[No. 24076-2-III. Division Three. November 6, 2007.]
[1] Open Government — Public Disclosure — Enjoining Release — Pleadings — Sufficiency — Issue Raised in Appeal by Party Denied Intervention. A party appealing the denial of a motion to intervene in an action to enjoin the release of public records that the party is seeking by way of a public disclosure request may, on appeal, challenge the sufficiency of the plaintiff's pleadings in the injunction action. [2] Trial — Special Proceeding — Civil Rule — Applicability. Under CR 81(a), the Superior Court Civil Rules do not apply in a special proceeding if they are inconsistent with rules or statutes expressly governing the special proceeding. [3] Open Government — Public Disclosure — Enjoining Release — Procedural Rules — Nature of Proceeding. For purposes of CR 81(a), which provides that the Superior Court Civil Rules govern all civil proceedings "[e]xcept where inconsistent with rules or statutes applicable to special proceedings," an action to enjoin the release of a public record under RCW 42.56.540 is a "special proceeding." [4] Open Government — Public Disclosure — Enjoining Release — Personal Information — Pro Se Action — Address on Pleading — Necessity. In a pro se action under RCW 42.56.540 to enjoin a government agency from releasing personal information about public employees, including their personal addresses, the pro se plaintiff is not required to comply with the CR 11(a) requirement that pro se pleadings state the party's address. [5] Pleading — Parties — Pro Se Plaintiffs — Technical Deficiency in Signing of Pleadings — Combining Signatures on Complaints — Validity. Any CR 11 technical deficiencies in the signing of multiple pleadings by several pro se plaintiffs may be cured by combining the signatures on the pleadings if no objection is raised by the defendants. [6] Civil Procedure — Substance or Form — In General. Court rules governing civil procedure should be applied in a manner that allows substance to prevail over form. [7] Parties — Intervention — Matter of Right — Review — Standard of Review. A trial court's ruling on a CR 24(a) motion to intervene as a matter of right is reviewed de novo. [8] Parties — Intervention — Matter of Right — Timeliness — Review — Standard of Review. A trial court's ruling that a CR 24(a) motion to intervene is untimely is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Discretion is abused if it is exercised without tenable grounds or reasons. [9] Parties — Intervention — Timeliness — After Judgment — Factors. A trial court's ruling on a postjudgment CR 24(a) motion to intervene must take into consideration all of the surrounding circumstances, such as what opportunity the movant had to identify the threatened interest, the reasons for the delay, and any adverse impact of delayed intervention. A strong showing must be made by the movant to warrant intervention after judgment has been rendered. [10] Open Government — Public Disclosure — Enjoining Release — Parties — Intervention — Timeliness — After Protective Order Issued. A motion to intervene in an action to enjoin the disclosure of public records made after the trial court has issued an injunction in the case is properly denied by the trial court if the party had sufficient notice of the action to have sought intervention sooner. [11] Parties — Joinder — Indispensable Parties — Review — Preservation for Review. A party's claim to be an indispensable party is preserved for review if joinder is mentioned in the caption of the party's motion to intervene and CR 19 is cited in the party's reply memorandum. [12] Parties — Joinder — Indispensable Parties — Determination — Test. Under CR 19(a), a trial court undertakes a two-part analysis to determine whether a party is indispensable. First, the trial court must determine whether the party is needed for a just adjudication, and second, the court must determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it. [13] Open Government — Public Disclosure — Enjoining Release — Parties — Joinder — Indispensable Party — Party Requesting Disclosure. A party requesting the disclosure of a public record is not an indispensable party to an action for an injunction against disclosure under RCW 42.56.540 inasmuch as the burden lies with the plaintiff to overcome the presumption that disclosure should be made and the requesting party's interest is readily apparent to the trial court. Nature of Action: Several Department of Corrections employees sought a protective order to enjoin the release of personal information sought by an inmate in a public disclosure request. Superior Court: The Superior Court for Walla Walla County, No. 05-2-00075-0, Robert L. Zagelow, J., on March 16, 2005, entered a judgment enjoining the release of the requested information. Court of Appeals: Holding that the plaintiffs' pleadings were sufficient, that the inmate's motion to intervene was untimely, and that joinder of the inmate in the action as an indispensable party was not required, the court affirms the judgment. Eric Burt, Clifford Pease-, John Moor-, Gary Edwards-, Richard Morgan-, David Snell-, Paul-David Winters-, Dustin West-, Cheri Sterlin-, Joann Irwin-, Laura Coleman-, Charles Crow-, Sherry Hartford-, Alan Walter-, and Harold Snively-, pro se. Michael C. Kahrs-, (of Kahrs Law Firm, PS), for appellant. Robert M. McKenna-, Attorney General, and Peter W. Berney-, Assistant, for respondent Department of Corrections. ¶1 BROWN, J. — This dispute arose in 2004 under former RCW 42.17.330 (2006) of the public disclosure act (PDA), now RCW 42.56.540 of the public records act (PRA). LAWS OF 2005, ch. 274, § 103. Washington State Penitentiary (WSP) inmate Allan Parmelee requested disclosure of personal information for a number of Department of Corrections (DOC) employees at WSP. The employees successfully enjoined disclosure under RCW 42.17.330 in the Walla Walla Superior Court. On appeal, Mr. Parmelee contends civil rule violations invalidate the injunction and the trial court erred in denying his request to intervene or be joined as an indispensable party. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. FACTS ¶2 On October 6, 2004, WSP intensive management unit inmate Parmelee was charged with violating WSP disciplinary rules for threatening and intimidating a staff member. The next day, Mr. Parmelee sent a letter to Megan Murray, DOC's public disclosure coordinator, requesting personal information on a number of WSP workers. ¶3 On December 5, 2004, Mr. Parmelee was again charged with intimidating staff members based on a letter to a friend requesting home addresses "on a couple pigs here" and commenting, "we need to find a couple big ugly dudes to come to Walla Walla for some late night service on these punks." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 101. ¶4 On December 22, 2004, Ms. Murray informed Mr. Parmelee the affected employees would be requesting injunctive relief and that DOC would not release the requested documents "until a hearing date is scheduled and a decision is made by [the] Walla Walla Superior Court." CP at 500. ¶5 On January 26, 2005, 11 pro se employees sued DOC in the Walla Walla Superior Court, asking for a protective order. The complaint contained 11 signatures without any addresses. That day, Alan Walter, as the plaintiffs' representative, moved for a protective order in a pleading without an address. Four more plaintiffs were added by an amended complaint, again without providing any address for the plaintiffs. ¶6 On February 1, 2005, Ms. Murray informed Mr. Parmelee of the superior court hearing date on the protective order and that she would let him know soon after whether DOC would be releasing the requested information. On March 16, the court granted the motion to enjoin release of the requested information. Pro se, Mr. Parmelee requested intervention, joinder as an indispensable party, and reconsideration without providing legal argument regarding whether he was an indispensable party in his opening pleadings. Mr. Parmelee briefly discussed joinder in his response to DOC's briefing. ¶7 The trial court decided Mr. Parmelee's motion to intervene was untimely and reasoned all other motions and requests were moot. Mr. Parmelee appealed. ANALYSIS A. Sufficiency of Pleadings ¶8 The issue is whether under our civil rules of procedure the pleadings were reversibly deficient. Mr. Parmelee contends the employees' failure to provide an address in their pleadings, sign the amended complaint, and their failure to all sign the motion for protective order constitutes reversible error. We disagree. ¶10 Under the PDA and PRA, if an agency intends to disclose records to a requester, an interested third party may object and seek judicial intervention to prevent disclosure. RCW 42.56.540 (formerly RCW 42.17.330); Spokane Police Guild v. Liquor Control Bd., 112 Wn.2d 30, 34-35, 769 P.2d 283 (1989). Here, the employees sought judicial intervention pro se without providing addresses on the pleadings. B. Intervention and Joinder as Indispensable Party ¶13 The issue is whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. Parmelee's intervention and indispensable party motions. ¶20 In sum, the trial court did not err. Mr. Parmelee requests attorney fees and costs under RCW 42.56.550(4). Since Mr. Parmelee has not prevailed, his request is denied. ¶21 Affirmed. SCHULTHEIS, A.C.J., and KULIK, J., concur.