such credit. RCW 9.94A.625(3) provides that "[a]ny period of community custody . . . shall be tolled during any period of time the offender is in confinement for any reason." This provision contains only one exception—persons who serve time after they are arrested for an alleged community custody violation are entitled to credit for that time if the alleged violation is ultimately determined in their favor. ¶5 Our interpretation of RCW 9.94A.715(1) is consistent with RCW 9.94A.625(3). The latter statute deals with tolling of the term of community custody after the term of community custody has started. It provides that the community custody term does not run during time in confinement for new crimes or for community custody violations. In contrast, RCW 9.94A.715(1) addresses the point in time at which the term of community custody begins. And, the statute is clear that the term of community custody begins when the offender completes his confinement time. CONCLUSION ¶6 Mr. Knippling completed his term of confinement 24 months before he was actually released, at which time his community custody term commenced. Following his release, Mr. Knippling had only 12 months of his term of community custody to serve. Accordingly, we grant his personal restraint petition. SCHULTHEIS, C.J, concurs. ¶7 SWEENEY, J. (dissenting) — First, " '[c]ommunity custody' means that portion of an offender's sentence . . . served in the community subject to controls placed on the offender's movement and activities by the department." RCW 9.94A.030(5) (emphasis added). The term community custody then clearly contemplates time spent in the community. Jordan Knippling was not in the community. He wants community custody credit for the additional time he spent in prison. ¶8 Next, and unfortunately for Mr. Knippling, "[a]ny period of community custody . . . shall be tolled during any period of time the offender is in confinement for any reason." RCW 9.94A.625(3) (emphasis added). That means, for me, a period of community custody is not tolled even when a person serves more time than he should for a conviction. The idea expressed by the legislature here is continued control for a period of time after a defendant is released from prison. ¶9 Mr. Knippling has not served the time he wants credit for "in the community" because he was "in confinement for any reason." RCW 9.94A.030(5), .625(3). RCW 9.94A.625(3) is controlling. His term of community custody began only when the State released him from confinement into the community. I would therefore deny his personal restraint petition.