[No. 57899-5-I. Division One. June 4, 2007.]
[1] Appeal Review Documentary Evidence Standard of Review. A record of trial court proceedings that consists entirely of written materials is reviewed de novo. [2] Statutes Construction Review Standard of Review. Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. [3] Appeal Decisions Reviewable Moot Questions What Constitutes. A case is not technically moot so long as the court can provide the basic relief originally sought or can provide effective relief. [4] Landlord and Tenant Unlawful Detainer Possession of Premises Tenant's Lack of Possession Mootness Right of Possession Monetary Stake in Outcome. An unlawful detainer action under chapter 59.12 RCW is not moot simply because the tenant does not have possession of the premises at the time of appeal. A tenant's relinquishment of the premises does not necessarily mean that the right of possession is undisputed. When an unlawful detainer action is commenced and the tenant does not concede the right of possession and has a monetary stake in the outcome of the case, the tenant has a right to have the issue determined. [5] Process Summons Purpose. The purpose of a summons is to give the defendant notice of the action, the time prescribed by law to answer, and the consequences of failing to do so. [6] Landlord and Tenant Unlawful Detainer Notice Statutory Provisions Compliance Jurisdictional Prerequisite. A summons in an unlawful detainer action must comply with RCW 59.18.365 to confer both personal and subject matter jurisdiction. [7] Landlord and Tenant Unlawful Detainer Statutory Provisions Construction In Favor of Tenant. The statutes governing unlawful detainer actions (chapter 59.12 RCW, chapter 59.18 RCW, and RCW 59.18.365-.410) are in derogation of the common law and are strictly construed in favor of the tenant. [8] Statutes Construction Considered as a Whole Meaning to All Words. A statute is construed as a whole, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous. [9] Landlord and Tenant Unlawful Detainer Minimal Level of Protection for Tenant Necessity. In unlawful detainer actions, justice requires the courts to provide tenants with a minimal level of protection. [10] Landlord and Tenant Unlawful Detainer Notice Summons Notice of Statutory Response Methods Jurisdiction. A superior court does not obtain subject matter jurisdiction over an unlawful detainer action if the unlawful detainer summons does not apprise the tenant of all of the acceptable methods of response set forth in RCW 59.18.365. Notifying the tenant of all of the statutory methods of response is a "time and manner" requirement for which strict compliance is required. [11] Costs Attorney Fees Contractual Right On Appeal Inclusion of Contract in Record Necessity. A contractual attorney fee clause will not support an award of attorney fees on appeal if the party requesting the fees fails to move to have a copy of the contract included in the appellate record. [12] Courts Jurisdiction Absence Effect. A judgment entered by a trial court lacking jurisdiction over the matter must be vacated. Nature of Action: Action by a residential landlord against a tenant for unlawful detainer. The summons stated that the tenant could respond by personally delivering her answer or notice of appearance to the landlord's attorney. The summons failed to inform the tenant that she could respond by mail or facsimile, as permitted by statute. Superior Court: The Superior Court for Snohomish County, No. 06-2-06132-1, Tracy G. Waggoner, J. Pro Tem., on February 9, 2006, entered a judgment in favor of the landlord, awarding damages for unpaid rent, a writ of restitution directing the sheriff to evict the tenant, and attorney fees. Court of Appeals: Holding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer action because the landlord's summons did not properly inform the tenant of the statutorily acceptable methods of response, the court vacates the judgment and remands the case for dismissal of the action. Scott R. Peterson- and Gerald F. Robison-, for appellant. Michael S. Cullen-, for respondent. Ά1 AGID, J. Ty Truly brought a residential unlawful detainer action against his tenant, Carmen Heuft, for nonpayment of rent. His summons stated that Heuft could respond by personally delivering her answer or notice of appearance to his attorney. His summons did not comply with recent amendments to RCW 59.18.365, which allow tenants to respond by mail or facsimile and include a sample summons form listing a tenant's options for responding. Compliance with RCW 59.18.365 is jurisdictional. Although courts have allowed substantial compliance with "form and content" requirements, we hold that making the tenant aware of the ways in which she can answer is a "time and manner" requirement with which courts require strict compliance. And, under the rules of statutory interpretation, allowing a summons to erroneously state that only personal delivery of an answer is acceptable would render the amendment to RCW 59.18.365(1) superfluous. Finally, because courts must strictly construe the unlawful detainer statute in favor of the tenant, we vacate the judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. FACTS Ά2 Heuft rented residential premises from Truly. Heuft paid only part of her rent in November 2005 and did not pay any rent in December 2005 or January 2006. On January 10, 2006, Truly gave Heuft statutory notice requiring her to pay rent or vacate. Heuft neither paid nor vacated. On January 17, 2006, Truly had Heuft personally served with the summons and complaint. The language of the summons complied with former RCW 59.18.365 (1989) DISCUSSION I. Mootness Ά5 In contrast, Truly relies on our holding in Josephinium Associates v. Kahli that an unlawful detainer action was moot because the tenant vacated the apartment. Ά6 Here, Heuft argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant a writ of restitution depriving her of possession and a monetary judgment against her for unpaid rent. Because her right to possession is at issue and she still has a monetary stake in the outcome of this case, we hold her appeal is not moot. II. Sufficiency of Summons To Confer Jurisdiction Ά7 This case presents an issue of first impression: whether a court has jurisdiction to enter judgment in a residential unlawful detainer action when the plaintiff-landlord fails to use RCW 59.18.365's recently amended statutory summons language allowing a defendant-tenant to answer not only by personal delivery but also by mail or facsimile. You can respond to the complaint in writing by delivering a copy of a notice of appearance or answer to your landlord's attorney (or your landlord if there is no attorney) by personal delivery, mailing or facsimile to the address or facsimile number stated below TO BE RECEIVED NO LATER THAN THE DEADLINE STATED ABOVE. Service by facsimile is complete upon successful transmission to the facsimile number, if any, listed in the summons. Ά9 Here, the summons Truly used did not tell Heuft that she could answer by any method other than personal delivery, even though it included Truly's attorney's facsimile number. Instead, it read: YOU CAN RESPOND to the complaint in writing by delivering a copy of a notice of appearance or answer to your landlord's attorney to be received no later than the deadline stated above. If we strictly construe RCW 59.18.365, Truly's failure to comply with the statutory summons language deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction over this residential unlawful detainer action. Ά10 But Truly contends that his summons was sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction because, despite having left out the tenant's alternative methods of responding to the complaint, it substantially complied with RCW 59.18.365. Truly relies on our holding in Sprincin King Street Partners v. Sound Conditioning Club, Inc. that a summons in an unlawful detainer action need only substantially comply with statutory requirements, meaning it must provide notice with "such particularity and certainty as not to deceive or mislead." Although the description of damages was slightly misleadingbecause it limited itself to fair market value of unpaid rentthat misstatement is not so vital as to deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. . . . Ά11 Our holding in that commercial unlawful detainer case is in tension with the Washington Supreme Court's holding in Housing Authority v. Terry that a landlord must strictly comply with the notice provisions of the residential unlawful detainer statute in order to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court. Ά12 Sprincin is distinguishable from both Terry and this case because it involves a "form and content" requirement. A footnote in Marsh-McLennan Building, Inc. v. Clapp explains that, before Terry, unlawful detainer cases often distinguished between "time and manner" requirements, with which a summons had to strictly comply, and "form and content" requirements, for which substantial compliance was sufficient. "[W]e have never adopted the strictest rule of construction as to the form or contents of such notices under our unlawful detainer statutes, chiefly for the reason, doubtless, that the statutes prescribe no form." But the current residential unlawful detainer statute does provide a form for a summons, and that form includes language giving the tenant the option to answer by mail or facsimile. Ά13 Here, the tenant's method of answering, although susceptible of falling into both categories, appears more appropriately to be considered a "manner" requirement. Our previous holdings support the conclusion that "manner" refers not only to how a landlord serves the tenant, but also to how the tenant responds. We have required that landlords correctly inform tenants of how much time they have to pay or vacate before an unlawful detainer complaint is filed Ά14 Further, when interpreting a statute, we must consider the statute as a whole and avoid rendering any section meaningless or superfluous. Ά15 Finally, we have stated that "justice requires the court to provide tenants with a minimal level of protection." III. Attorney Fees CONCLUSION APPELWICK, C.J., and SCHINDLER, J., concur.